Tax‐Efficient Asset Management: Evidence from Equity Mutual Funds

Published date01 April 2020
Date01 April 2020
AuthorCLEMENS SIALM,HANJIANG ZHANG
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12843
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE VOL. LXXV, NO. 2 APRIL 2020
Tax-Efficient Asset Management: Evidence from
Equity Mutual Funds
CLEMENS SIALM and HANJIANG ZHANG
ABSTRACT
We investigate the relation between tax burdens and mutual fund performance from
both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The theoretical model introduces
heterogeneous tax clienteles in an environment with decreasing returns to scale and
shows that the equilibrium performance of mutual funds depends on the size of the
tax clienteles. Our empirical results show that the performance of U.S. equity mutual
funds is related to their tax burdens. We find that tax-efficient funds exhibit not only
superior after-tax performance, but also superior before-tax performance due to lower
trading costs, favorable style exposures, and better selectivity.
INVESTMENT TAXES HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL impact on the long-term performance
of taxable mutual fund investors. Mutual funds in the United States are re-
quired to distribute their dividend income and their realized capital gains to
their shareholders. These distributions are taxed at the fund investor level at
different rates. In particular, short-term capital gains distributions, generated
by the liquidation of fund positions held for less than one year, are typically
taxed at substantially higher rates than long-term capital gains distributions.
Unrealized capital gains, meanwhile, remain untaxed until the securities are
Clemens Sialm is at the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, and
at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Hanjiang Zhang is at Washington State Univer-
sity. We thank Stefan Nagel (the Editor); an Associate Editor; two referees; Dan Bergstresser;
Jonathan Cohn; Magnus Dahlquist; Joel Dickson; Steve Dimmock; Rich Evans; Daniel Feen-
berg; Will Gerken; Greg Kadlec; Xiang Kang; Inmoo Lee; Marlena Lee; David Lesmond; Tobias
Moskowitz; Tim Park; Jim Poterba; John Shoven; Nathan Sosner; Juan Sotes-Paladino; Laura
Starks; Sheridan Titman; Scott Weisbenner; participants at the 2015 American Finance Associa-
tion Meetings in Boston, the 2015 Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research Conference
in Singapore, the 2018 Conference of Swiss Economists Abroad in Zurich, the 2018 European
Symposium in Financial Markets in Gerzensee, and the 2018 Finance Down Under Conference
in Melbourne; and seminar participants at AQR Capital Management, Georgetown University,
Georgia State University, McGill University, Monash University, Northeastern University, Notre
Dame University, Stanford University, Tulane University, University of California at Riverside,
University of Delaware, University of Illinois at Chicago, University of Kentucky, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, University of New South Wales, University of Sydney, the University
of Texas at Austin, University of Texas at San Antonio, and YorkUniversity for helpful comments.
We also thank Daniel Sialm for research assistance. Clemens Sialm is an independent consultant
with AQR Capital Management and thanks the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research for
financial support during his Sabbatical leave. We are grateful to the Geneva Institute for Wealth
Management for their research award.
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12843
C2019 the American Finance Association
735
736 The Journal of Finance R
liquidated. In this paper, we shed light on the costs and benefits of tax-efficient
asset management by investigating the before- and after-tax performance of
U.S. equity mutual funds with different tax management strategies.
Mutual funds can reduce the tax burdens of their shareholders by defer-
ring the realization of capital gains, by accelerating the realization of capital
losses, and by avoiding securities with high dividend yields, as discussed by
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002). Such tax management strategies, however,
constrain funds’ investment choices and may reduce their before-tax perfor-
mance. On the other hand, fund managers who are sufficiently savvy to avoid
taxes may exhibit superior investment abilities in other dimensions as well.
For instance, tax-efficient fund managers may generate lower trading costs,
take on favorable factor exposures, and demonstrate superior stock selection
and timing abilities.
To better understand the equilibrium relation between before- and after-
tax returns across mutual funds, we develop a stylized model with different
investment strategies and heterogeneous tax clienteles. Investors have access
to investment opportunities that face different tax burdens and that are subject
to decreasing returns to scale, as suggested by Berk and Green (2004). The
model shows that the returns of the different investment strategies depend
on the distribution of tax clienteles. If the proportion of tax-exempt investors
is relatively high, then tax-exempt investors are the dominant investors and
before-tax returns are equalized across the strategies. Conversely, if taxable
investors are dominant, then after-tax returns are equalized. At intermediate
distribution levels, neither before-tax nor after-tax returns are equalized, in
contrast to the predictions by Berk and Green (2004).
