The Effect of Prosecutorial Actions on Deterrence: A County-Level Analysis

• DOI: 10.1177/0887403419829201
• Author: Scott M. Mourtgos,Ian T. Adams
• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403419829201

Criminal Justice Policy Review

2020, Vol. 31(4) 479 –499

© The Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0887403419829201

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Article

The Effect of Prosecutorial

Actions on Deterrence: A

County-Level Analysis

Scott M. Mourtgos1 and Ian T. Adams1

Abstract

In the current study, we examine prosecutorial decisions that affect the certainty,

celerity, and severity of punishment at the county level in the state of Florida.

Leveraging a unique data set, we investigate the effect of the rate at which prosecuting

agencies within each county filed formal charges against offenders (certainty), the

swiftness of criminal case resolution (celerity), and the rate at which cases were pled

to less severe punishments (severity). We test for the effect of those covariates on

aggregate county-level crime rates over a 5-year period. We find that prosecutors’

effect on the certainty and celerity of punishment was associated with lower levels

of crime, whereas their effect on the severity of punishment was not. Together,

these findings highlight the role of the prosecutor in shaping the general deterrent

environment within a county.

Keywords

deterrence, prosecutor, crime, criminal justice

The government’s ability to deter crime through formal sanctions is one of the essen-

tial functions of government. A long history of research demonstrates the ability to

deter crime rests on a government’s ability to control the three pillars of deterrence

theory: the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment (Beccaria, 1764; Braga &

Weisburd, 2012). Although there is considerable research examining the effectiveness

of police in deterring crime (e.g., Bertelli & Richardson, 2008; Eck & Spelman, 1987;

Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001; Levitt, 1997; Marvell & Moody, 1996; Mourtgos,

1The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

Corresponding Author:

Scott M. Mourtgos, Department of Political Science, The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112,

USA.

Email: scott.mourtgos@utah.edu

829201CJPXXX10.1177/0887403419829201Criminal Justice Policy ReviewMourtgos and Adams

research-article2019

480 Criminal Justice Policy Review 31(4)

Wise, & Petros, 2018; Sampson & Cohen, 1988; Weisburd & Green, 1995) and the

length of prison sentences in deterring crime (e.g., Loughran et al., 2009; Snodgrass,

Blokland, Haviland, Nieuwbeerta, & Nagin, 2011), there is currently a dearth of evi-

dence regarding prosecutors’ effect on deterrence (Pfaff, 2017).

The lack of attention paid to prosecutors’ effect on deterrence is likely not because

of simple disregard by researchers, but rather because it is difficult to obtain the neces-

sary data for such research. Accordingly, although the prosecutor’s influence on deter-

rence, and the criminal justice system writ large, is substantial (Dunahoe, 2005), the

workings of prosecutors largely remain a black box (Pfaff, 2017).

Understanding prosecutors’ role in deterrence is crucial because the assumed cost–

benefit analysis offenders make when deciding to commit a crime (Hirschi, 2014) is

not based solely on the probability of being apprehended by the police and being sen-

tenced to prison by a judge. Rather, deterrence theory considers the probability of

apprehension by the police, the probability of being formally charged by a prosecuting

agency if apprehended, and the severity of formal sanction (Nagin, Solow, & Lum,

2015). In this article, we further the understanding of prosecutors’ influence on deter-

ring crime.

In the present study, we provide an empirical test of deterrence theory by investigat-

ing the role of the prosecutor, a key player in the criminal justice system. First, we

review the current state of knowledge on deterrence theory. Within this review, we

derive research questions to investigate how prosecutors’ actions should affect deter-

rence, given the theoretical guidance. We develop research questions rather than spe-

cific hypotheses due to the current void in knowledge regarding prosecutors’ effect on

deterrence (Pfaff, 2017).

Second, we address those research questions through multivariate analysis of data

that have recently become available. We operationalize the data at the county level for

the entirety of one state (Florida). We model data to examine the percentage of cases

that prosecutors formally file charges on (certainty), the percentage of the resulting

cases that are adjudicated in an expeditious manner (celerity), and the percentage of

cases that are pled to lesser charges (severity). We find that the certainty of prosecution

and the celerity with which criminal cases move through the court system are associ-

ated with lower levels of crime. At the same time, the proportion of cases that are pled

to less severe sentences is not associated with the level of crime within a county. We

conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implication for criminal justice

policy and future research.

Deterrence Theory

Most modern theories of deterrence can be traced back to Beccaria’s (1764) treatise,

On Crime and Punishments. Beccaria argued that the three key ingredients to deter-

rence are the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment. The logic of this model is

based on rational choice theory where would-be offenders balance the benefits and

costs of crime (Nagin, 2018; Nagin et al., 2015). The offender is assumed to pursue

pleasure over pain, can predict and balance future benefits and costs, and acts to