TASER® Exposure and Cognitive Impairment

• Date: 01 February 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12173
• Author: Robert J. Kane,Michael D. White
• Published date: 01 February 2016

RESEARCH ARTICLE

TASER EXPOSURE AND COGNITIVE

IMPAIRMENT

TASER RExposure and Cognitive

Impairment

Implications for Valid Miranda Waivers and the Timing

of Police Custodial Interrogations

Robert J. Kane

Drexel University

Michael D. White

Arizona State University

Research Summary

This study reports findings from a randomized controlled trial that examined the effects

of the TASERR(a conducted energy weapon sold by TASER International, Scottsdale,

Arizona) on several dimensions of cognitive functioning. The research demonstrated

that in a sample of healthy human volunteer participants, TASER exposure led to

significant and substantial reductions in (a) short-term auditory recall and (b) abilities

to assimilate new information through auditory processes. The effects lasted up to 1 hour

for most subjects, almost all of whom returned to baseline 60 minutes postexposure.

The authors thank Justin Ready, Carl Yamashiro, Sharon Goldsworthy, Darya McClain, Lisa Dario, Andrea

Borrego, and Natalie Todak for their important contributions to this project. The authors express their deep

gratitude to the physicians and health-care professionals at Hope Research Institute and Freedom Pain

Hospital in Scottsdale, Arizona. The authors are grateful for the guidance provided by the project’s Advisory

Group: Dr. George P. Prigitano, Dr. Neil H. Pliskin, Dr. Jeffrey D. Ho, Dr. Donald M. Dawes, Jeremy D. Mussman,

Esq., and Chief Frank Balkcom. They also thank the following police officers from Glendale, Arizona: Shawn

Dirks and Brian Ong, who administered the TASER exposures. Finally, the authors also thank the more than 20

graduate students from Arizona State University who assisted with data collection and the 142 individuals

who participated in the study.

This project was funded by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice (project number

2011-IJ-CX-0102). Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect

the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Direct correspondence to Robert J. Kane,

Department of Criminology and Justice Studies, Drexel University, 3141 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA

19104 (e-mail: rjk72@drexel.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12173 C2015 American Society of Criminology 79

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 1

Research Article Taser Exposure and Cognitive Impairment

Policy Implications

The study applies the findings of reduced cognitive functioning among healthy partic-

ipants in a laboratory setting to criminal suspects in field settings and questions the

abilities of “average” suspects to waive their Mirand a rights knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily within 60 minutes of a TASER exposure. The study poses the ques-

tion: What would it cost police to wait 60 minutes after a TASER deployment before

engaging suspects in custodial interrogations?

When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miranda v.Arizona (1966), it did more

than require police officers to advise suspects of their Fifth and Sixth Amend-

ment rights prior to engaging them in custodial interrogations. It required

officers to obtain a “valid waiver” before they could allow suspects to, in effect, relinquish

their rights that protected them against self-incrimination and guaranteed them legal repre-

sentation during interrogations. According to the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, such waivers

could be accepted only if suspects made them knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In

other decisions—both before and after Miranda v. Arizona—the Court has treated “know-

ing,” “intelligent,” and “voluntary” as legal concepts to be assessed independently of one

another in evaluations of suspects’ competency to waive their rights (Dickerson v. United

States, 2000; Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964; Fare v. Mic hae l C., 1979; In re Gault, 1967; Johnson

v. Zerbst, 1938). In general, the waiver requirement contains two components (Moran v.

Burbine, 1986: 2260):

1. It must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate

choice.”

2. It must be “made with a full awareness of both the natureof the right being abandoned

and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”

Note that “awareness” generally refers to the knowing requirement, whereas the “conse-

quences” generally refers to the intelligent requirement.

The Miranda v. Arizona (1966) decision also is notable for not requiring officers to

use specific or standardized language when advising suspects of their so-called Miranda

rights. As a result, research has identified at least 47 different versions of Miranda

warnings in use across the United States (e.g., Greenfield, Dougherty, Jackson, Podboy, and

Zimmerman, 2001; Helms, 2003), as well as more than 400 different Miranda components

(Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, Sewell, and Hazelwood, 2007). Moreover, even though

Miranda warnings range in complexity from first-grade to postgraduate school reading

levels (Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, et al., 2007: 185), the Court has never established a

bright-line lower threshold of age, intelligence, education, or mental fitness to determine,

a priori, suspects’ capacities (or lack thereof) to waive their rights knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily. Rather, through several decisions (e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 1987 and

80 Criminology & Public Policy