The Policy‐to‐Perceptions Link in Deterrence

• Author: Thomas A. Loughran,Greg Pogarsky
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12241
• Date: 01 August 2016
• Published date: 01 August 2016

POLICY ESSAY

DIRECTIONS IN DETERRENCE THEORY

AND POLICY

The Policy-to-Perceptions Link

in Deterrence

Time to Retire the Clearance Rate

Greg Pogarsky

University at Albany, SUNY

Thomas A. Loughran

University of Maryland

In “Arrested Development: Misguided Directions in Deterrence Theory and Policy,”

Pickett and Roche (2016: 727–751; hereafter “PR”) critique two aspects of “Deter-

rence, Criminal Opportunities and Police,”by Nagin, Solow, and Lum(2015; hereafter

“NSL”). First, PR challenge NSL’s skepticism of several studies reporting that the ratio of

arrests to known crimes in a county, the “clearance rate,” is uncorrelated with perceptions

of sanction risk among residents in that county (see Kleck and Barnes, 2013, 2014; Kleck,

Sever, Li, and Gertz, 2005; Lochner, 2007). PR assert that these null findings have “im-

portant implications” for deterrence discourse and that skepticism about their utility is

misplaced. In contrast, NSL, as well as Apel and Nagin in other studies, consider the lack

of correlation between clearance rates and risk perceptions uninformative about perceptual

formation and offender decision making (see Apel, 2013; Apel and Nagin, 2011; Nagin,

2013a, 2013b). Second, PR continue, because NSL do not give due regard to these null

findings, the “plausibility of NSL’s theory is called into question.”

Other essayists in this series (one in particular) are far better suited than us to

clarify NSL’s (2015) theory and refute PR’s (2016) challenges to it. Instead, we take this

opportunity to provide commentary along with theoretical support for something we have

long believed: The clearance rate is uninformative in deterrence research. Some of the

many reasons we believe this date back to 1970 and predate its present application to

the policy-to-perception link. Other, newer ideas we import from behavioral economics,

We are grateful to Ray Paternoster, Charles Wellford, Kyle Thomas, and Daniel Nagin for helpful feedback on

earlier drafts. Direct correspondence to Greg Pogarsky, School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, SUNY,

135 Western Avenue, Albany, NY 12222 (e-mail: gpogarsky@albany.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12241 C2016 American Society of Criminology 777

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 3