The Beginning of the End: United States v. Alabama and the Doctrine of Self-deportation
| Publication year | 2013 |
The Beginning of the End: United States v. Alabama and the Doctrine of Self-Deportation
Benjamin D. Galloway
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"Remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists."
—Franklin D. Roosevelt1
In United States v. Alabama,2 a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struck down several sections of Alabama's Hammon-Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (H.B. 56).3 This Act-which has been called the strictest anti-immigration law in the country-demonstrates a growing trend among states to exert more control over immigration regulation.4 Writing for the court, Judge Wilson concluded that federal law preempted sections 10, 11(a), 13(a), 16, 17, and 27 of H.B. 56.5 In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit gave a victory to those championing the rights of illegal immigrants while also curtailing the power of the states to regulate within their own borders.
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A. Enactment of H.B. 56
The Alabama legislature passed H.B. 56 on June 2, 2011 based on finding that "immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness in [Alabama] and that illegal immigration is encouraged when public agencies within [Alabama] provide public benefits without verifying immigration status."6 Governor Bentley signed H.B. 56 into law that same month.7 According to Representative Hammon, a sponsor of the law, its purpose was to "attack[] every aspect of an illegal alien's life" in order to force them to "deport themselves."8 As stated in the legislative findings, H.B. 56 was designed to "discourage illegal immigration within the state and maximize enforcement of federal immigration laws through cooperation with federal authorities."9 Shortly thereafter, organizations such as the Immigration Reform Law Institute characterized the law as the "most advanced state" immigration law to date.10
Several sections of H.B. 56, some mirroring those of Arizona's S.B. 1070 recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States,11 were put forth to achieve Alabama's legislative purpose. This Note will focus on sections 10, 11(a), and 12(a), which all emulate Arizona's law, as well as section 27. First, section 10 makes the "willful failure to complete or carry registration documents in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) [or] 1306(a)" a crime.12 Under section 11, it was a crime for an unlawfully present alien to solicit, apply for, or perform work of any kind within the state of Alabama.13 Section 12 required law enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of any individual who had been stopped or was under arrest if the officer reasonably suspected the person may be in the country illegally.14
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Importantly, the determination of immigration status was to be based upon federal standards.15 Also similar to S.B. 1070, section 12 contains provisions which aim at lightening the burden that could be caused to minority groups by the effects of the statute.16 Additionally, this Note will look at the court's analysis of section 27, which represented a new attempt at state control over immigration by prohibiting state courts from enforcing any contract where an illegal immigrant was a party if the contract required the unlawfully present individual to remain in the country for more than twenty-four hours after its formation in order to perform the contract, and the other party "had direct or constructive knowledge" of their illegal status.17
B. Procedural History
The United States Department of Justice and the Obama administration brought suit against Alabama, claiming that federal law preempted the Alabama law.18 Judge Sharon Blackburn of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ruled on the validity of the law on September 28, 2011.19 In her opinion, Judge Blackburn upheld sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30.20 Two principles guided her analysis: the congressional purpose of the underlying federal statute, and whether Congress had legislated in a traditionally state-occupied
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field.21 Subsequently, Judge Blackburn issued preliminary injunctions against sections 11(a), 13, 16, and 17 based on the likelihood of successful preemption challenges.22
Following the district court's ruling, the United States appealed the denials of preliminary injunctions, and Alabama subsequently cross-appealed the injunctions granted by the district court. The United States sought an injunction pending appeal against the sections that were denied by the district court in order to maintain the status quo until the appeal could be heard. A panel of judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ultimately granted injunctions pending appeal against sections 10, 27, 28, and 30, leaving sections 12 and 18 as the only ones currently intact and enforced.23
A. Federal Preemption
The foundation for the doctrine of preemption is provided by the Supremacy Clause, which states:
[T]he Laws of the United States[,] which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.24
Therefore, "if a federal statute establishes a rule, and if the Constitution grants Congress the power to establish that rule, then the rule preempts whatever state law it contradicts."25 Consequently, courts necessarily begin by establishing that Congress validly enacted the federal law in question within the limitations of its enumerated powers.26 Courts are "guided by two cornerstones" when determining the extent to which state law is preempted by federal law.27 First, "'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
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case.'"28 Second, the preemption analysis is guided by an "'assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"29 This has been labeled the presumption against preemption and has led to a level of deference to state and local laws within areas of traditional state concern.30 However, when a state regulates in an area with "a history of significant federal presence," the presumption against preemption is not applied.31
Congress can demonstrate its intent to preempt state law "by express language in a congressional enactment [express preemption], by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field [field preemption], or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment [conflict preemption]."32
1. Express Preemption. Express preemption will be found when a federal law includes a clause explicitly removing specified powers from the states. Courts focus on the plain language of preemption clauses when they are included, as it "necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent."33 For example, the Immigration Reform and Control Act34 has an express preemption clause that prohibits "any State or local law [from] imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)" on employers who hire undocumented immigrants.35
2. Field Preemption. Field preemption will be found where "'the federal interest is so dominant'" in a federal regulatory scheme that it may be presumed that Congress intended to occupy the entire area of law, leaving no room for state action.36 The Court has found that some
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federal regulatory schemes are "so pervasive" that "Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."37 Furthermore, the "federal interest" in a field can be "so dominant" that federal law "will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."38 A finding of field preemption results in states being either limited or excluded from the field.39
3. Conflict Preemption. It is well settled that a state law which "actually conflicts" with a federal statute is preempted, even if the statute contains no express preemption clause or does not impliedly occupy a field.40 State law is conflict-preempted when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes . . . of Congress,"41 as well as when it is a "physical impossibility" to comply with both the federal and state law.42 Conflict preemption has been found when local immigration law "has had a deleterious effect on the United States' foreign relations."43 Ultimately, "'a statute is preempted . . . if it conflicts with federal law making compliance with both state and federal law impossible.'"44
B. Arizona v. United States
The Supreme Court recently addressed self-deportation styled immigration law in Arizona v. United States.45 In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court considered whether four provisions of Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070)46 were preempted by federal immigration laws.47 Justice
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Kennedy began by framing the court's preemption analysis based on the framework laid out above.48
The Court first determined the validity of section 3 of S.B. 1070, which prohibited the "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document . . . in violation of 8 [U.S.C. §] 1304(e) or 1306(a)."49 Justice Kennedy concluded that, based upon the framework enacted by Congress, the federal government had "occupied the field of alien registration."50 In response to Arizona's assertion that section 3 was valid because it had the same goal as its federal counterpart, Justice Kennedy further stated that "[w]here Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the...
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