The Influence of Organizational Incentives on Absenteeism

• DOI: 10.1177/0887403405280361
• Published date: 01 June 2006
• Author: Scott D. Camp,Eric G. Lambert
• Date: 01 June 2006
• Subject Matter: Articles

10.1177/0887403405280361Criminal Justice Policy ReviewCamp, Lambert / Sick Leave Among Correctional Workers

The Influence of Organizational

Incentives on Absenteeism

Sick-Leave Use Among

Correctional Workers

Scott D. Camp

Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.

Eric G. Lambert

University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio

Absenteeism creates problems for organizations. The policies of the Civil Service Retire-

ment System, available to federal workers hired before 1987, allow unused sick leave to

be added to length of service when workers retire. The policies of the Federal Employees

Retirement System, on the other hand, create a use or lose situation. Yearly data on sick

leave, a measure of absenteeism, for employees at the Federal Bureau of Prisons were

examined for 1994 through 2003. The results of multilevel analysis confirmed that differ-

ent incentive structures of the twofederal retirement systems produced differences in the

use of sick leave.The analysis also demonstrated that the use of leave wasaffected by dif-

ferences in the environment at the respective prisons. Finally, some preliminary and

rough cost figures are presented to give some idea of the financial costs associated with

the greater leave associated with the newer federal retirement system.

Keywords: absenteeism; sick leave; prison workers

Unscheduled absences, often termed absenteeism, are associated with lower levels

of organizational productivity (Dilts, Deitsch, & Paul, 1985; Harrison & Price,

2003; Huczynski & Fitzpatrick, 1989; Rhodes & Steers, 1990; Steers & Rhodes,

1978), and this is particularly true for correctional organizations that are labor inten-

sive. Approximately 80% of the costs of operating prisons overthe life of a prison are

for direct payments of wages and fringe benefits (Crants, 1991). In addition to the

labor-intensive nature of prisons, correctional facilities have many mandatory posts,

positions that must be filled regardless of whether the scheduled worker reports for

144

Criminal Justice

Policy Review

Volume 17 Number 2

June 2006 144-172

© 2006 Sage Publications

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Authors’Note: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect

the views or policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons or the U.S. Department of Justice. The authors thank

Janet Lambert for editing and proofreadingthe article. The authors also thank the anonymous reviewers for

their comments and suggestions.

duty. From prior discussions between the lead author and wardens at federal prisons,

wardens report that most mandatory posts are custody positions that monitor inmate

behavior. When unscheduled leave occurs, another worker must be scheduled to fill

the post if it is mandatory. Not only are there managerial inefficienciesand costs asso-

ciated with scheduling replacement workers, wardens noted that the posts are typi-

cally filled by workers who have already completed a normal shift (or work week) or

by workers who would normally fill different functions in the prison, such as educa-

tion or other prison programs. Under both replacement scenarios, the productivity of

the agency is affected as either overtimewages are paid to the replacement worker or a

function of the prison is temporarily vacated. Neither is beneficial for the correctional

organization in the long run.

Given the financial and organizational problems associated with absenteeism,

management at correctional agencies would seem to have a continuing interest in

monitoring and developing incentives to address the use of unscheduled leave, which

usually takes the form of sick leave. Despite this interest, there are few published stud-

ies that empirically examined the antecedents of absenteeism in correctional agencies

(Gross, Larson, Urban, & Zupan, 1994; Lambert, 2001; Lombardo, 1981; Venne,

1997). A recent exception is a study of the antecedents of self-reports of absenteeism

among workers at the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP; Lambert, Camp, Edwards, &

Saylor, 2005). The study prepared by Lambert et al. (2005) built upon earlier work

(Brooke, 1986; Brooke & Price, 1989; Nicholson, Brown, & Chadwick-Jones, 1976)

and indicated that self-reported absenteeism was related to individual factors, such as

age and gender, as well as attitudinal measures, such as commitment to the organiza-

tion and job satisfaction. The results suggested that the use of sick leave was influ-

enced by factors not related to whether employees were ill. This suggests that sick

leave could be influenced and perhaps manipulated by factors that may be under the

control of correctional agencies. Nonetheless, the Lambert et al. study did not examine

whether sick-leave use, as an indicator of absenteeism, was influenced by different

organizational incentives. This is an important practical concern as incentives are

under the control of the organization and not a characteristic of the individuals

employed by the organization.

The current analysis adds to the literature on the use of sick leave in particular, and

absenteeism in general, by investigating whether the use of sick leave is influenced by

different incentive structures. This analysis is unusual in that official records of sick

leave were examined. The primary hypothesis tested was whether correctionalwork-

ers employed under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) use more sick

leave than workers employed under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).

Although there are many differences between the two retirement systems, the differ-

ence that is most relevant for the present study pertains to the disposition of unused

sick leave upon retirement.

Under the provisions of CSRS, unused sick-leave days are counted toward time of

service when an employee retires.1Beginning in 1987, all new employees were

switched to the FERS system, and employees covered by CSRS were giventhe oppor -

tunity to switch to the new FERS system. Under FERS, unused sick leave simply van-

Camp, Lambert / Sick Leave Among Correctional Workers 145