Targeted Killings

• Date: 01 February 2017
• Published date: 01 February 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12282

POLICY ESSAY

TARGETED KILLINGS IN THE WAR

ON TERROR

Targeted Killings

How Should We Assess Them?

Brian Forst

American University

In the great debate over what to do about terrorism, a particularly vexing set of questions

surrounds the tactic of targeted killings: Are they effective? Are they just? Under what

circumstances should they be used? Are viable alternatives available, such as targeted

arrests or greater use of “soft power?” Are the alternatives more effective? Under what

circumstances?

The first of these questions, whether the tactic is effective, is of special interest to social

scientists because it falls in their wheelhouse—it can be addressed readily and dispassionately

by using the framework of theoretical and empirical analysis. But there are complications

even regarding the question of effectiveness. The tactic may be effective in disrupting a

terrorist organization in the short term but not in the long term. It may be effective in

ending certain types of terrorist activities and in particular settings but not in others. It

may be effective politically in the country that launches the attack but not militarily on the

ground. It may be effective militarily but not diplomatically either in the land of the attack

or among international alliances. It may be either more or less effective on any dimension

than the available data are capable of revealing.

Even if we had valid responses for all these contingencies, the tactic of targeted killings

will be more acceptable for some circumstances than for others. We have not yet organized

our thinking about the use of targeted killings to be able to assemble a model to support a

coherent policy that resists the slippery slope problem—the tendency to use the tactic in a

variety of situations where its costs exceed the benefits simply because it is believed to have

succeeded before, elsewhere. When the option of military restraint against terrorism is po-

litically imperiled by an appearance of presidential weakness, the least intrusive intervention

is likely to get overused, however counterproductive it might be (Walt, 2016). Rigorous

Direct correspondence to Brian Forst, 2513 Pegasus Lane, Reston, VA 20191-4226 (e-mail:

bforst@american.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12282 C2017 American Society of Criminology 221

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 16 rIssue 1