The Changing War on Poverty

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12364
Published date01 May 2015
Date01 May 2015
The Changing War on Poverty 359
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 75, Iss. 3, pp. 359–360. © 2015 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12364.
Marcelo M. Giugale is senior director
of the World Bank s Global Practice for
Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management
and a fellow of the National Academy of
Public Administration. This column is based
on his 2014 TED: Talk “Ending Poverty.”
Twitter : @Marcelo_WB
Perspective
Marcelo M. Giugale
The Global Practice for Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management
e Changing War on Poverty
O ver the past decade, identification and com-
munication technologies have revolutionized
the way developing countries fight poverty.
This started in Mexico in the mid-1990s when the
government decided to transfer cash directly to the
poor. The payments were conditional—the recipients
had to keep their children vaccinated and in school—
and the money was literally transported by officials
into remote villages. The idea made no political sense,
for it put the spotlight on the country s persistent
poverty—an embarrassing reality for a party that had
been in office for almost 70 years. The Mexicans did
it anyway.
Today, about 70 developing countries, 35 of which are
in Africa, have followed the example. They use digital-
ized biometrics to identify people, and cell phones or
debit cards to make the transfers. India alone has bio-
metrically identified half-a-billion people in about five
years, at a cost of around $4 per person—a bargain
if you compare it with the economic cost of keeping
someone in legal inexistence. Most evaluations show
that, as a tool for social assistance, the cash transfer
programs have worked well.
But the programs transformed much more than social
assistance. By forcing governments to know the poor
by name, individually, they forged a new kind of state–
citizen relationship that is changing the balance in the
war on poverty. First, a massive amount of information
is being generated in real time. We now know where
the poor live, how much they earn, and how many
kids they have—the personal information you collect
when you register someone in the program. But we
also know what they consume, pay, and need—the
data that become available as they spend the transfer.
This can lead to better targeting, smarter design, less
duplication, higher progressivity, closer monitoring,
and more rigorous evaluation. In other words, you can
improve the quality of public expenditures.
Second, you can now listen to the poor—literally.
The same cell phone used to transfer the cash can be
used to build continuous panel surveys. That is, you
can call and follow the same individual or household
over time and ask questions like: “You had told us
that rice is your family s staple food; we noticed the
price of rice has doubled in your country. Are you
eating less rice? Are you eating less?” This is the kind
of information that helps you deal with shocks faster
and better. Have you ever wondered why there was
no social explosion in Mexico when the global crisis
of 2008–09 brought the American economy to a
screeching halt? The fact that the Mexican govern-
ment hiked—by 15%—the cash transfers to the five
million poorest families must have surely played a
role.
Third, you can direct more public funding from the
supply to the demand for services. Take, for example,
universal health coverage. A number of governments
in emerging economies—China, Chile, Georgia,
and Nigeria, to name a few—are experimenting with
paying for the medical treatment of people who could
not otherwise afford it. The innovation is that patients
can choose between public and private suppliers. The
former are then pressed to reform and compete. Think
of this as school vouchers but for healthcare. They do
not work everywhere—they are useless in areas with
no alternative providers—but where they do work,
they make a huge difference.
1
Fourth, you can put an end to long-standing fiscal
aberrations. Gasoline subsidies are a prime example.
They are captured mostly by the rich and, in several
countries, absorb more resources than, say, primary
education. Trying to dismantle, or even cut, those
subsidies has many times been met with violent social
unrest—witness the rioting in Nigeria in early 2012.
But others have found a way. In 2010, Iran came up
with an interesting idea: it converted the subsidy into
cash and transferred it to bank accounts opened for
every Iranian citizen—$40 per person per month,
to be precise (Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011).
Certainly, these transfers have no impact on the lives
of the rich, but they may be the difference between

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