Smith v. State: the Georgia Supreme Court Mandated Jury Instructions in Battered Person Syndrome Cases - Sherry M. Hall

• Publication year: 1998

Smith v. State: The Georgia Supreme Court Mandated Jury Instructions in Battered Person Syndrome Cases

After a recent Georgia Supreme Court ruling, battered person syndrome¹ is entitled to separate jury charges when the defendant properly establishes the battered person syndrome self-defense claim.²

I. Factual Background

In Smith v. State,³ defendant Vernita Smith was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for shooting her husband.⁴ Defendant testified that her husband repeatedly beat her during their marriage. He held a gun to her head and threatened to kill her and take her child. He once choked her until she lost consciousness. On another occasion, he wrapped a lamp cord around her neck and stopped choking her only when her brother pulled him away. Defendant called the police a dozen times and left her husband twice. However, she returned each time after he apologized. Several witnesses corroborated defendant's abuse. On the day of the shooting, the husband became angry and struck defendant in the face. He then continued to hit her and held a metal can over his head in a threatening way. She grabbed a pistol and shot him. The bullet entered his arm and lodged in his chest. The husband ran out of the house and defendant followed.⁵ Defendant offered to get him medical help, and the husband replied, "Bitch, you're dead."⁶ The husband died later as a result of the shot.⁷

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the Superior Court of Baldwin County.⁸ At the trial, an expert in domestic violence testified on behalf of defendant on the symptoms of battered person syndrome.⁹ The expert determined that defendant exhibited the symptoms of battered person syndrome and therefore suffered from the syndrome.¹⁰ Defendant requested three separate jury charges relating to the battered person syndrome.¹¹ The court allowed defense counsel to explain in its closing argument how defendant's experience as a battered woman affected her state of mind at the time of the shooting.¹² However, defendant's proposed jury instructions were rejected.¹³

The trial court, against defendant's request, charged the jury on both murder and manslaughter using the pattern instructions on justification given in section 16-3-21(a) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").¹⁴ The Georgia Court of Appeals, unable to reverse the trial court because it was bound by precedent, recognized that this decision would not be universally embraced.¹⁵ It noted the problems with a standard jury charge:

[T]he standard charge on justification cannot adequately permit a jury to consider a properly asserted defense of battered person syndrome because such a charge instructs that the accused must reasonably believe that the force used was necessary to protect herself from imminent bodily harm while the battered person syndrome defense can turn on the fact that the accused has become so deeply troubled that she cannot objectively determine whether harm is "imminent."¹⁶

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if and when a defendant is entitled to a separate charge on battered person syndrome.¹⁷ Because the evidence established that defendant suffered from battered person syndrome, the Georgia Supreme Court held defendant was entitled to a requested jury charge to explain the relevancy of this evidence as it related to the reasonableness of defendant's belief that she needed to use deadly force immediately to defend herself against her husband.¹⁸ The court held that this ruling applies to all cases in "the pipeline" and reversed the court of appeals.¹⁹

II. Legal Background

Traditionally, under the Georgia Code of 1933, justification by a claim of self defense was only available when defendants could show that a reasonable person would fear imminent great bodily harm or death.²⁰

Defendants' particular characteristics were not taken into consideration when determining if their actions were reasonable.²¹ This criteria was used in 1946, when the Georgia Supreme Court held in Bivins v. State²² that the fears of a defendant that justify a homicide must be the fears of a reasonable person.²³ Furthermore, the court held that if the defendant was an unusually timid person, or lacked courage, and committed the homicide under circumstances that would not have created fears in a reasonable person, then the defendant was not justified.²⁴ The standard during this era was to use a completely objective analysis of the defendant's actions. The courts would not consider any subjective, personal characteristics of a defendant.

In 1968 the Criminal Code of Georgia was enacted.²⁵ The legislature enacted section 26-902 to establish what constitutes justifiable homicide.²⁶ The committee notes to chapter 26-9 stated that one of the purposes of the code is to recodify the reasonable belief test.²⁷ However, the courts did not construe any difference in the standard for reasonableness after this enactment.²⁸

In 1972 juries were still not allowed to consider the actual fears of a defendant.²⁹ In Moore v. State,³⁰ defendant appealed the trial court decision to refuse a jury charge that excused defendant's actions if he reasonably believed the shooting was necessary to protect himself.³¹ The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the trial court decision to charge the jury on the fears of a reasonable man, not the fears of the defendant.³²

By 1981 the trend in Georgia was changing. In Daniels v. State,³³ the Georgia Supreme Court for the first time acknowledged a difference in the new formulation of the Criminal Code by ruling in favor of the defendant.³⁴ In Daniels the defendant had previously been attacked with a knife and received scars to his chest.³⁵ The court held that evidence of this previous attack was relevant to whether he reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to defend himself.³⁶ "The defendant should be allowed to prove the crimes previously committed against him to show his intent and motive in defending himself."³⁷ The court further noted that in '"cases of doubt, the testimony should be admitted.'"³⁸ The court was making a change towards a subjective view of reasonableness by considering the personal, past experiences of the defendant. Previously the court would only look at how society in general would have reacted in the particular situation.

Another change occurred in 1981 when the Georgia Supreme Court recognized "the battered woman syndrome as a scientifically established theory."³⁹ In Smith v. State,⁴⁰ the supreme court held expert opinion on battered person syndrome is admissible to aid the jury in evaluating the battered woman's defense of self-defense.⁴¹ The court stated that even when the expert opinion is on the ultimate issues to be decided by a jury, the testimony is admissible when the jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw conclusions for themselves.⁴² Furthermore, "the expert's testimony explaining why a person suffering from battered woman's syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself, would be such conclusions that jurors could not ordinarily draw for themselves."⁴³

Toward the end of the decade, the court increased the level of subjectivity in battered person syndrome cases by relaxing the imminent danger requirement. In 1989 the Georgia Supreme Court in Chapman v. State⁴⁴ held that self-defense could be found even if the "actual threat of harm does not immediately precede the homicide."⁴⁵ In Chapman the husband repeatedly beat defendant, and two days before his death, he attacked defendant and threatened to kill her. On the day of the shooting, defendant closed her bank account, bought a pistol and bullets from two...