So Help Me, God, Decide This Case: the Eleventh Circuit's New Standard for Dismissing Religious Jurors During Deliberations
| Publication year | 2022 |
So Help Me, God, Decide This Case: The Eleventh Circuit's New Standard for Dismissing Religious Jurors During Deliberations
Amanda Claxton
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You are on trial for a crime. Maybe you did precisely what the government claims, though perhaps not. However, a judge will not decide your fate because you exercised your constitutional right to a jury trial. During deliberations, you hear that a juror practices a religion condemning those who commit the crime you are accused of. You feel the juror would unfairly prejudice your chances of walking away freely. To your dismay, the judge refuses to dismiss the juror. You ask whether allowing this prejudicial juror to determine your fate is legal. After United States v. Brown,1 it is.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in Brown.2 There, the court dismissed a juror who stated during deliberations that the Holy Spirit told him the defendant was not guilty.3 This en banc decision will likely preclude district courts in the future from removing jurors who express religious prejudice yet convince the court that their religious views are unprejudicial.
Jurors should not participate in jury service if their beliefs keep them from deliberating using the facts presented. Contrastingly, courts should
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not discourage religion by dismissing jurors who merely practice constitutionally granted religious freedoms. Thus, when does religious freedom become legal persecution?
Corrine Brown, a former House of Representatives member, was indicted with twenty-four counts relating to defrauding donors of a charity in over $800,000.4 The charity, One Door for Education—Amy Anderson Scholarship Fund, grants scholarships to underprivileged children.5 Brown demanded a trial by jury.6 Brown and her co-conspirators were prosecuted in the Middle District of Florida.7
During voir dire,8 the judge asked potential jurors specifically about prejudice: "[d]o any of you have any religious or moral beliefs that you believe would preclude you from serving as a juror because . . . it would involve sitting in judgment of another person?"9 Juror 13 did not respond or otherwise express any religious, moral, or political concerns that would hinder his job as a juror.10
After the trial, the district court judge instructed the jury and reminded the jurors that they must "follow the law as [he] explain[ed] it—even if [the juror did] not agree with the law."11 Further, the judge emphasized that every juror must "decide the case for [himself] . . . but only after fully considering the evidence with . . . the other jurors."12
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The judge perceived that the first day of deliberations "progress[ed] smoothly."13 However, during the evening on the second day of deliberations, Juror 8 communicated to the courtroom deputy that another juror discussed "higher beings."14 On the third day of deliberations, the judge consulted the parties, and all parties agreed to interview Juror 8 after determining they needed more information to dismiss the juror.15
In a sealed courtroom, Juror 8 gave the judge a letter expressing concerns about Juror 13's ability to deliberate.16 Juror 8 alleged that Juror 13 stated, "A Higher Being told me Corrine Brown was Not Guilty on all charges[,]" and he "trusted the Holy Ghost."17 Juror 13 avowed that he only made the remarks at the beginning of deliberations, then again "shortly after, maybe within a few hours after."18
After Juror 8's interrogation, the judge questioned Juror 13 to decide whether he "had simply 'pray[ed] for guidance,'" or was "raising some religious view that would prevent him from ever determining . . . that Ms. Brown was guilty on charges[.]"19 While praying for guidance is allowed, raising fixed religious views is problematic.20 Brown argued that Juror 13 deliberated on the evidence presented.21
Juror 13 confirmed that he "prayed about this [and] . . . looked at the information, and . . . received information as to what I was told to do in relation to what I heard here today—or this past two weeks."22 When asked where the divine guidance came from, Juror 13 stated, "My Father in Heaven."23 During later questioning, the judge asked Juror 13 if he said the exact phrase, "A higher being told me that Corrine Brown was
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not guilty on all charges[,]" to which Juror 13 replied, "No. I said the Holy Spirit told me that."24
Still, when the judge asked Juror 13 if he was struggling morally or religiously in ways that may obstruct his ability to deliberate using the evidence presented, Juror 13 insisted that he was not.25 Juror 13 asserted that he was "following and listening to what has been presented and making a determination from that . . . ."26 Specifically, he "had been listening to the evidence and 'for the truth.'"27 Juror 13 stated, "I followed all the things that you presented. My religious beliefs are going by the testimonies . . .which I believe that's what we're supposed to do, and then render a decision on those testimonies, and the evidence presented in the room."28
