Shaking Hands with Hitler: The Politics‐Administration Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13009
• Author: Alasdair Roberts
• Date: 01 March 2019
• Published date: 01 March 2019

Shaking Hands with Hitler: The Politics-Administration Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism 267

Shaking Hands with Hitler: The Politics-Administration

Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism

Alasdair Roberts

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Abstract: Researchers have examined the impact of the politics-administration dichotomy on the practice and theory

of public administration within the United States. But the dichotomy also influenced patterns of international

engagement by American experts in the 1920s and 1930s. Americans believed that they could set politics aside and

collaborate on administrative questions with regimes that did not respect democracy and human rights. This belief

was tested after the rise of Adolf Hitler. American experts in public administration engaged with the Nazi regime for

three years, ignoring the rising controversy over Nazi policies. The breaking point came in 1936. American experts

finally recognized that it was impossible to ignore political questions and became forthright proponents of “democratic

administration.” This struggle to define the boundaries of international engagement is relevant today, as specialists

in public administration again find themselves in a world in which a shared commitment to democracy and human

rights cannot be taken for granted.

Evidence for Practice

• In the 1920s and 1930s, American engagement with foreign experts in public administration was guided by

the belief that it was possible to ignore “grand politics” and focus on administration.

• This belief was tested after the advent of Nazism in Germany in 1933. American experts engaged with the

Nazi regime for three years.

• In 1936, these experts finally recognized that political questions could not be ignored. They saw that it was

necessary to speak up for democracy and human rights in a world in which these values were challenged.

• The experience of 1933–36 is relevant today, as democratic values are contested once again and experts in

liberal democracies define guidelines for engagement with nondemocratic regimes.

In the United States, the field of public

administration coalesced in the first part of the

twentieth century. The emerging field was built

on the politics-administration dichotomy—that

is, the notion that politics and administration are

“distinct and separable processes” (Bernstein 1952).

An immense literature has shown how the dichotomy

shaped the new field. Researchers have examined

how institutions were designed to reinforce the

wall between administration and politics (O’Toole

1987; Rosenbloom 2008). They have explored how

administrators honored the dichotomy by avoiding

political questions (Hassett and Watson 2002;

Loveridge 1968; Roberts 1994)—or honored the

dichotomy in the breach, by professing neutrality

even as they engaged in politics (Maranto and Skelley

1992). There is also a long-standing debate on

whether governmental affairs in the United States can

be divided into these two compartments at all (Kettl

2018, 68–69; Rohr 1989, 34).

Such research focuses on the influence of the

dichotomy on institutions and practice within the

United States. But in its early years, the dichotomy

shaped the field in another way. From the start,

scholars and practitioners of public administration

in the United States sought connections with peers

in other countries, to exchange best practices and

collaborate in research. This raised questions about

the boundaries of international engagement. Was

it acceptable to engage with countries that did not

respect democracy and human rights? The dichotomy

seemed to answer this question: it suggested that

Americans could engage with foreigners on purely

administrative problems without endorsing, or

inadvertently importing, nondemocratic values.

In the 1930s, this formula for collaboration was

applied but eventually abandoned. American experts

wanted to expand cooperation with counterparts in

Germany, even after the advent of a Nazi government

in 1933. At first, they ignored the rising controversy

over Nazism, insisting that they were concerned

only with administrative questions. The breaking

point came in the summer of 1936, when these

experts became the unwitting instruments of Nazi

propaganda at a conference in Berlin and then

struggled with fascists at a conference in Warsaw.

The Americans realized that the dichotomy was an

inadequate guideline for international cooperation.

Alasdair Roberts is professor of

political science and public policy at the

University of Massachusetts Amherst. He

is also a fellow of the National Academy

of Public Administration. His most recent

book,

Can Government Do Anything Right?,

was published by Polity Books in 2018.

E-mail:asroberts@umass.edu

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 79, Iss. 2, pp. 267–276. © 2018 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13009.

Research Article