The politics of correctional privatization in the United States

• Author: Brett C. Burkhardt
• Date: 01 May 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12431
• Published date: 01 May 2019

DOI: 10.1111/1745-9133.12431

RESEARCH ARTICLE

CORRECTIONAL PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The politics of correctional privatization in the

United States

Brett C. Burkhardt

Oregon State University

Correspondence

BrettC. Burkhardt, School of Public Policy,

OregonState University, 400 Bexell Hall,

Corvallis,OR 97331.

Email:brett.burkhardt@oregonstate.edu

Research Summary: Private correctional firms are politi-

cal actors. They work to create favorable conditions to mar-

ket their services. At the same time, they are constrained by

external political forces, including political parties, social

movements, and public opinion. In this article, I review

what we know about the reciprocal relationship betweent he

private corrections industry and politics.

Policy Implications: Through my review of extant

research, I discover several implications for practitioners

and policy makers. First, correctional privatization is not

uniformly accepted, a fact that presents challenges for the

industry and opportunities for critics. Second, punitive poli-

cies that seem beneficial to industry (particularly those

related to tough immigration policy) may in fact pose

real reputational risks. Third, new forms of privatization—

namely, social impact bonds—may prove more tolerable to

the general public. Finally, consideration of political activ-

ity by private industry should not distract from political

activity by public-sector actors (e.g., prison guard unions).

KEYWORDS

immigration, politics, private prisons, privatization, public policy

In the United States, private corrections is a multifaceted, multibillion-dollar market. In this market,

government authorities at all levels—federal, state, and local—contract with private firms, which per-

form a variety of correctional duties: incarceration, supervision, drug testing, electronic monitoring,

counseling, immigrant detention, prisoner transportation, and more. Privatization of criminal justice

functions is not new—there are historical precursors in the United States and elsewhere (Feeley,2002;

Hallett, 2006). But what is perhaps unique about the present era is that a market has sprung up to

address a set of services that is so central to governance. In an era of mass imprisonment (and mass

Criminology & Public Policy. 2019;18:401–418. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/capp © 2019 American Society of Criminology 401

402 BURKHARDT

probation), the administration of criminal justice has come to take on a significant share of what it

means to govern (Soss & Weaver, 2017; Weaver, Hacker, & Wildeman, 2013).

The modern private corrections industry began to take form in the 1980s in an era of economic

conservatism and expanded criminal justice punishment. In the early years of the industry, many com-

panies vied for a limited number of contracts. Today, the industry is dominated by two firms: GEO

Group (formerly Wackenhut Corrections Corporation) and CoreCivic (previously Corrections Corpo-

ration of America, or CCA).1These companies have moved beyond their early role of jailers for hire,

and they now deliver a variety of services to individuals involved in the criminal justice (and immigra-

tion) system on behalf of governments in the United States and beyond.

As with all markets, politics matter in the modern private corrections market. The private companies

are political actors. They seek to influence legislation, regulation, and public opinion, all of which have

implications for the firms’ financial success. At the same time, political parties, social movements, and

other interested groups shape the contours of the correctional marketplace and corrections generally.

Therefore, in this article, I conceive of the public political sphere and the private corrections industry

as engaging in a dynamic, reciprocal process of influence.

The article is structured as follows. In the first section, I consider how politics influence correctional

privatization, looking at the role of party politics, public opinion, and social movements. In the sec-

ond section, I examine how the private corrections industry affects politics through several channels:

campaign contributions, lobbying, and ties to government officials. Although in these two sections I

present politics as a cause and an effect of industry success, respectively,t hese relationships should be

thought of as being part of a reciprocal system. In the third section, I describe several gaps in existing

knowledge of the politics of correctional privatization. In the fourth section, I identify the implications

for the policy and practice of correctional privatization. Throughout the article, my focus is on private

prisons, with consideration of related private domains as appropriate.

1POLITICS INFLUENCE PRIVATIZATION

Politics permeate punishment (Campbell & Schoenfeld, 2013; Gottschalk, 2015; Jacobs & Jackson,

2010). This fact is no less true when it comes to privatized forms of punishment. Party politics, public

opinion, and social movements all influence the fortunes of the private corrections industry.

1.1 Parties and politicians

At present, prison privatization is an issue that divides Democrats and Republicans. This was apparent

in the 2016 presidential election season. The two major Democratic contenders, Bernie Sanders and

Hillary Clinton, both took public stances opposing the practice. Sanders called private prisons “dis-

graceful” and “morally repugnant,” and he introduced a (failed) Senate bill that would require that

prisons be run by the government (Jackson, 2015). Clinton endorsed the Obama administration’sm ove

(in August, 2016) to phase out private prison contracts in the Bureau of Prisons (Monica, 2016). By the

fall of 2015, both Sanders and Clinton had announced they would no longeraccept campaign donations

from the private prison industry (Eisen, 2018). The main Republican contender and eventual victor,

Donald Trump, took a different stance during the campaign: “I do think we can do a lot of privatiza-

tions and private prisons. It seems to work a lot better” (Mark, 2016). He and his allied political action

committees received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the industry (Eisen, 2018).

Yett he findings from quantitativeanalyses of state-level prison privatization have generally failed to

reveal a relationship between party control of government and prison privatization (Burkhardt, 2017;