The Boston Marathon Bombings: Who's to Blame and Why It Matters for Public Administration

• Date: 01 November 2014
• Published date: 01 November 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12263
• Author: John D. Marvel

John D. Marvel is assistant professor

in the School of Policy, Government, and

International Affairs at George Mason

University. His research focuses on work

motivation, employee turnover, and public

sector organizational performance.

E-mail: jmarvel@gmu.edu

The Boston Marathon Bombings: Who’s to Blame and Why It Matters for Public Administration 713

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 74, Iss. 6, pp. 713–725. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12263.

bombings—af‌f ect citizens’ beliefs regarding which

government organizations, if any, are culpable for

failing to prevent the bombings. We are particularly

interested in whether high-level public administra-

tors enjoy higher levels of credibility than politicians

and, consequently, exert more inf‌l uence over citizens’

blame attributions. We take no position on whether

the inf‌l uence of public administrators is normatively

desirable; instead, we treat the question of public

administrators’ inf‌l uence on citizens’ blame attribu-

tions as an empirical one. By exploring how elite

“blame statements” inf‌l uence citizens’ beliefs about

government’s culpability for the Boston Marathon

bombings, we aim to show that public opinion is a

substantively important area for future public admin-

istration research.

Blame Attribution and Its Implications

for Public Administration

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks and other tragic

public events, politicians and other elites inevitably

look to assign and avoid blame—blame for failure to

anticipate an event (e.g., 9/11), blame for failure to

respond swiftly and competently to an event (e.g.,

Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill),

and blame for any other failures, real or perceived

(Gomez and Wilson 2008; Malhotra and Kuo 2008).

 is “blame game” usually takes place in full view of

the public, and so it inf‌l uences citizens’ beliefs about

which government actors are responsible for whatever

failure, if any, has occurred (Maestas et al. 2008).

 ese beliefs, in turn, af‌f ect citizens’ more general

political attitudes (e.g., what policies to support) and

decision making (e.g., whom to vote for), which inf‌l u-

ence the policy responses that politicians are willing to

support publicly (Iyengar 1987; Pef‌f‌l ey 1984). Finally,

these policy responses, which might include such

things as funding changes for government programs

or organizational restructuring, have crucial implica-

tions for public administration.

Wise (2002), for instance, questions the wisdom of

the post-9/11 impulse—driven in part by a public

 is article examines how elite attributions of blame—

statements from politicians and high-level public

administrators assigning responsibility for failure to

prevent the Boston Marathon bombings—af‌f ect citizens’

beliefs regarding which government organizations, if

any, are culpable for failing to prevent the bombings.

 e primary hypothesis is that public administrators,

owing to their greater credibility relative to politicians,

will more strongly inf‌l uence citizens’ notions of who is

to blame. Findings show that public administrators are

viewed as signif‌i cantly more credible among Democrats,

and this credibility advantage translates into inf‌l uence.

Additionally, blame statements implicating the Federal

Bureau of Investigation for failing to prevent the Boston

Marathon bombings are particularly inf‌l uential among

Republicans, and exculpatory statements are particularly

inf‌l uential among Democrats. As discussed in the context

of the Boston Marathon bombings, the public process of

attributing blame for a perceived governmental failure

has important implications for public administration.

The political and public opinion aspects of

governmental responses to terrorist attacks are

understudied within the discipline of public

administration. Instead, the technical and manage-

rial aspects of governmental responses (e.g., how

can intergovernmental coordination of emergency

response functions be improved? How can we train

public sector managers to be ef‌f ective leaders in crisis

situations?) receive the lion’s share of attention from

public administration scholars.  ere is good reason

for this, as answers to these kinds of technical and

managerial questions are crucial for public admin-

istration practitioners. Nevertheless, this substan-

tive imbalance represents a signif‌i cant gap in public

administration scholarship, given that politics and

public opinion can shape government’s organizational

and institutional responses to terrorist attacks.

Accordingly, this article examines how elite attribu-

tions of blame—statements from politicians and

high-level public administrators assigning respon-

sibility for failure to prevent the Boston Marathon

 e Boston Marathon Bombings: Who’s to Blame and Why

It Matters for Public Administration

John D. Marvel

George Mason University