Habeas Corpus Law in the Ninth Circuit After Mendoza v. Carey: a New Era?

• Publication year: 2008
• Citation: Vol. 31 No. 04

UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND LAW REVIEWVolume 31, No. 4SUMMER 2008

NOTE

Habeas Corpus Law in the Ninth Circuit After Mendoza v. Carey: A New Era?

Jay W. Spencer(fn*)

I. Introduction

To protect the innocent and punish the wicked, we as a society often choose to incarcerate criminals. By its very nature, incarceration dictates that certain prisoner rights be limited in order to achieve society's purposes.(fn1) The difficulty arises in striking a balance between serving the functions of incarceration and protecting the basic rights of the prisoner.(fn2) On June 7, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a split decision in Mendoza v. Carey(fn3) that attempted to strike such a balance. The court granted an evidentiary hearing to an inmate in a habeas corpus proceeding,(fn4) contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions,(fn5) and in so doing encouraged non-English-speaking inmates to assert their right to post-conviction appeals. The court based its decision upon the inmate's alleged inability to either access legal materials in a language in which he was fluent or receive assistance from a translator during the statutory period for filing habeas corpus appeals.(fn6) The writ of habeas corpus is a constitutionally protected right,(fn7) its purpose being, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause."(fn8) Given its importance, the Ninth Circuit's willingness to grant broader access to the writ is a proper step towards assuring that all prisoners, regardless of language spoken or national origin, are offered adequate access to its protections.

After a brief review in Part II of the current habeas corpus appeals practice following the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),(fn9) Part III of this Note will examine the factual and procedural history of Mendoza. Next, Part IV will analyze the case's majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V contrasts Mendoza with factually similar cases in other jurisdictions and demonstrates that, even though the Ninth Circuit stands alone, its ruling strikes a proper balance between limiting abuse of the writ and ensuring that it remains available to all inmates who diligently pursue their rights.

II. Habeas Corpus Law

Federal habeas corpus law is an unusual area of law, often misunderstood even by practitioners.(fn10) Though technically a civil action, the Supreme Court of the United States has characterized habeas practice as "unique," only generally conforming to civil practice.(fn11) Because habeas law follows neither criminal nor civil procedure, the substance and procedure of a typical habeas proceeding may well befuddle a casual observer.

One such confusing aspect involves which substantive grounds a habeas appeal may properly encompass.(fn12) One might assume that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is an extension or an appeal of the criminal action under which the petitioner was jailed, but that is not the case.(fn13) Instead, habeas proceedings are initiated by inmates who believe that their continued imprisonment violates their federal constitutional rights.(fn14) It is, therefore, not a means to attack ordinary procedural or substantive errors that occurred at trial; rather, errors alleged in a habeas petition must rise to constitutional proportions.(fn15) For example, unless errors at trial were so substantial and prejudicial as to implicate a constitutional right of the petitioner, he or she may not use habeas to correct erroneous factual determinations, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, or challenge the admission of evidence.(fn16) The writ of habeas corpus is instead a "procedural device for subjecting executive, judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny."(fn17) For these reasons, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is distinct from an appeal of a criminal proceeding.

Procedurally, federal habeas practice can also prove confusing.(fn18) The process begins when a prisoner petitions the federal district court that sentenced them for a writ of habeas corpus.(fn19) Because the right to counsel(fn20) does not reach civil proceedings such as habeas petitions, a petitioner must often research and draft his or her petition without legal assistance.(fn21) The court may dismiss a petition for any number of reasons.(fn22) In order to better determine the validity of the petitioner's factual allegations, the court may schedule an evidentiary hearing at any time after the petition is filed.(fn23) The court will then issue a ruling on the petition.(fn24) If the court denies the writ, the petitioner must obtain a Certificate of Appealability in order to appeal the ruling.(fn25) The end result of a successful petition ranges from a new sentencing hearing to the actual release of the prisoner, depending on the severity of the violations found.(fn26)

This Note focuses on postconviction petitions for habeas relief to federal courts, whether authored by state or federal prisoners. Although the writ is available before a conviction, such actions are rare: federal courts nearly always require a petitioner to first exhaust his state court remedies.(fn27) As a result, the vast majority of habeas actions brought in federal courts are postconviction actions brought by inmates in state or federal prisons.(fn28) It is this type of habeas petition that was at issue in Mendoza.(fn29)

In the years preceding the 1996 enactment of the AEDPA, Congress sought to amend perceived inadequacies in habeas corpus law.(fn30) Congressional observers had noticed for some years both a pattern of delayed filings and an increase in the number of filings of petitions for writs.(fn31) At the time, there was no restriction as to when a prisoner could file a habeas petition,(fn32) which resulted in the filing of a multitude of "stale" claims.(fn33) Congress concluded that habeas petitioners were abusing the system.(fn34) Political pressure to change habeas appeals increased following the conviction and pending execution of Timothy McVeigh for the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building.(fn35) Accordingly, Congress enacted the AEDPA.(fn36)

The AEDPA encompasses a broad range of topics, including the streamlining of habeas and death penalty appeal procedures, the institution of mandatory victim restitution, and the implementation of various provisions regarding international terrorist acts.(fn37) Specifically, the AEDPA applies a one-year limitation period to applications for a writ of habeas corpus by inmates incarcerated pursuant to a state court judgment.(fn38) The statute does, however, allow for statutory tolling of that one-year period while a properly filed application for postconviction relief is pending.(fn39)

Citing what it called an abuse of the habeas corpus practice, particularly in capital cases,(fn40) Congress expressed an intention to limit delayed and repetitive filings,(fn41) while nevertheless providing prisoners with adequate review "when [they] diligently pursue[] state remedies and applies for federal habeas review in a timely manner."(fn42)

In addition to the AEDPA's tolling provision, courts have been willing to allow equitable tolling of the one-year limitation on the filing of habeas petitions.(fn43) While the statute is silent regarding equitable tolling, a majority of courts allow it upon satisfaction of the extraordinary circumstances test,(fn44) which requires extraordinary circumstances that were beyond the petitioner's control.(fn45) Because the extraordinary circumstances test necessitates a case-by-case factual analysis,(fn46) the doctrine of equitable tolling has created "a complicated, inconsistent procedural morass that is difficult for the most knowledgeable legal scholar to understand."(fn47) From that morass arose Mendoza.

III. The History of Mendoza

Carlos Mendoza, a California state prisoner, was sentenced to fourteen years in prison after pleading no contest to a charge of assault with a firearm.(fn48) Mendoza did not appeal his conviction, which became final on August 21, 2001.(fn49) He spent his first three months of incarceration at a reception center,(fn50) where the law library contained no Spanish-language books.(fn51) Mendoza alleged that guards told him that he could not begin any habeas proceedings until he arrived at his assigned prison.(fn52) After three months at the reception center, he was assigned to Solano State Prison, where he again found no Spanish-language books or forms, no postings about the AEDPA time limit in any language, and no Spanish-speaking clerks or librarians that could assist him.(fn53) Through conversations with other Spanish-speaking inmates in the prison yard, however, he was eventually able to locate a bilingual inmate who agreed to assist him in drafting his habeas petitions.(fn54)

Mendoza finally filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 14, 2003, nearly twenty-one months after his conviction became final.(fn55) Over the next year, with the help of another bilingual inmate, he filed a second habeas petition in the Superior Court of California, a petition in the California Court of Appeals, and two petitions in the California Supreme Court.(fn56) Each of these petitions was denied, with the final denial occurring on March 17...