Strikes in Wartime: Experience with Controls
| Author | Edwin E. Witte |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271624222400121 |
| Published date | 01 November 1942 |
| Date | 01 November 1942 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
128
Strikes
in
Wartime:
Experience
with
Controls
By
EDWIN
E.
WITTE
I N
TOTAL
war,
strikes
are
such
a
se-
rious
menace
that
belligerents
must
seek
to
prevent
their
occurrence
or
to
get
them
settled
as
soon
as
possible.
The
problem,
however,
is
much
more
complex
than
one
of
merely
passing
a
law
making
it
unlawful
to
strike.
This
is
true
particularly
in
democratic
coun-
tries,
in
which
public
opinion
will
not
sanction
the
shooting
of
strikers
as
trai-
tors.
DURING
THE
FIRST
WORLD
WAR
An
account
of the
world
experience
with
efforts
to
minimize
the
menace
of
strikes
in
the
present-day
total
warfare
must
begin
with
the
first
World
War.
In
that
war,
the
policies
pursued
by
the
European
belligerents
on
both
sides
differed
only
in
minor
respects.
Germany
In
the
principal
enemy
country,
Ger-
many,’
an
industrial
truce
was
agreed
upon
between
capital
and
labor
at
the
outbreak
of
the
war.
Community
labor
councils
and
district
and
national
media-
tion
and
arbitration
agencies
were
or-
ganized,
all
with
equal
representation
from
employers
and
trade
unionists.
The
Government
brought
pressure
to
bear
on
employers
to
deal
with
the trade
unions
and
there
was
a
very
marked
increase
in
the
number
of
collective
agreements,
particularly
in
the
heavy
industries.
.
By
1916,
strikes
were
again
on
the
increase.
In
December
of
that
year
the
National
Auxiliary
Service
Act
was
passed,
which
made
all
workers
subject
to
industrial
conscription.
It
estab-
lished
a
national
arbitration
board
for
the
adjustment
of
labor
disputes
occur-
ring
in
national
service
industries,
not
locally
adjusted.
It
also
prohibited
workers
from
leaving
such
industries
without
leaving
certificates
issued
by
local
boards
(whose
chairmen
were
ap-
pointees
of
the
War
Office) .
The
same
act,
however,
also
provided
for
labor
representation
on
all
these
boards
and
required
establishments
employing
five
hundred
or
more
workers
to
set
up
workmen’s
committees,
which
were
to
be
consulted
on
all
labor
matters.
This
satisfied
the trade
unions,
whose
official
leaders
never
wavered
in
their
support
of
the
Government.
By
1917,
however,
strong
opposition
developed
within
the
rank
and
file
of
labor.
There
were
forty
times
as
many
days
lost
through
strikes
in
1917
as
in
1915,
and
three
times
as
many
in
1918
as
in
1917.
In
the
final
collapse,
strikes
among
industrial
workers
played
almost
as
large
a
role
as
did
the
uprisings
in
the
military
forces.
France
In
France
the trade
unions
were
much
weaker
than
in
Germany,
and
in
the
first
years
of
the
war
were
ignored
by
the
Government.
With
the
German
armies
almost
at
the
gates
of
Paris,
labor
disputes
almost
ceased
for
the
time
being.
Once
the
most
serious
men-
ace
was
over,
industrial
unrest
became
manifest.
To
appease
labor,
Albert
Thomas,
one
of
the
principal
labor
leaders,
was
made
Minister
of
Muni-
tions.
Shortly
thereafter,
serious
strikes
broke
out
among
the
munition
workers
in
Paris.
Thomas
then,
in
January
1917,
promulgated
a
decree
forbidding
1
The
author
is
indebted
for
much
of
the
information
about
the
policies
pursued
in
Germany
and
France
during
the
first
World
War
to
a
report
written
in
one
of
his
classes
at
the
University
of
Wisconsin,
several
years
ago,
by
Mr.
Sam
Schwartz,
now
of
Duke
University.
at SAGE PUBLICATIONS on December 4, 2012ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from
To continue reading
Request your trial