The impact of supreme audit institutions and ombudsmen in Belgium and The Netherlands

• Author: Wouter Acker,Geert Bouckaert
• Published date: 01 February 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12182
• Date: 01 February 2019

Received: 12 July 2017 Revised: 8 June 2018 Accepted: 5 July 2018

DOI: 10.1111/faam.12182

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The impact of supreme audit institutions and

ombudsmen in Belgium and The Netherlands

Wouter van Acker Geert Bouckaert

KULeuven Public Governance Institute, Leuven,

Belgium

Correspondence

Woutervan Acker, KU LeuvenPublic Governance

Institute,Parkstraat 45, Bus 3609, 3000 Leuven,

Belgium.

Email:wouter.vanacker@kuleuven.be

Fundinginformation

EuropeanUnion Seventh Framework Programme,

Grant/AwardNumber: 320090

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of the audit and ombud process

on the implementation of recommendations made by supreme audit

institutions and ombudsmen in Belgium and the Netherlands. Based

on previous findings, the focus lies on influential internal and exter-

nal factors in determining the effectiveness of the audit and ombud

investigations. The article concludes that the impact of the process

and factors often mentioned in the literatureare less significant than

found in other research. Political factors, such as coalition agree-

mentsand politicians trying to save face, seem to be much more influ-

ential in explaining the implementation rate.

KEYWORDS

accountability, audit offices, ombudsman, performance audits

1INTRODUCTION

Audit and ombudsman institutions are democratic tools in order to check the executive branch of government,

but also management tools in providing advice on customer relations, citizen rights, efficiency, and effectiveness

(Kostadinova, 2015; Pollitt et al., 1999). These roles go hand in hand, ever since performance, instead of a singular

focus on accounting, has taken a prime role in the work of auditors (Arnaboldi & Lapsley,2008; Arnaboldi, Lapsley, &

Steccolini, 2015). A more efficient, effective, and just government is expected to be more legitimate, and deserves its

citizens’ trust, and thus strengthens democracy. The impact of public accountability,including supreme audit institu-

tions (SAIs) and ombudsmen, has been a research topic for several decades.

However, the effectivenessof audits should not be taken for granted (Morin, 2001). One of the key quests of the

scholars focused on SAIs and ombudsmen is thus to find out how effective these institutions are. Do their opinions

and recommendations really have an effect? How can theybe as effective as possible? Which factors are key in making

sure that governmentalorganizations actually learn from their findings and reports? However, in comparison to perfor-

mance management in general,the amount of research on accountability effectiveness is still somewhat meager (Buck,

Kirkham, & Thompson, 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo,2017; Van Loocke & Put, 2011). This is especially the case

with regard to the effects of ombudsman investigations (with a few exceptions,differing in degree of similarity to this

article: Gill, 2011, 2012; Hertogh, 2001; Kostadinova, 2015; Wilkins, 2012).

These issues bring social factors and matters of power into the game of accountability,making performance audit-

ing and ombudsman investigations into much more than a mere technical issue (Modell, 2009). These social and

power-related factors come to the fore in the relationship between the actors (organizations under scrutiny) and the

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2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 55

56 VAN AC KER AND BOUCKAERT

TABL E 1 Selected cases

BE forum Actor Topic Year of audit

SAI 1 Flemish Employment Bureau HRM Policy 2011

SAI 2 TaxInspection Bureau Organization and

Functioning

2010

SAI 3 FederalMinistry of Justice

and Penitentiary

Institutions

HRM Policy 2010

SAI 4 Agency for the European

Social Fund

Use of Resources 2010

FederalOmbudsman FederalMinistry of Justice

and Penitentiary

Institutions

Complaint Reports on

Prisoner'sRights

2009–2012

Flemish Ombudsman 1 Flemish TaxCollecting

Agency

General Annual Complaints

Report

2006–2013

Flemish Ombudsman 2 Flemish Public Transport

Company (De Lijn)

General Annual Complaints

Report

2009–2012

Flemish Ombudsman 3 Flemish Agency for Housing GeneralAnnual Complaints

Report

2010–2011

NL forum Actor Topic Year of audit

SAI 1 DNB: National Bank Stability of Banks 2011

SAI 2 Ministry of Economic Affairs European Procurements 2012

SAI 3 Ministry of Economic Affairs TariffRegulations for the

Energy Market

2009

SAI 4 Ministry of Finance Evaluation of Subsidies 2011

SAI 5 ProRail (Railway

Infrastructure)

Use of Public Funds 2011

SAI 6 Ministry for Health and

Sports

Online Medical Care 2009

forum (the ombudsman or SAI; Bovens, 2005). Do they trust each other? Is the forum seen as an expert on the issue

at hand? Is the forum perceived as a controller or as an advisor? Are the final recommendations explained properly

to the actor? Each of the answers to these and other questions could have conceivable influence on the effectiveness

and implementation rate of the audit and ombudsman recommendations. Over the past years researchers havecome

up with a large number of factors that are claimed and/or found to be influential (see VanLoocke & Put [2011] for an

overview).In this article, several of these factors are investigated for their influence in determining the effectiveness of

six Dutch and eight Belgian cases of public accountability.These cases are shown hereunder, in table 1. We will inves-

tigate how the processes of the Dutch and Belgian SAI, the Belgian federal ombudsman, and the Flemish ombudsman

haveinfluenced the implementation rate of the policy recommendations. The focus lies on the role of the media, parlia-

ment, trust and collaboration, the perception of each other's role and expertise, exitmeetings, and to what extent the

SAIs’ and ombudsmen's criteria are appropriate and known to all participating actors.

The research presented in this article is novel in the field for a number of reasons. First, it focuses on some scarcely

researched factors: the dilemma between the role of SAIs and ombudsman as watchdog/controlleron the one side, and

advisor on the other,as well as the influence of parliament and the media on the implementation of recommendations.

Second, it integrates ombudsmen into the research on public accountability.The impact of ombudsmen's recommen-

dations and the process of ombudsmen's investigations havebeen investigated only rarely.

Tobest of the authors’ knowledge, ombudsman institutions and SAIs have not been investigated in combination in

terms of the effectiveness of their investigations and audits. More has been written from a legal perspective on SAIs

and ombudsmen as being part of a larger accountability regime (McMillan, 2010; Wettenhall, 2012; Wilkins, 2015;