Supreme Court Outcomes in Criminal Justice Cases (1994-2012 Terms)

• Published date: 01 December 2015
• Date: 01 December 2015
• Author: Kevin G. Buckler
• DOI: 10.1177/0887403414544954
• Subject Matter: Articles

Criminal Justice Policy Review

2015, Vol. 26(8) 773 –804

© 2014 SAGE Publications

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DOI: 10.1177/0887403414544954

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Article

Supreme Court Outcomes in

Criminal Justice Cases

(1994-2012 Terms): An

Examination of Status

Differential and Amici Curiae

Effects

Kevin G. Buckler1

Abstract

This study examines the role of status differential between the involved parties and

amici curiae participation in explaining variation in U.S. Supreme Court criminal

justice decisions that favor the government interest over the interest of the other

party (1994-2012 terms). The study finds status differential between the involved

parties to be a significant predictor of outcome. Repeat player effects were found for

special interests that file in support of the government entity (U.S. Solicitor General

and Criminal Justice Legal Foundation), but not for special interests who file for

the other party (the American Civil Liberties Union and National Association of

Criminal Defense Lawyers). The study found that greater levels of aggregate amici

curiae participation (all interest group activity) in the direction of the other party

significantly reduce the likelihood of a case outcome that favors the government.

Implications are discussed.

Keywords

criminal justice policy, U.S. Supreme Court, status differential, amici curiae, repeat

players

The field of criminal justice has a rich conflict-based tradition of placing at the center

of its inquiry the notion of status as it pertains to the ability of the involved party to

1Prairie View A&M University, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kevin Buckler, Department of Justice Studies, College of Juvenile Justice and Psychology, Prairie View

A&M University, P.O. Box 518, MS2600, Prairie View, TX 77446, USA.

Email: kgbuckler@pvamu.edu

544954CJPXXX10.1177/0887403414544954Criminal Justice Policy ReviewBuckler

research-article2014

774 Criminal Justice Policy Review 26(8)

ward off the power and authority of the government entity pursuing an adversarial

action (Liu et al., 1998). Most extant research on the status of the involved party

focuses on socioeconomic indicators and their impacts on criminal justice outcomes.

These indicators often include race, income, ethnicity, and educational attainment.

Some recent research finds that minority, the poor, and the less educated are at a rela-

tive disadvantage on criminal justice outcomes (see, for instance, Hartley, Maddan, &

Spohn, 2007; Mitchell, 2005; Phillips, 2009; Shepard Engel & Calnon, 2004). Notably,

scholars who examine status measures suggest that these effects are situational. These

effects are present for certain offenses but not others (see, Chiricos & Waldo, 1975;

D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993; Jankovich, 1978; Reiman, 1979). These socioeco-

nomic effects are also primarily present in particular social, political, and historical

contexts (Benson & Walker, 1988; Liu et al., 1998; Myers, 1987; Peterson & Hagan,

1984). The empirical examinations of status effects in the field of criminal justice

focus nearly exclusively on police, lower court, and correctional decision points. An

important area of study left unexplored in the available criminal justice research is the

extent to which the notion of status of the involved party has an impact on appellate

court outcomes in criminal justice cases, particularly at the U.S. Supreme Court level.

Status of the involved party assumes a slightly different meaning in the context of

appellate court processes. In U.S. Supreme Court criminal justice cases, a defendant

convicted of a crime by a lower court and incarcerated or fined for the offense carries

a substantial stigma linked to the adverse decision at the earlier stage of the process.

This stigma is a circumstance that to an extent is structurally established. For instance,

on an occasion whereby the appellate court reviews a decision of fact resolved by a

trial judge (such as whether a potential jury member is biased), the appellate court

most typically defers to the judgment of the lower court judge unless there is evidence

of “clear error.” In habeas corpus and other court processes that follow an exhaustion

of original appeal remedies following a conviction, the convict carries the stigma of

having already lost a round of original appeals following the conviction. In each

instance—whether it is the stigma associated with being a convict who is in the origi-

nal appellate stage or that of a convict who has exhausted original appeals—there is a

stigma that a party to certain other criminal justice cases (such as a citizen who files a

Section 1983 lawsuit) need not endure.

