Strategic Defence Review 1998: Politics, Power, and Influence in Government Decisions

• Author: Nicholas O'Regan,Glenn Parry,Robert Grattan
• Date: 01 July 2015
• Published date: 01 July 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.2012

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Strat. Change 24: 305–320 (2015)

Published online in Wiley Online Library

(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/jsc.2012

Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Strategic Change

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Strategic Defence Review 1998: Politics, Power,

andInfluence in Government Decisions1

Robert Grattan

Faculty of Business and Law, Bristol Business School, UK

Nicholas O’Regan

Faculty of Business and Law, Bristol Business School, UK

Glenn Parry

Faculty of Business and Law, Bristol Business School, UK

Politics, power, and influence impact upon strategy, where the intention to produce

a foreign policy-based strategic defence review was forgone during last-minute

adjustments and compromises over money.

is paper seeks to present an overview of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review

(SDR) 1997/98 from a strategy process perspective and adopts a view of the SDR

as an attempt to form strategy through discourse. e SDR was a ne-grained,

logical analysis of foreign and defence policy, and was a response mechanism

similar to that used by large organizations and governmental bodies when deter-

mining future strategic direction.

e actual policies relating to defence that emerged are not considered, as

content has been separated from process. During 2009, interviews were conducted

with many of the leading gures involved, which have been supplemented with

reference to Parliamentary documents and information from the Ministry of

Defence (MoD)’s les provided under the Freedom of Information Act. e way

the review was conducted contains elements of organizational politics and power,

but a chance inuence intervened at one point.

A strategic defence review sets out the long-term future shape, size, and vision

for the armed forces. Only six major reviews have happened since World War II.

A major review had been undertaken by the Conservative government and was

published in 1981 as the Defence White Paper. Whilst in opposition Labour

Ministers had made numerous calls for a new strategic defence review and signaled

an intention to undertake a full review should they gain power (Mayhew, 1992;

Clark, 1993, 1996; Squire, 1994). A new defence review was resisted by the

1 JEL classication codes: D21, D83, MOO, M21, Z18.

The UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence

Review was conducted using

logical analysis of foreign policy

to identify requirements, but the

final costs exceeded the funding

allowed by the Treasury, imposing

changes to be made.

The success of individuals in a

strategic process is a function of

the power they can wield directly

and the support they can muster.

Strategic aspirations are always

bounded by resource limitations,

forcing managers to make

changes, however rigorous and

logical their arguments.

306 Robert Grattan, Nicholas O’Regan, and Glenn Parry

Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change

DOI: 10.1002/jsc

process and subsequent emergent behavior which arose.

ird, a reection is presented of the review as a critique

of the attempt by the UK government to form strategy

through discourse. is is followed by a discussion, review,

and critique of the case in light of the literature. e paper

nishes with conclusions and future work.

Research methodology

is case study enabled researchers to examine and inter-

pret the processes that were used within the MoD to

produce a defence policy. Case study research is also useful

when the aim of the research is also to answer ‘how’ and

‘why’ questions (Yin, 2003). is matches the wider aims

of this research, to gain an understanding of how strategy

formulation through discourse manifests itself in practice.

ough our overall focus was on understanding strategy

formation, consideration of the actual process in relation

to theory led to a discussion on the value resulting from

the SDR exercise and how greater value through process

understanding might be delivered in future.

e researchers interviewed as widely as possible but,

inevitably, some whose account would have been valuable

did not wish to be involved. ose who did agree to be

interviewed and gave generously of their valuable time are

listed in the Appendix to this paper. e interviews were

conducted in 2009, were semi-structured, and conducted

face to face. e data obtained enabled researchers to

uncover how informants perceived and interpreted the

situations and events (Bryman, 2008). e themes covered

were largely chosen by the interviewees, but some prompt-

ing was carried out by the interviewer. e main theme

was individuals’ roles in the SDR and the obstacles and

enablers they met. In addition, most interviewees also

gave their perceptions of the subsequent outcome of the

review process. It is noteworthy that all those who were

involved in the actual process were convinced that SDR

was a logical analysis, honestly conducted. All interviews

were recorded and transcribed, and the ethical guidelines

described by Maylor and Blackmon (2005) were used.

Conservative government, claiming that such a review

would damage their credibility and could create instability

in the defence industry, particularly with regard to the

Euroghter fast jet procurement being undertaken at the

time (Arbuthnot, 1997). However, it was signaled very

early on by Labour that the Euroghter would be outside

any such review (O’Neill, 1997).

In 1997 the incoming Labour government honored a

manifesto pledge to conduct a strategic defence review

based on the needs of foreign policy and open to inputs

from whomsoever felt that they had something meaning-

ful to contribute. In May 1997 the review began (Reid,

1997a). Further to the exclusion of the Euroghter, the

Minister for the Armed Forces signaled government com-

mitment to the Trident nuclear deterrent, although the

total number of missiles would be included in the review

(Reid, 1997b,c). e Secretary of State for Defence, the

then Mr. George (and now Lord) Robertson, wrote (1998

Foreword to Essays):

roughout the Review, I have been determined to

extend the principle of openness… and to encourage

informed debate on all aspects of our defence policy.

is review was to be unique – in contrast to earlier

ones conducted behind closed doors at the MoD – and

sought consensus through open discourse. UK Defence

Reviews have been accused of being driven by the Treasury

(Daddow, 2010) and having a distinct focus on saving

money. e 1998 SDR uniquely was to progress from

policy, through the required force structures, to the result-

ing cost. is logical sequence, however, resulted in a

budget that the Treasury was unable to meet.

In presenting the process and critique of strategy for-

mulation, this paper will proceed through the following

stages. First, a description of the case research methodol-

ogy used. Second, the case study analysis of the Strategic

Defence Review 1997/98, identifying the process designed

to produce a logical and sound defence policy. e case

provides a documented history of the deployment of the