Team formation with complementary skills

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12296
AuthorMürüvvet Büyükboyaci,Andrea Robbett
Published date01 November 2019
Date01 November 2019
Received: 17 January 2018
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Revised: 2 September 2018
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Accepted: 6 November 2018
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12296
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Team formation with complementary skills
Mürüvvet Büyükboyaci
1
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Andrea Robbett
2
1
Department of Economics, Middle East
Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
2
Department of Economics, Middlebury
College, Middlebury University,
Middlebury, Vermont
Correspondence
Büyükboyaci Mürüvvet, Department of
Economics, Middle East Technical
University, Universities District,
Dumlupinar Bulvari No: 1, 06800
Cankaya, Ankara, Turkey.
Email:muruvvet@metu.edu.tr
Funding information
European Unions Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme under the
Marie SkłodowskaCurie, Grant/Award
Number: 2015ABH67840007
Abstract
One explanation for the prevalence of selfmanaged work teams is that they
enable workers with complementary skills to specialize in the tasks they do
best, a benefit that may be enhanced if workers can sort themselves into teams.
To assess this explanation, we design a realeffort experiment to study the
endogenous formation of teams, and its effect on productivity, when
specialization either is or is not feasible. We find a strong positive interaction
between endogenous team formation and the ability to specialize, indicating
that endogenous team formation is a particularly effective mechanism for
promoting team output in production environments that enable the exploitation
of skill complementarities.
KEYWORDS
comparative advantage, contest, endogenous team formation, matching, team performance,
weakestlink technology
JEL CLASSIFICATION
C91, C92, C71, C72, D72, H41
1
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INTRODUCTION
The use of teambased incentives in the workplace has become increasingly common, with the majority of large firms
employing selfmanaged work teams in recent years (Lazear & Shaw, 2007). One explanation for the increasing
prevalence of work teams, despite the inherent freeriding incentives, is that they allow firms to exploit skill
complementarities among workers (Lazear, 1998, 2000). Such teams are often formed endogenously, particularly in
manufacturing industries, law, academia, and other professional organizations (Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2013).
Selforganization has the potential to further amplify this benefit of teamsprovided that agents are able to successfully
partner with those individuals whose skills best complement their own. Both laboratory and field studies, along with
anecdotal evidence, indicate that enabling workers to voluntarily join teams can have a positive impact on overall
productivity (Hamilton, Nickerson, & Owan, 2003; Herbst, Konrad, & Morath, 2015). However, this study has thus far
focused on how much effort teammates exert, rather than how they allocate effort across distinct tasks or whether
endogenous team formation can enable agents to form teams that exploit skill complementarities. Despite the
prevalence of selfmanaged work teams, there is little direct evidence that teammates are able to successfully coordinate
on an allocation of tasks that maximize team productivity; nor is there evidence that they anticipate such coordination
and sort themselves into teams that enable them to take advantage of skill complementarities.
1
To address these questions, we design an experiment to study the endogenous formation of teams and its effect on
production, in team contests when specialization either is or is not feasible. By denying some teams the ability to
© 2018 The Authors. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
J Econ Manage Strat. 2019;28:713733. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jems
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This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercialNoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is noncommercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
specialize, we are able to assess whether teammates seek out different partners in different production environments.
Additionally, we can isolate the channel through which team formation is likely to be most effective: Facilitating the
formation of teams with complementary skills. Specifically, we consider a simple production environment, in which
two team members must complete two distinct tasks to produce a unit of output. The introduction of multiple tasks,
which can be potentially completed by either team member, incorporates the potential gains from specialization that is
a natural feature of most team production environments (Lazear, 1998). Our experimental design allows us to induce
and control participantsabilities in each task, by manipulating how much they can accomplish within the time period.
Among the population of potential team members, all agents have the same overall capacity to complete tasks, but
differ in the distribution of their induced skillsacross the two tasks and which task they are bestat. Specifically, our
population is equally divided among agents who are equally skilled at each task, agents who are slightly better at one
task and weaker at the other, and agents who are very good at one task and very poor at the other.
Within this setting, we conduct a 2 × 2 team contest experiment, in which we independently vary: (a) Whether
teammates have some ability to choose their partner or they instead rotate through the different possible match
types in the population; (b) whether each worker must completebothtaskstoproduceoritispossibletospecialize.
In the endogenously formed team contests, participants first rank each possible teammate on the basis of the agents
observed productivity in each task and agents are sorted into teams on the basis of these rankings. We predict that
the attractiveness of teammates with different skill sets will depend on whether the agents anticipate working
independently on both tasks or specializing in one task. To assess these predictions, we exogenously vary whether or
not specialization is possible by changing how teammatesefforts are aggregated in a perfectcomplements
production function. In half the sessions, each teammate must work on both tasks to produce and we expect all
productivity types to strictly prefer partners with more balanced skills. In the other sessions, participants have
flexibility in how to allocate the division of tasks across teammates. If they anticipate that they will be able to
coordinate on an outcome in which team members specialize, then their preferences over teammates should flip,
with agents no longer valuing balanced skill sets and instead preferring those who are best at the task at which they
themselves are weakest.
We find that endogenous team formation has a positive effect on productivity, primarily through the channel of
producing more efficient matches, with little effect on effort or coordination. Our results indicate that team formation
promotes productivity by facilitating the formation of teams of complementary skills that enable agents to focus on the
task they do best. Teammates who cannot specialize spend most of their time on their weaker task and divide their time
similarly regardless of how teams form. When specialization is possible, in contrast, participants spend significantly
more time on their stronger task when they are able to form their own teams. Consistent with our predictions,
participants prefer to be matched with more balanced types when specialization is not possible, but rank those with
more extreme, but complementary, skills higher when the teammates can specialize. As a result, the realized teams in
both treatments are characterized by balanced types matched with other balanced types and extreme types matched
with other extreme types. Surprisingly, in situations when agents are predicted to be indifferent between two types,
participants rank those with complementary skills as more preferred teammates, even when specialization is not
possible. Our results highlight the remarkable ability of agents to successfully sort into teams in which they can be most
productive and indicate that, as a result, endogenous team formation is particularly effective as a means of exploiting
gains from complementarities in worker skills. The ability to seek out and partner with other agents whose skills are
complementary is likely to be particularly valuable in situations where workers’“on the groundknowledge of the
relative strengths of their coworkers is superior to the information held by management.
Our paper is most closely related to the strands of the experimental literature concerning behavior in team contests
and endogenous group formation in strategic interactions. As discussed above, the primary focus of the team contest
literature is on the provision of costly effort and an overarching conclusion is that teams regularly overprovided chosen
effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
2
With respect to the optimal formation of teams under different production
technologies, Brookins, Lightle, and Ryvkin (2015, 2017) investigate how a principal should organize agents who differ
in their overall abilities when teammatesefforts are perfect substitutes or perfect complements. These studies differ
from the current paper in that they study teammates engaged in an identical task with heterogeneous values for the
prize or costs of effort, whereas we consider teammates each engaged in two distinct tasks, with heterogeneous skills at
each, while holding constant their overall costs and benefits.
The experiment most similar to the current design is Büyükboyaci and Robbett (2017), which used the same two
task production environment.
3
That study considered the effect of team contests by varying whether participants
competed in teams or individually, as well as whether team members could specialize and communicate. The results
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BÜYÜKBOYACI AND ROBBETT

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