The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, Units, and Actions.

• Author: Boussel, Pierre

Irregular warfare--a deliberately asymmetric approach to the enemy to surprise and destabilize (1)--is not just a tactic in Iranian military doctrine; it is also an established operational model of the "Islamic Revolution." The day after taking power, the regime set up a "headquarters for irregular warfare," (2) which it used against its enemy then, Iraq. From the start, the aim was to have a force on the fringes of a conventional force, offering a wide range of interventions: combat, intelligence, special operations, and soft power, among others.

The IRGC (3) was born out of the desire to protect the gains of the Islamic Revolution (4) against internal and external enemies and to export the ideology of the regime, whatever the means and modus operandi. Mostly confined, in terms of external operations, to southern Lebanon and a few operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (5) in the years following its establishment after the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran, (6) it became, during the Syrian civil war, a textbook case illustrating Iran's expansionist strategy.

To understand the IRGC is to understand the deeper realities of the regime. Before being killed in a U.S. strike, the then Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani declared in 2018: "The IRGC has a structure, statutes, rules and regulations, but in reality [it is] an intellectual system" (7) in which every action is sacred. The aim of Soleimani was summarized as: "to create opportunities out of dark crises." (8) This phrase exemplified the modus operandi of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operating in the Syrian theater. It used the Syrian crisis to create opportunities for itself.

Tehran's axes of intervention in Syria are: 1) To protect the Shi'a minorities in Syria; 2) to create a corridor to the shores of the Mediterranean by eliminating the American presence; and 3) to create the conditions for an encirclement maneuver of the Israeli state if necessary, pre-positioning men and military equipment on the outskirts of the Golan Heights without opening fire on Israeli positions. (9) There is no time limit on any of the objectives. It is not a question of conquering an area and then withdrawing as soon as peace is signed. The Quds Force wants to establish Pax Irania in Syria and in all the countries of the "Axis of Resistance." (a) The aim is to create a transnational peace that transcends flags and borders, a space of shared theological values and strategic cohesion where Tehran, as the epicenter of the edifice, is the guarantor of everyone's security.

After supplying law enforcement equipment to Damascus in 2011 (10) and training officers in the management of pre-insurgency situations, (11) the Quds Force quickly moved on to its core business: establishing militias (12) tasked with spreading the message of the "Islamic Revolution" among the civilian population. (13) An Iranian major general close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has estimated that the IRGC has created 82 fighting units in Syria since the beginning of its intervention, amounting to some 70,000 armed men. (b)

The first part of this article focuses on the human organization of the Quds Force, from the rank-and-file to the senior officers who plan the Iranian presence in Syria. It then distinguishes between the Force's units and locally created militias. It takes a close look at recruitment operations, the nature of military confrontations, infiltration attempts, and soft-power work aimed at increasing Tehran's influence in Syria. Before offering concluding observations, particular attention is paid to the failure of Iranian intelligence, which, by dint of proselytizing, forgets to be discreet.

This article is largely based on Iranian and Arab sources that reflect either the positions of governments or opposition movements operating in the region. The daily reading and study of sources likely to have biases and agendas is cross-referenced with factual events reported by Western sources and analyses, which, depending on the vector and country of origin, may also be biased. Cross-referencing these sources provides a mine of knowledge. The exaggerations of certain sources conceal weaknesses. Silence reveals embarrassment. Shameless lies reveal the dynamics of propaganda. The paradox is that some sources are more interesting in their silence than they are in their content. This article is mainly based on open-source information. The author has been closely following the activities of the Quds Force in Syria for over 10 years. This tracking is cited when the author is not aware of relevant open-source information. The protection of human sources on this extremely sensitive issue imposes a duty of care on those who take the risk of providing foreign analysts with information about the IRGC's actions.

The staff of the Quds Force has the peculiarity of being open and official at the top and utterly secretive when it comes to the men on the ground, the real linchpins of Tehran's policy in Syria. The identification of the actors of the Iranian presence in Syria in this article is based on Iranian sources, both pro-government and political opposition.

