Terrorism and Counterterrorism Challenges for the Biden Administration.

• Author: Hofman, Bruce

As the Biden administration starts work in January, it will face a new raft of national security challenges. Counterterrorism, as with the previous three administrations, will once again be a central concern. The administration will be forced to grapple with old threats, including from the Islamic State and al-Qaida, as well as a rapidly changing--and deteriorating--domestic terrorism landscape. Despite 20 years of the so-called war on terror, the battle for the safety of the American homeland remains fraught with challenges and risks. Managing this war will require enduring vigilance and energy, as well as a new set of counterterrorism policies, to more effectively address the totality of the new terrorism threat.

Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose," goes the famous 19th -century epigram by Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr. The more things change, the more they stay the same. The same might be said about both the new and ongoing terrorist threats President-elect Joe Biden and his incoming administration faces as it attempts to fashion an effective counterterrorism strategy.

Four years ago, an analysis assessing these same dangers for newly elected President Donald J. Trump identified three main challenges:

* The fact that the Islamic State had fundamentally changed the global terrorist landscape during its brief incarnation as a self-proclaimed "State" and that, regardless of its then-imminent defeat, the threat it posed would not disappear;

* That al-Qa'ida, despite its prolonged quiescence, had taken advantage of the global coalition's preoccupation with the Islamic State and was therefore quietly rebuilding and marshaling its resources to carry on the struggle against the United States; and,

* That America's adversaries had deliberately enmeshed us in a debilitating war of attrition that we lacked an effective strategy to counter, much less defeat. (1)

That this assessment should have proven prescient and retained its relevance is testament to the highly parlous situation in which the United States again today finds itself--with the same international terrorism threats continuing unabated, but now joined by a salient and profoundly unsettling domestic dimension.

This article assesses the threat to homeland security posed by non-state actors; accordingly, it deals less with state-sponsored threats, as well as proxy warfare around the world. First, the article will briefy summarize the counterterrorism strategies pursued by the Trump administration. It then assesses the enduring threats posed by the United States's most persistent terrorist enemies of the past two decades, the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida. Finally, the article provides an in-depth analysis of the current domestic terrorism threat, assessing dangers posed by both far-right and far-left extremists, before concluding with policy recommendations for the incoming administration. An important caveat: this is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of the entire landscape of terrorist threats confronting the United States and the new Biden administration. Rather, it reffects the authors'--albeit, perhaps, idiosyncratic--view of the most salient and compelling threats the United States faces as a new presidential administration takes of--and the war on terrorism continues unabated.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

To its credit, the Trump administration put forth a highly creditable U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism in October 2018. This was the fourth iteration of this planning guidance since the war on terrorism commenced nearly two decades ago. Significantly, it was the first not concerned exclusively with al-Qa'ida. In contrast to the 2003, 2006, and 2011 versions, the latest iteration identified the Islamic State as well as Iran and Iranian-backed Shi'a militias, domestic violent far-right and far-left extremists, and militant single-issue organizations as all presenting significant security concerns. (2)

The most tangible manifestation of the Trump administration's implementation of this strategy was the old made new again: the continuance of the high-value targeting of top terrorist leaders that had dominated both the Bush and Obama administrations' respective approaches to counterterrorism. Accordingly, the elimination of a succession of senior Islamic State and al-Qa'ida leaders followed. Foremost among these was the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State's emir, in October 2019.

Even further inroads were made to al-Qa'ida's senior leadership. In September 2019, President Trump confirmed that Usama bin Ladin's youngest son and presumptive heir apparent, Hamza, had perished as a result of a U.S. "counterterrorism operation in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region" at least two months before. (3) Five months later, the president reported the elimination of Qassim al-Rimi, the leader of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), (4) and in June 2020, U.S. Africa Command provided intelligence and other support that enabled French military forces in Mali to kill the leader of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Abdelmalek Droukdel. (5) Later that same month, a U.S. missile strike claimed the life of Khaled al-Aruri, the de facto commander of Hurras al-Din, al-Qa'ida's closest ally in Syria. (6) And, in August 2020, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (aka Abu Muhammad al-Masri), believed to be al-Qa'ida's second-highest leader, was assassinated in Tehran, reportedly by Israeli operatives, perhaps with U.S. assistance. (7) (a) The United States also cited its counterterrorism strategy to justify the killing of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. "Under my leadership," President Trump declared afterward, "America's policy is unambiguous: To terrorists who harm or intend to harm any American, we will find you; we will eliminate you." (8)

But as tactically successful as the elimination of these terrorist commanders and their many predecessors were, they have proven insufficient to stem the continued growth and geographical expansion of salaf-jihadi and Shi'a radicalization worldwide. There are four times as many salaf-jihadi groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department today than there were in 2001. (9) And much of Iran's regional foreign policy, including its manipulations of the war in Syria, has relied on mobilizing Shi'a proxy forces from Yemen to Pakistan, compiling upward of 150,000 fighters. (10) Any optimism that we are approaching the end of the war on terror is, therefore, likely misplaced.

A very different conclusion and message, however, has been repeatedly expressed by the Trump administration. On successive occasions the president, vice president, and secretary of state among others have declared the defeat of both the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida. (11) Such declarations ft well with Trump's 2016 campaign pledge to end the "stupid endless wars" (12) whereby even the modest numbers of U.S. military and intelligence personnel deployed overseas to support either host-nation or local indigenous counterterrorism operations principally in Syria, Afghanistan, and Africa are further reduced if not eliminated completely.

Yet, as the opening paragraph of the most recent report from the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team tracking the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida operations states: the former "remains resilient" and has actually increased attacks in Iraq and Syria, while the latter has "ingrained itself in local communities and Conflicts." The United Nations' overall assessment of the vitality of the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida is thus at odds with the Trump administration's claims. "Both organizations and their global afliates and supporters," the report argues, "continue to generate violence around the world, whether through insurgency tactics, the direction and facilitation of terrorism or providing the inspiration for attacks." (13)

The Islamic State

Indeed, the Trump administration's own national counterterrorism strategy statement is more closely aligned with the U.N. analysis than with the administration's assertions. The most recent statement of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, for instance, was explicit in its caution that despite the Islamic State's catastrophic military setbacks in Syria and Iraq, "The group's global reach remains robust, with eight official branches and more than two dozen networks regularly conducting terrorist and insurgent operations across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East." (14) Since that time, the Islamic State's operations have expanded to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Mozambique. (15) Hopes that al-Baghdadi's killing would have undermined the group's resiliency were dashed when in quick succession Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (real name Amir Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mawla (16)) was named emir and issued a renewed, blistering call to battle. (17) Without exception, every one of the Islamic State's more than two dozen branches and networks fell into line pledging bay'a--the oath of allegiance and fealty--to al-Qurashi. (18)

Moreover, the Islamic State is still able to call upon an estimated 20,000 fighters worldwide. The vast majority--10,000--remain entrenched in Syria and Iraq; with 3,500 more in Nigeria; another 3,000-3,500 in Mozambique; 2,200 in Afghanistan; and 400 in Libya. (19) With this many men-at-arms, the Islamic State was able to surge attacks in Syria over this past spring's Ramadan and escalate its operations in Iraq. In the latter, for instance, attacks almost doubled between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020. (20) But perhaps the Islamic State's greatest achievement has been its spread to Mozambique. (21) Over the past three years, the group has successfully allied with local Ansar al-Sunna to kill over 2,000 persons. (22) In one single incident in November 2020, more than 50 people were beheaded in...