The Islamic State's Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz.

• Author: Zelin, Aaron Y.

Since the Islamic State lost its last bit of physical territory in Baghuz al-Fawqani, Syria, in March 2019, much focus has unsurprisingly been placed on the group's terrorism and insurgency campaign to try to retake territory, as well as the indefinite detention of approximately 60,000 Islamic State-affiliated individuals in northeast Syria. (a) Yet, quietly, within a few short months of the group's territorial collapse, there were already signs that it had not given up its governance ambitions and was still attempting to enforce its writ in territories it once held. As early as June 2019, evidence of the Islamic State's governance attempts appeared in Deir ez-Zor Province (formerly the Islamic State's Wilayat al-Khayr) and Hasakah Province (formerly the group's Wilayat al-Barakah).

Although the Islamic State has yet to regain permanent tamkin (consolidated administrative control) (1) over any area in eastern Syria, through its shadow governance activities over the past four years, the group has continued to project power and instill fear into local populations across eastern Syria. In doing so, the Islamic State seeks to create a mechanism to reimplement its caliphate project quickly if it were ever able to occupy territory again in the future. More immediately, however, these efforts by the Islamic State provide financial infrastructure for the organization to continue its terrorism and insurgency campaign, primarily directed against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), including SDF-run detention centers and prisons holding Islamic State-affiliated individuals. For example, on July 31, 2023, Internal Security Forces in northeast Syria (supported by coalition forces) arrested an Islamic State-affiliated leader accused of conducting finance operations in Deir ez-Zor. (2)

Therefore, while it is important to continue to track the Islamic State's claimed attacks and ongoing insurgency, doing so without understanding evolving dynamics at the local environment misses the broader aperture of Islamic State activity. In order to understand the full nature of the Islamic State threat today in Syria, one must look below easily quantifiable actions at what the group could be hiding, specifically indicators that can evaluate its strength below the surface. This is in part because over the past few years, a lot of the Islamic State's governance activity has occurred at night or in areas where the SDF has reduced operations due to security concerns for its own safety. To address this gap in understanding the current status of the Islamic State, this article will explore the group's history of governance and analyze the reality of the Islamic State's propaganda and claims of responsibility for attacks since the fall of its territorial control, before examining its shadow governance efforts in eastern Syria between 2019 and 2023.

The Islamic State's History of Governance

The Isiamic State movement's long history can be broken into several distinct periods. (3) The group's foundation in the 1990s until 2006 was defined by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership. This saw the group move from the training camps of Afghanistan to Iraq where, under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad and later al-Qa'ida in the Land of Two Rivers (better known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq, or AQI), it rose to notoriety for waging a bloody sectarian insurgency.

In October 2006, the group's next phase began. Then-leader of AQI, Abu Ayyub al-Masri (Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), pledged allegiance to the new self-declared leader of the faithful, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, and with it established its first self-declared state, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In January 2007, ISI's Shaykh 'Uthman Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi released a book explaining the group's rationale for declaring its state. (4) In his writing, al-Tamimi outlined ISI's responsibilities as a state in the areas it governs: "prosecuting criminals and sinners, implementation of the hudud (fixed punishments in the Qur'an and Hadith), mediating and resolving conflicts, providing security, distributing food and relief, and selling oil and gas." (5)

Although ISI proclaimed itself as a state, (6) the Islamic State of Iraq controlled limited territory, for insubstantial amounts of time--due to the U.S. military occupation, but also as a consequence of rival insurgent and tribal competition for power. ISI attempted to show a "veneer of legitimacy" by establishing a cabinet of ministries first in April 2007 and again in September 2009. Nevertheless, because of numerous obstacles facing ISI, the group was unable to properly implement the administrative responsibilities al-Tamimi outlined. (7) Instead, ISI primarily focused on "instituting hisba (moral policing) activities and targeting enemies as murtadin (apostates) who were seen as legitimate to target and kill." (8) This period helped to set up the Islamic State's later governance, which was marshaled by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi after he became the leader in 2010 when al-Muhajir and Abu Umar were killed.

