Space between concern and crime

• Published date: 01 February 2020
• Author: James Silver
• Date: 01 February 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12474

DOI: 10.1111/1745-9133.12474

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

COUNTERING MASS VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Space between concern and crime

Two recommendations for promoting the adoption of the threat

assessment model and encouraging bystander reporting

James Silver

Worcester State University

Correspondence

JamesSilver, Department of Criminal Justice,

WorcesterState University,486 Chandler

Street,Worcester, MA 01602.

Email:jsilver@worcester.edu

Abstract: Amid widespread agreement that public mass

violence is generally the result of understandable and often

discoverable thoughts and behaviors, the threat assess-

ment model of identifying, assessing, and managing poten-

tial offenders has proven an effective safety approach

across different offender types. In this article I describe

two impediments to the model’s efficacy – incomplete

national adoption of the model, and the disinclination of

some bystanders to report concerning behaviors potentially

related to public mass violence. I propose addressing the

first of these obstacles by encouraging use of dissemina-

tion and implementation science, and the second by extend-

ing emerging application of social norms concepts. Each

approach leverages the strength of existing (and develop-

ing) threat assessment strategies and highlights potentially

productive areas for research and policy innovation.

1INTRODUCTION

Amid widespread agreement that public mass violence is generally the result of understandable and

often discoverable thoughts and behaviors, the threat assessment model of identifying, assessing,

and managing potential offenders has been proven to be an effective safety approach across different

offender types. In this article I describe two impediments to the model’s efficacy: incomplete national

adoption of the model and the disinclination of some bystanders to report concerning behaviors poten-

tially related to public mass violence. I propose addressing the first of these obstacles by encourag-

ing use of dissemination and implementation science and the second by extending emerging appli-

cation of social norms concepts. Each approach can be employed to leverage the strength of existing

Criminology & Public Policy. 2020;19:253–270. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/capp © 2020 American Society of Criminology 253

254 SILVER

(and developing) threat assessment strategies and to highlight potentially productive areas forresearch

and policy innovation.

I make no distinctions between offender types (e.g., active shooter, mass murderer, school shooter,

or terrorist), referring to all those who plan to kill, attempt to kill, or do kill more than one person in a

public space as “public mass casualty offenders” (PMCOs). Although there are sound theoretical and

practical reasons to disaggregate offender types in other contexts and for other purposes, the threat

assessment model can be applied to all who engage in purposive behaviors designed to bring about

the death of others in a public space. This broad approach can also be applied to serve two additional

purposes. First, ongoing definitional debates regarding the minimum number of victims to qualify as

a “mass” event (e.g., a three- or four-victim threshold to qualify as a mass murder) can be avoided.

Second, from a theoretical perspective, the pre-attack behaviors and motivation(s) that underlie an

attempt to kill more than one person in public are recognized as not necessarily related to the ability

to accomplish that objective (Silva & Capellan, 2018).

I consider the public mass casualty events that are the focus of current legislative and policy dis-

cussions (Krouse & Richardson, 2015), excluding primarily domestic violence events that occur in the

home and that are often treated in the literature as conceptually distinct from an act of public violence

(Holmes & Holmes, 1992; Petee, Padgett, & York, 1997). I also exclude events arising from gang

and/or organized crime activities as these offenders are typically considered to have different moti-

vations from those who attack in populated and public places (Madfis, 2014b), and they may involve

pre-attack behaviors different in both kind and frequency from those of PMCOs.

2THREAT ASSESSMENT

The idea that most public mass casualty events are the result of understandable and often discoverable

thoughts and behaviors has been widely confirmed in studies of diverseoffender types, including public

mass murderers and shooters (Fridel, 2017; Gill, Silver, Horgan, & Corner, 2017; Krouse & Richard-

son, 2015; Lankford, 2016), adolescent mass murderers (Meloy et al., 2004), schoolshooters (Bonanno

& Levenson, 2014; Langman, 2009; Levin & Madfis, 2009; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018; National

Threat Assessment Center, 2018; Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2002), attackers of

public figures (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999), active shooters (Osborne & Capellan, 2016; Silver, Simons,

& Craun, 2018), higher education campus attackers (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010; Fox &

Savage, 2009), and lone actor terrorists (Horgan, Gill, Bouhana, Silver, & Corner, 2016; Schuurman,

Bakker, Gill, & Bouhana, 2017).

There is a growing consensus that PMCOs frequently engage in behaviors that, if noticed and

reported, can serve as warnings and aid in the identification of those on a trajectory toward attack.

The existence of such “warning behaviors”was proposed by the Fixated Research Group in a series of

studies primarily regarding approaches and communications to the British Royal Family (James et al.,

2007, 2008, 2011; Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2011; Mullen et al., 2009). Relying on

slightly different conceptualizations, these patterns of behavior indicating an increasing threat have

also been described as “signaling the attack” (Vossekuil et al., 2002), “high-risk indicators” (Calhoun

& Weston, 2003), and “red flag indicators” (White, Meloy, Mohandie, & Kienlen, 2017).

Meloy et al. (2011) proposed a typology of warning behavior patterns of PMCOs that captures

change and may indicate accelerating risk. These warning behaviors are not discrete variables but

patterns for analysis (Meloy, Hart, & Hoffmann, 2014). The eight behavioral patterns they proposed

included, among others, “pathway warning behaviors,” which are part of research, planning, and

preparing for an attack. The U.S. Secret Service (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Vossekuil et al., 2002)