The Effects of Interfirm Ties on Illegal Corporate Behavior

AuthorJamie D. Collins,Christopher R. Reutzel
Published date01 June 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/basr.12117
Date01 June 2017
The Effects of Interfirm Ties
on Illegal Corporate Behavior
JAMIE D. COLLINS AND CHRISTOPHER R. REUTZEL
ABSTRACT
Although numerous benefits are associated with interfirm
ties, these external relationships can also have negative
consequences. Theoretically based in the relational com-
ponent of social capital, we identify one potentially serious
consequence of interfirm ties, propensity of firms engag-
ing in illegal behavior. Results of our study of S&P 500
firms suggest that companies benefit from a lower likeli-
hood of illegal behavior when they have numerous weak
ties to other firms. Conversely, when they become overly
embedded in a network of strong ties, they are more likely
to engage in illegal behavior. We also found evidence that
reciprocity and status similarity influence firms’ propensi-
ty to engage in illegal behavior.
Corporations account for a significant source of economic
growth and societal vitality. In fact, by reinvesting profits
regularly to increase productivity, firms contribute to eco-
nomic growth and support the view that capitalism is “... much
more than an economic system for exchange; rather, it defines
Jamie D. Collins is a Director of Center for Entrepreneurship, College of Business Administra-
tion, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX. E-mail: Collins@shsu.edu. Christopher R.
Reutzel is an Assistant Professor of Management at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville,
TX. E-mail: Reutzel@shsu.edu.
V
C2017 W. Michael Hoffman Center for Business Ethics at Bentley University. Published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington
Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
Business and Society Review 122:2 251–282
bs_bs_banner
thedominantsocialsystemofourage,onethatshapesthecul-
tural, economic, and political institutions of our lives as well as
our understanding of them and our commitment to change within
them” (Heiman 2003, p. 187). However, in recent years height-
ened scrutiny of corporate behavior is evidenced as a result of
several high-profile firms engaging in illegal behavior. Yet, the
existing literature on illegal corporate behavior covers a broad
realm of organizational activities which have been explored utiliz-
ing disparate theoretical approaches (Ashforth et al. 2008; Zeidan
2013). More work is especially needed to understand what
encourages and/or facilities this type of behavior because of its
destructive nature. To this end, we focus on the relationship
between interfirm partnership ties and a specific set of illegal cor-
porate behaviors, those involving the violation of federal regula-
tions (Sullivan et al. 2007).
Our study examines the influence of interfirm relationships on
the likelihood of engaging in illegal corporate behaviors. Under-
standing the effects of these relationships in the practice of illegal
corporate behavior contributes insight regarding whether firms’
potential contributions to society will be viewed in future years as
a net positive (Heath 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2006). Given the
growing concerns about firm behaviors, significant external pres-
sureshavebeenplacedoncorporationstoabidebyrelevantlegal
and statutory requirements (Kassinis and Vafeas 2006; Pajunen
2006; Stevens et al. 2005). Our research provides additional
insights regarding factors that provide the context in which indi-
vidual decision makers exhibit a greater likelihood to engage in
illegal behaviors.
We specifically find evidence that violations of federal regulations
can result when the firm is constrained in avenues available for
achieving and maintaining desired short-term performance levels.
Thus, this study suggests the conditions that serve as a catalyst
for decision makers within corporations engaging in illegal activity.
The results of this research show a potential “dark side” of partici-
pating in a formal network of relationships. In doing so, this study
reinforces the view that scholars and practitioners can gain value
from a holistic view of the benefits and the risks associated with
firms becoming relationally embedded in a network of interfirm
ties.
252 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Firms’ partnership ties constitute an important form of relational
capital, i.e., potentially beneficial relationships between two or more
parties (Hitt et al. 2006; Li et al. 2008). Relational capital is a dimen-
sion of social capital (i.e., this conceptualization bifurcates the rela-
tional and structural dimensions of social capital) that represents
the outcomes derived from a relationship between two or more par-
ties (Arregle et al. 2007; Hitt et al. 2006). While much of the
research on relational capital emphasizes the benefits, this study
examines the relatively unexplored potential “dark side” of interfirm
ties (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Braendle et al. 2005; Vaughan
1999), especially the potential to engage in illegal corporate behav-
ior. Prior research has examined multiple different influences on
corporate deviance (Baumer 2007; Brass et al. 2004; Jehn and Scott
2015; Vaughan 1998), but relatively few studies have investigated
the link between partnership ties and illegal corporate behavior (Col-
lins et al. 2009; Vaughan 1999). The research reported herein focus-
es on the potential disadvantages of firms’ portfolios of
relationships, particularly their influence on providing an environ-
ment in which potential illegal corporate behaviors can arise.
The topic of corporate illegal activities is particularly salient for
top decision makers within an organization (Baumer 2007). Prior
research suggests that engaging in illegal behavior can become
accepted practice within organizations. Related research also
suggests that while relational ties facilitate exchange and dis-
courage opportunism among partners, they also increase oppor-
tunities for deviant and/or illegal behavior (Anderson and Jap
2005; Bernard 2006). Relational ties serve as conduits of knowl-
edge between partners, mechanisms for enforcement of perfor-
mance expectations, and catalysts for identifying new economic
opportunities. Such ties are frequently utilized to increase the
rate of interactions, build trust and facilitate the flow of informa-
tion among the actors. However, prior research has argued
broadly that these ties can become catalysts for illegal behavior
by partnering firms (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Baumer 2007;
Buchan 2005). We now turn to addressing the characteristics of
the relational ties between partner firms that can influence the
likelihood that managers within firms make choices that lead to
253COLLINS AND REUTZEL

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