The Islamic State movement's next period spanned 2012 to 2017 and marked its transnational expansion. Renamed in April 2013 to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (aka ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), ISIL's main focus was to present itself in a positive light to the Syrian population through da'wa (missionary) forums and by providing services, (9) prior to a wave of infighting that began in January 2014 between ISIL and revolutionary, Islamist, and other jihadi factions in Syria. (10) As ISIL, the group also carried out "softer" moral policing, including burning cigarettes and confiscating alcohol.

Yet, like a decade prior, ISIL killed other leaders from rival Syrian insurgent groups, prompting backlash. Due to infighting, ISIL was pushed out of Latakia, Idlib, and parts of Aleppo between January and March 2014. (11) As a result, the organization focused its state-building project in eastern Syria in Raqqa governorate and parts of Deir ez-Zor governorate. After ISIL's consolidation in the east, reports of "harsher punishments began to appear, such as cutting off hands for robbery or crucifying alleged apostates." (12) As ISIL, the group "sought to appear as a state-like entity, showing off its various administrative departments including its da'wa offices, shariah courts, religious schools, police stations, and local municipalities, among others." (13) Despite these efforts, during this period the group performed "an uneven governance strategy across its proto-wilayat (provinces)." (14)

In June 2014, the group captured Mosul and declared its caliphate, changing its name again--to simply the Islamic State. During this time, the Islamic State took control of large swaths of territory across Syria and Iraq, and created an intricate bureaucratic system that sought to touch on and govern all aspects of the lives of those that lived under its control. (15) When compared with its first state as ISI and its building toward a second state as ISIL, the post-June 2014 Islamic State governance structures, plans, and implementation were far superior.

At its height, the Islamic State operated government dawawin (administrations; diwan as singular) across numerous provinces. (16) These included: Administration of the Judiciary and Grievances, Administration of the Hisba (Morality Police), Administration of Da'wa (Proselytization) and Mosques, Administration of Zakat and Charities, Administration of the Soldiers, Administration of Public Security, Administration of the Treasury (Finance), Administration of Media, Administration of Education, Administration of Health, Administration of Agriculture and Livestock, Administration of (Natural) Resources, Administration of Services (Water, Electricity), Administration of Spoils of War, and Administration of Real Estate and Land Tax. It used these government bodies to regulate social relationships, extract resources from local populations, and appropriate those resources for their own gain. (17) But also during this period, the Islamic State constantly struggled to balance its ideology with the practical realities of its state-building project.

From 2017 to today, the Islamic State has been characterized by decline. Leading up to the full loss of territory in March 2019, the Islamic State took active measures to consolidate its organizational structure and to position itself to survive as an underground insurgent group. Unlike previously when it had a series of wilayat (provinces) within a particular country, the group melded them together into one "province" to streamline decision-making and operations. In the case of Syria, this transformed Wilayat al-Raqqah, Wilayat Halab, Wilayat al-Barakah, Wilayat al-Khayr, Wilayat al-Furat, Wilayat Homs, Wilayat Hamah, Wilayat Dimashq, Wilayat Hawran to just Wilayat al-Sham in mid-July 2018. (b) However, it is important to acknowledge that despite the fact that the Islamic State has been on the defensive, it retains its governance ambitions.

Do Numbers Tell the Whole Story? The Current State of Islamic State Propaganda and Claimed Attacks

Since 2019, the Islamic State has been relatively quiet on the propaganda front when it comes to eastern Syria. Most of the limited focus has been on the so-called daily life in the caliphate. But, without the physical territory it once held, today it usually features fighters hanging around one another, praying, cooking, or preparing for a battle during Ramadan or Eid al-Adha.

From mid-2019 to mid-2020, the Islamic State's Wilayat al-Sham (in its former provinces of al-Khayr and al-Barakah) media office in Syria released three videos threatening its various enemies (SDF, coalition, local leaders, and activists) in northeast and eastern Syria. (18) This was accompanied by an Al Naba--the Islamic State's weekly newsletter--interview in mid-November 2020 with Islamic State commander Abu Mansur al-Ansari in which he stated how terrible...