The government moved to dismiss Juror 13.29 While he seemed "very earnest," "very sincere," and it was apparent that "he [was] trying to follow the court's instructions . . . [and render] proper jury service,"30 Juror 13 was "'direct[ed] . . . what disposition of the charges should be made' by 'the higher being' or 'Holy Spirit.'"31 The court also noted that "a juror who makes that statement to other jurors" at the initiation of deliberation is "injecting religious beliefs that are inconsistent with the instructions of the court."32
Ultimately, the judge dismissed and replaced Juror 13 because he decidedly could not weigh the evidence and formulate a lawful decision.33 Subsequently, the jury found Brown guilty of eighteen counts and not guilty of four counts.34
Brown moved for a new trial because of Juror 13's removal.35 The judge denied the motion because the juror "seemed unaware of the
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inconsistency" between his alleged ability to follow the instructions and his religious beliefs, which "compelled him to disregard those instructions . . . ."36 Brown appealed, then the court of appeals vacated a panel decision affirming her conviction. The court reheard this appeal en banc.37
On appeal, the issue was whether a substantial possibility existed that Juror 13 based his decision on the evidence and the law.38 Specifically, the court analyzed whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the juror's religious statements precluded him from rendering a lawful verdict and fulfilling his duty as a juror—this court held that the statements did not preclude Juror 13 from rendering a lawful verdict.39
A. Sixth Amendment Right to a Unanimous Guilty Verdict
Jurors must determine factual issues using common sense, while defendants seek a fair, unprejudiced verdict. The Sixth Amendment40 protects a criminal defendant's interests by granting the right to a "speedy and public" trial by an impartial jury in federal and state
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jurisdictions.41 The Supreme Court of the United States interpreted "impartial jury" to mean a unanimous verdict.42
In some instances, a jury of fewer than twelve members is constitutional. For example, with approval from the court, parties may stipulate to a jury of fewer than twelve jurors.43 A court may also dismiss a juror for "good cause" after the trial and during deliberations.44 Even in those instances of juror dismissal, the court still requires a unanimous verdict of the remaining jurors.45 Alternatively, a court may replace a dismissed juror rather than continue deliberations with a partial jury.46 The court will use a factors test to decide whether a juror substitute
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would prejudice the defendant.47 Replacing a dismissed juror is a reversible error when the alternation prejudices the defendant.48
B. Freedom of Speech and Religion
While the Sixth Amendment protects the defendants during a trial, the First Amendment49 protects jurors' interests by guaranteeing all individuals the freedom of expression, religion, assembly, and petition against the state. Congress shall not promote or devalue any religion by passing prejudicial laws or restricting the press or individuals from speaking freely.50
However, courts may dismiss jurors whose religious beliefs preclude them from pronouncing individuals guilty or whose religious beliefs expressly conflict with substantive law.51 For example, in United States v. Geffrard,52 the dismissed juror sent a "lengthy, combative letter" to the
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district court judge.53 The juror's letter explained that, because she believed in Swedenborgianism,54 she "could not live with a verdict of guilty for any of the accused on any of the charges . . . ."55 The juror stated that her religious beliefs "made it impossible for her to deliberate"56 because discoursing "the teachings of Emanuel Swedenborg with the other jurors in relation to this case . . . would be like discussing the theory of relativity with my cocker spaniel dog."57 Thus, the juror's dismissal was warranted because the religion was inharmonious with jury duty.58
C. Jury Deliberations
1. Judgment by Ordinary Peers
During a jury trial, a judge instructs the jury on the applicable law, and the jury applies the law to the facts presented.59 The right to a jury trial "protects parties" from judgment by a "special class of trained professionals who . . . may not understand or appreciate the way
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ordinary people live their lives."60 Judges belong to that class of professionals which may interfere with the jury's fact-finding task.61
2. Removal of a Juror
To protect the trial's integrity and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict, a district court may dismiss a juror...
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