To empirically estimate the relation between tax efficiency and fund perfor-
mance, we use data on a comprehensive sample of U.S. equity mutual funds
between 1990 and 2016. We find that taxes have a significant effect on the
performance of taxable fund investors. On average, fund shareholders in the
highest tax bracket are estimated to pay investment taxes that amount to
1.08% of their investment value per year. This tax burden is similar in size
to fund expenses, which have received substantial attention in the literature
(e.g., French (2008)).
We find that the tax burden of mutual funds can be predicted by their invest-
ment styles, by the flows of fund investors, and by the capital gains overhang.
Tax burdens tend to be higher for funds that focus on small-capitalization and
value portfolios, as these investment styles trigger relatively high realizations
of capital gains. In addition, tax burdens increase as funds experience redemp-
tions by fund investors or volatile investor flows. Finally, funds’ tax burdens
are positively related to turnover, fund age, and the capital gains overhang.
We further find that the tax efficiency of mutual funds is highly persistent,
as mutual funds tend to maintain consistent styles and investment strategies
over time. A one-standard-deviation increase in prior tax burden is associated
with a significant increase in the tax burden of a fund over the next year of
between 0.44 and 0.47 percentage points.
Tax-Efficient Asset Management 737
Turning to our main analysis, we find that the before- and after-tax perfor-
mance of U.S. equity mutual funds is related to their prior tax burdens. We
find that tax-efficient funds generate not only superior after-tax performance,
but also superior before-tax performance over the next year. A one-standard-
deviation decrease in the tax burden over the prior three years (which is equal to
1.18 percentage points) is associated with a significant increase in the before-tax
return of a fund of between 0.39 and 0.55 percentage points over the next year.
Tax-efficient funds generate superior after-tax returns in the future due both
to higher before-tax returns and lower tax burdens. Thus, our results indicate
that tax-efficient asset management strategies, as practiced by U.S. equity
mutual funds between 1990 and 2016, exhibit favorable returns after as well
as before taxes. The superior pre-tax performance of tax-efficient funds is not
eliminated by fund flows, as would be expected from the stylized benchmark
model with decreasing returns to scale. This puzzling result indicates that fund
investors are not fully aware of the benefits of tax efficiency.
To further investigate the pre-tax performance differences across funds with
differential tax efficiency, we study the trading costs, style exposures, and
investment abilities of mutual funds. The superior pre-tax performance of tax-
efficient funds can be explained by lower trading costs, favorable style expo-
sures, and superior investment ability. These results indicate that the invest-
ment ability of fund managers is correlated across different dimensions: fund
managers who avoided taxable distributions in prior years face lower trad-
ing costs, exhibit superior selectivity, and take on favorable style exposures in
future years.
Mutual funds might be tax efficient not because these funds deliberately
minimize their tax burden, but rather because these funds’ strategies gener-
ate relatively low tax burdens as a byproduct. For example, a low-turnover
fund that invests in large capitalization stocks should be relatively tax effi-
cient because this fund liquidates stock positions infrequently and any such
liquidations are concentrated among poorly performing stocks that are ex-
cluded from large-capitalization benchmarks. To address this possibility, we
study the performance of mutual funds that explicitly classify themselves as
tax-managed funds. We find that after taxes, self-designated tax-efficient funds
outperform matched funds in the same families with similar investment styles.
Furthermore, the self-designated tax-efficient funds do not significantly under-
perform other funds before taxes, indicating that the constraints imposed by
tax-efficient asset management do not appear to have negative performance
consequences. Since these matched funds exhibit similar investment styles and
have similar management teams, these matching results are consistent with
our main results, which indicate that performance differences can be explained
by trading costs, style exposures, and investment abilities.
Our paper is related to a small literature that investigates the tax impli-
cations of mutual fund management. Jeffrey and Arnott (1993), Dickson and
Shoven (1995), and Arnott, Kalesnik, and Schuesler (2018) show that invest-
ment taxes play an important role for mutual fund investors. Barclay,Pearson,
and Weisbach (1998) discuss the conflict that mutual fund managers face in

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