Leaders and Combatants

Quds is one of the four units that make up the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), along with the ground, air, and naval forces. A recruitment website in Iran explains that its mission is to "organize Islamic movements," raise funds, and oversee external relations. (14) Young recruits undergo nine to 12 months of training at the Mashhad center in northeast Iran, known by the code name 4000, or at the Ben Ali barracks (code name 320). (15) Ideological and theological training is provided at the Imam Hossein University in Tehran (District Babaei Hwy).

At the top of the Quds organization is a cenacle of staff officers. Each zone of intervention (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon) is headed by a commander. The position gives access to the Council, a forum of exchange and consultation, who reports on their specific activities in Syria to General Esmail Qaani, head of the Quds Force. (16)

Commander Khalil Zahedi, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi, is currently the linchpin of the Iranian presence in Syria. There is no photograph or official biography of him. Nor is there any evidence that the Iranians are communicating the identity of this man, who is apparently in the sights of Israeli and American special forces. (17)

Commander Zahedi's prerogatives are many and varied. He manages subordinates assigned to geographical areas, such as Commander Hajj Kumait, responsible for eastern Syria (Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah, Raqqa, and Badia). (18) He has solved logistical problems concerning ammunition stocks and fuel by receiving emissaries from Behnam Shahriyari, identified by the United States as the head of an oil smuggling network. (19) Lower-ranking Iranian officers deployed on the ground organize the purchase of Syrian houses, apartments, shops, and farmland, which they then provide to pro-Iranian fighters. (20)

Commander Zahedi has to ensure that the field visits of his superior, General Qaani, go smoothly--for example, when the latter came to oversee the distribution of humanitarian aid to the victims of the February 6, 2023, earthquake. (21) Zahedi is also responsible for the maintenance of Shi'a places of worship and the security of religious festivals and recreational activities. For example, he oversaw the inauguration of a school for children to learn to speak Persian (22) and ensured that a mosque in the al-Tamou district of al-Mayadeen, which had been converted into an IRGC command post, could be used as a hall for religious ceremonies. (23)

If General Qassem Soleimani, killed in early 2020, still embodies the mission of the Quds Force in Syria in the Iranian imagination, other lesser-known officers have played important roles, albeit less high-profile, but still leaving an operational footprint. (24) One example is General Hossein Hamdani (25) who formed the first militias to support President Bashar al-Assad during the worst of the Syrian civil war, when gunfire could be heard in the corridors of the presidential palace. Inspired by the Basiji model, (c) Hamdani organized the embedding of fighters in civil society--by having them sleep in people's homes rather than in barracks, for example--to create a human link with the civilian population. (26)

Two other generals contributed greatly to the internationalization of the force: Mohammad Hijazi, who had long worked with Hezbollah and whose connections were very useful in coordinating the arrival of Lebanese fighters, and Esmail Qaani, (27) the current head of the Quds Force and an expert on Afghanistan and its Shi'a minorities (Hazaras), from which came the powerful Liwa Fatemiyoun group (28) operating in Syria. (29)

The article's appendix contains an organizational chart of the principal Iranian officials and officers currently involved in the Syrian file based on the author's tracking of the Iranian presence in Syria since 2011.

General Hossein Salami, commander-in-chief of the IRGC, recently gave an update on his forces' involvement in Syria. He put forward three key ideas that he said should guide Iran's strategy in Syria. (30)

* The fight against the West requires "one or two intermediate grounds" to fight on; by which he means Syria. The notion that Tehran's security begins in Damascus is an old one in Iran.

* The IRGC is to play "a decisive role in Iranian deterrence" in the Middle East. The Quds Force is an asymmetric force. No state or army has been able to defeat it or roll it back.

* The IRGC forces are "transformational." They do not exist in a static reality. They are constantly evolving.

Units and Militias

The Quds Force is made up of units operating in particular in the Syrian theater. They operate in complete secrecy and are never mentioned in official media from the authorities in Tehran. (d) Thanks to Syrian opposition sources, the presence of some...