The stigma that a convicted party must contend with may very well be magnified

by the relative status of the government entity or agent in the role of adversary in the

appellate matter. Kritzer (2003) asserts that government entities and agents have an

advantage over private individuals because the government makes the rules that the

court applies and has ways of “stacking the deck” in its favor, including having judges

that are loyal to the state or government. There is extensive empirical evidence sup-

porting the primacy of the government entity in cases where a government entity is a

party to the litigation (Atkins, 1991; Farole, 1999; McCormick, 1993; Sheehan,

Mishler, & Songer, 1992; Smyth, 2000). Prior scholarship, moreover, suggests that in

data sets that include both state and federal cases, when the U.S. government or an

agent of the U.S. government is a party to the appellate case, the U.S. Supreme Court

case outcome is more likely to favor the government entity over the other party

Buckler 775

involved (Buckler, Davila, & Wilson, 2011). The status of the other party who opposes

the government entity in an appellate case before the U.S. Supreme Court and the

status of the government entity (e.g., federal, state, or local) may be considered rela-

tive to one another (Collins, 2004, 2007), as a status differential.

The notion on status differential between the government and the other party should

not, however, be construed as essentially determinate of the U.S. Supreme Court out-

come. In appellate court practice, third-party entities with a substantive interest (for

future cases) in how the appellate court resolves a particular point of law may file

amici curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs with the Court. These briefs represent an

effort by the interest group to influence the direction of the final decision of the Court.

In a context rife with social and culture conflict, the American legal system provides a

framework through which organizations and individuals with different interests and

values compete in attempt to shape the state and the social structure (see Chambliss &

Seidman, 1971; McCaghy, 1976; Quinney, 1970; Sellin, 1938; Turk, 1969; Vold,

1958). Adherents to this pluralist conflict theory view criminal justice policy (which

includes the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court), accordingly, as a manifestation of

the core values of those organizations and individuals who possess the power to suc-

cessfully compete for favorable issue definitions and outcomes (Brownstein, 2007;

Fairchild, 1981; Hallet & Palumbo, 1993; Ismaili, 2006; Owens, 2014).

In certain instances of criminal justice questions before the U.S. Supreme Court,

various interest groups that seek a favorable ruling to affect future cases come to the

aid of those with lower status levels than the government entity or agent in the case

(Songer, Kuersten, & Kaheny, 2000). Similarly, certain interest groups may provide

assistance to the government entity or agent in the case to influence decisions in future

cases, in the opposite direction (Ivers & O’Connor, 1987). The filing pattern of interest

groups typically aligns with the Crime Control versus Due Process framework elabo-

rated by Herbert Packer (1968). In most instances, a particular interest group or clas-

sification of interest group (for instance, organizations of municipal and state managers

or district attorneys’ associations) files amici curiae exclusively in support of either

government positions or other party positions. In this regard, interest groups who com-

pete to have their views recognized by U.S. Supreme Court decisions that establish

precedent for future cases are either crime control in their orientation or due process in

their orientation, but generally not both.1

Empirical examinations of interest group effects on criminal justice policy out-

comes are exceedingly rare (Stolz, 2002). Scholars who conduct empirical research in

this area most typically study legislative processes (see Roby, 1969; Stolz, 1984, 1985,

1999, 2005) at the exclusion of appellate court processes (one notable exception is the

work of Ivers & O’Connor, 1987). The extant studies of the influence of special inter-

ests on appellate court processes, moreover, examine court policy outcomes in an

aggregate manner. These studies include in the analyzed data a multitude of case types

and are not narrowly focused on the issue of crime policy (see, for instance, Collins,

2004, 2007, 2008; Collins & Martinek, 2010; Collins & Solowiej, 2007). This point is

an important one; an appellate court’s collective approach to a case and the factors that

justices utilize to inform their decisions may vary across different types of cases. For