The Impact of Managing for Results Mandates in Corrections: Lessons From Three States

• Author: Donald P. Moynihan
• Published date: 01 March 2005
• Date: 01 March 2005
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0887403403261278
• Subject Matter: Articles

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Moynihan / MANA
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10.1177/0887403403261278 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW / March 2005
GING FOR RESULTS
The Impact of Managing for
Results Mandates in Corrections:
Lessons From Three States
Donald P. Moynihan
Texas A&M University
Almost all state governments have adopted legislative or administrative mandates to
manage for results. These mandates require agencies to engage in strategic planning
and performance measurement, with the hope that performance information will be
used to change decision-making behavior and improve performance. This article
examines case studies of Alabama, Virginia, and Vermont to understand how correc-
tions managers react to and use these mandates. The findings indicate a high degree
of variation in case outcomes, ranging from compliance, to performance improve-
ment efforts, to a questioning of the basic goals of corrections. There is a common
logic that explains how managing for results is used however, based on organization’s
leadership agenda, and informed by knowledge of environmental challenges and
opportunities.
Keywords: management; strategic planning; performance management; perfor-
mance measurement; reform
THE GROWTH OF THE MANAGING FOR RESULTS
The most widespread governmental reform over the past decade has been
managing for results (MFR). The best-known example of this movement
was the 1993 passage of the Government Performance and Results Act at
the federal level, however MFR has been applied at the local level also
(Poister & Streib, 1999; Wang, 2000). This article examines the implemen-
tation of MFR mandates at the state level in the function of corrections. Of
50 state governments, 47 have either legislative or administrative MFR
mandates (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998), and all bar two states can point to
formal MFR procedures (Moynihan, 2001). Not only has MFR been widely
adopted, it has also been intensively adopted. A survey of state managers
found that strategic planning and performance measurement were the most
Criminal Justice Policy Review, Volume 16, Number 1, March 2005 18-37
DOI: 10.1177/0887403403261278
© 2005 Sage Publications
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Moynihan / MANAGING FOR RESULTS 19
intensively adopted of the menu of reinvention reforms popularized by for-
mer Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review (Brudney,
Hebert, & Wright, 1999). Corrections managers in state government, along
with every other function, face a mandate to effectively implement this
reform.
What exactly do these MFR mandates entail? There is a consensus
between public management literature, professional standards, and actual
government mandates about what MFR means, the goals it hopes to
achieve, and how to go about achieving them.1 The Government Perfor-
mance Project of Syracuse University surveyed different management sys-
tems in state and local government, including MFR, and has devised a stan-
dard set of criteria for MFR systems that reflect this consensus.2 The four
main criteria for MFR are the following:
1. Government engages in results-oriented, strategic planning.
2. Government develops indicators and evaluative data that can measure prog-
ress toward results and accomplishments.
3. Leaders and managers use results data for policy making, management, and
evaluation of progress.
4. Government clearly communicates the results of its activities to stake-
holders.
Survey, interview, and document content analysis by the Government
Performance Project found that state governments have designed systems
that seek to achieve the above criteria (Moynihan & Ingraham, 2003). Con-
tent analysis of state-by-state legislative MFR mandates confirm the
emphasis on creating performance information through strategic planning
and performance measurement, the diffusion of this information to employ-
ees and the public, and the use of this information to inform public decision
making (Snell & Grooters, 2000). This model of MFR reflects a systems
approach to decision making, illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 ties the creation and diffusion of performance information to
specific decision venues. A survey of state managers further confirms this
model, citing improved decision making as the most frequently cited pur-
pose of MFR (Melkers & Willoughby, 2001). What the Government Perfor-
mance Project reported, however, was that although most state govern-
ments had proven adept at creating systematic routines to create, collect,
and diffuse performance information, they struggled to ensure that this
information was actually used in decision making (Moynihan & Ingraham,
2003). Evidence of such use tended to be sporadic and anecdotal, particu-

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20 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW / March 2005
Based on stakeholder input and previous
performance, government engages in results-
oriented strategic planning; goals have a clear
purpose and are communicated.
P erformance information is communicated to
employees, the public and to specific decision
venues, including implementing strategic goals,
r esource allocation, policymaking, evaluation,
Government engages in valid and
performance monitoring, performance
accurate performance measurement that
i mprovement efforts, benchmarking, capacity
reflects progress toward results.
improvements.
Measures are communicated.
Figure 1: Integrating Planning, Measurement, and Decision Venues
larly among statewide actors, that is, central agency actors and elected offi-
cials. In particular, there was very limited evidence that such information
informed resource allocation decisions (Joyce & Tompkins, 2002).
Despite the evidence of disappointing use among statewide actors, MFR
adherents argued that the reform is worthwhile if agency managers use per-
formance information to re-engineer processes toward more effective and
efficient outcomes. To assess whether this hope is justified means examin-
ing how agencies are reacting to the performance mandates they now face.
Careful case studies at this level can describe whether and how such perfor-
mance information use is occurring. Thus far, there has been a dearth of
such research. A notable exception is Franklin (2000), who reported the
tendency for agency managers in Arizona and Texas to view MFR mandates
as top-down control mechanisms that force compliance.
This article provides case evidence on how corrections managers react to
MFR mandates. Concern with rising costs, and the possibility of privatized
competition, has put corrections under intense pressure to demonstrate a
results focus. Managers are told that MFR provides a tool to defend their
budgets but worry that elected officials will use performance information to
micromanage operations, cut resources, or to set as a benchmark for private
competition.

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Moynihan / MANAGING FOR RESULTS 21
DATA AND METHODS
Case Selection
For case study selection, I sought to examine different theoretical condi-
tions to maximize theoretical replication (Yin, 1994). Using Government
Performance Project close-ended survey and content analysis data I created
scales that measured the degree of implementation of strategic planning and
performance measurement systems for all 50 state governments. Because
MFR mandates typically require agency-level and statewide reporting, the
scales measure the availability of state-wide performance information, and
corrections-specific information (in state and corrections budgets, perfor-
mance reports, and strategic planning documents). States were divided into
three categories: high, medium, and low levels of MFR implementation. To
be eligible for selection a state had to satisfy the category in terms of state-
wide and corrections performance information. The states of Alabama, Ver-
mont, and Virginia most closely satisfied the above criteria, respectively
fulfilling the categories of low, moderate, and high implementers of MFR.
Data Collection
Government Performance Project surveys, interview transcripts, and
content analysis provided a large amount of background information about
the MFR system in each state but offered only limited, specific information
about corrections beyond the availability and type of performance data.
Given that the interest of the study was in learning about how implementa-
tion was occurring, I visited each state to undertake in-depth interviews of
the key participants in the MFR process: (a) operational managers in correc-
tional institutions, (b) senior managers at the Department of Corrections
(DOC), and (c) managers in the state management and budget office. Ban
(1995) utilized a similar sampling technique to good effect, illustrating con-
sistent variation in behavior of members of different parts of the same orga-
nization. I developed a key informant in each pool of interviewees and used
a snowball method of sampling the additional interviewees, with 12 inter-
viewees per state, some of whom were interviewed multiple times. In addi-
tion, I analyzed transcripts of Government Performance Project interviews
on MFR of the most senior officials in the Department of Finance, provid-
ing an additional two interviewees per state, giving a total of 42 interview-
ees. Interviews were semistructured, based on a standard interview protocol

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22 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW / March 2005
and probes. For the purposes of confidentiality, interviewees are cited by an
assigned number rather than by name.
Data Analysis
Responses were recorded, transcribed, and stored in QSR NUDIST, a
software program designed for...