The Journal of Finance

Publisher:
Wiley
Publication date:
2021-02-01
ISBN:
0022-1082

Latest documents

  • (Re‐)Imag(in)ing Price Trends

    We reconsider trend‐based predictability by employing flexible learning methods to identify price patterns that are highly predictive of returns, as opposed to testing predefined patterns like momentum or reversal. Our predictor data are stock‐level price charts, allowing us to extract the most predictive price patterns using machine learning image analysis techniques. These patterns differ significantly from commonly analyzed trend signals, yield more accurate return predictions, enable more profitable investment strategies, and demonstrate robustness across specifications. Remarkably, they exhibit context independence, as short‐term patterns perform well on longer time scales, and patterns learned from U.S. stocks prove effective in international markets.

  • Discount Rates, Debt Maturity, and the Fiscal Theory

    This paper examines how the transmission of government portfolio risk arising from maturity operations depends on the stance of monetary/fiscal policy. Accounting for risk premia in the fiscal theory allows the government portfolio to affect expected inflation, even in a frictionless economy. The effects of maturity rebalancing on expected inflation in the fiscal theory depend directly on the conditional nominal term premium, giving rise to an optimal debt‐maturity policy that is state‐dependent. In a calibrated macrofinance model, we demonstrate that maturity operations have sizable effects on expected inflation and output through our novel risk transmission mechanism.

  • Selling Fast and Buying Slow: Heuristics and Trading Performance of Institutional Investors

    Are market experts prone to heuristics, and do these heuristics transfer across buying and selling domains? We investigate this question using a unique data set of institutional investors with portfolios averaging $573 million. A striking finding emerges: While there is evidence of skill in buying, selling decisions underperform substantially, even relative to random‐selling strategies. This holds despite the similarity between the two decisions in frequency, substance, and consequences for performance. Evidence suggests an asymmetric allocation of cognitive resources such as attention can explain the discrepancy: We document a systematic, costly heuristic process for selling but not for buying.

  • ISSUE INFORMATION
  • Global Pricing of Carbon‐Transition Risk

    The energy transition away from fossil fuels exposes companies to carbon‐transition risk. Estimating the market‐based premium associated with carbon‐transition risk in a cross section of 14,400 firms in 77 countries, we find higher stock returns associated with higher levels and growth rates of carbon emissions in all sectors and most countries. Carbon premia related to emissions growth are greater for firms located in countries with lower economic development, larger energy sectors, and less inclusive political systems. Premia related to emission levels are higher in countries with stricter domestic climate policies. The latter have increased with investor awareness about climate change risk.

  • Informational Black Holes in Financial Markets

    We show that information aggregation in primary financial markets fails precisely when investors hold socially useful information for screening projects. Being wary of the Winner's Curse, less optimistic investors refrain from making financing offers, since their offers would be accepted only when a project is unviable. Their information is therefore lost. The Winner's Curse and associated information loss grow with the number of informed market participants, so that larger markets can lead to worse financing decisions and higher cost of capital for firms seeking financing. Precommitment to ration fundraising allocations, collusive club bidding, and shorting markets can mitigate the inefficiency.

  • The Legal Origins of Financial Development: Evidence from the Shanghai Concessions

    The primary challenge to assessing the legal origins view of comparative financial development is identifying exogenous changes in legal systems. We assemble new data on Shanghai's British and French concessions between 1845 and 1936. Two regime changes altered British and French legal jurisdiction over their respective concessions. By examining the changing application of different legal traditions to adjacent neighborhoods within the same city and controlling for military, economic, and political characteristics, we offer new evidence consistent with the legal origins view: the financial development advantage in the British concession widened after Western legal jurisdiction intensified and narrowed after it abated.

  • Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution

    This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (“prompt corrective action”) or continues managing the assets at a reduced skill level (“resolution under receivership”). In either case, I show that if the regulator tolerates fewer withdrawals until intervention, the depositors may react by preempting the regulator: they run on the bank more often ex ante. A policy of never intervening can leave the bank more stable than a conservative intervention policy.

  • Attention Spillover in Asset Pricing

    Exploiting a screen display feature whereby the order of stock display is determined by the stock's listing code, we lever a novel identification strategy and study how the interaction between overconfidence and limited attention affect asset pricing. We find that stocks displayed next to those with higher returns in the past two weeks are associated with higher returns in the future week, which are reverted in the long run. This is consistent with our conjectures that investors tend to trade more after positive investment experience and are more likely to pay attention to neighboring stocks, both confirmed using trading data.

  • Retail Trading in Options and the Rise of the Big Three Wholesalers

    We document a rapid increase in retail trading in options in the United States. Facilitated by payment for order flow (PFOF) from wholesalers executing retail orders, retail trading recently reached over 60% of total market volume. Nearly 90% of PFOF comes from three wholesalers. Exploiting new flags in transaction‐level data, we isolate wholesaler trades and build a novel measure of retail options trading. Our measure comoves with equity‐based retail activity proxies and drops significantly during U.S. brokerage platform outages and trading restrictions. Retail investors prefer cheaper, weekly options with average bid‐ask spread of 12.6%, and lose money on average.

Featured documents

  • Buyout Activity: The Impact of Aggregate Discount Rates

    Buyout booms form in response to declines in the aggregate risk premium. We document that the equity risk premium is the primary determinant of buyout activity rather than credit‐specific conditions. We articulate a simple explanation for this phenomenon: a low risk premium increases the present...

  • Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value

    This paper introduces a new hand‐collected data set that tracks restrictions on shareholder rights at approximately 1,000 firms from 1978 to 1989. In conjunction with the 1990 to 2006 IRRC data, we track shareholder rights over 30 years. Most governance changes occurred during the 1980s. We find a...

  • Capital Account Liberalization and Aggregate Productivity: The Role of Firm Capital Allocation

    We study the effects of capital account liberalization on firm capital allocation and aggregate productivity in 10 Eastern European countries. Using a large firm‐level data set, we show that capital account liberalization decreases the dispersion in the return to capital across firms, particularly...

  • Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws

    We argue and demonstrate empirically that a firm's institutional and legal context has first‐order effects in tests that use state antitakeover laws for identification. A priori, the size and direction of a law's effect on a firm's takeover protection depends on (i) other state antitakeover laws, (i...

  • Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross‐Border Bank Acquisitions

    We study how differences in bank regulation influence cross‐border bank acquisition flows and share price reactions to cross‐border deal announcements. Using a sample of 7,297 domestic and 916 majority cross‐border deals announced between 1995 and 2012, we find evidence of a form of “regulatory...

  • Capital Share Risk in U.S. Asset Pricing

    A single macroeconomic factor based on growth in the capital share of aggregate income exhibits significant explanatory power for expected returns across a range of equity characteristic portfolios and nonequity asset classes, with risk price estimates that are of the same sign and similar in...

  • Borrow Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts

    Private equity funds pay particular attention to capital structure when executing leveraged buyouts, creating an interesting setting for examining capital structure theories. Using a large, international sample of buyouts from 1980 to 2008, we find that buyout leverage is unrelated to the cross‐sect...

  • CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short‐Termism

    This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very sensitive to short‐term performance. This...

  • AFA 2019 ATLANTA MEETINGS SEVENTY‐NINTH ANNUAL MEETING AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION Atlanta, Georgia
  • Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution

    This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (“prompt corrective action”)...

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