Scientific argument in organizational crisis communication: the case of Exxon.

• Author: Sellnow, Timothy L.
• Position: Exxon Corp.

Scientific research and development is, for many organizations, the key to survival. Organizations depend upon science to help create products and services that successfully compete with similar organizations. Beyond the creation or refinement of products and services, however, is the role of science as a tool for maintaining the social legitimacy of organizations facing controversy. For example, the crisis at Three Mile Island resulted in a reexamination of the entire nuclear industry in the United States. In describing the ineptitude of the nuclear power industry's initial response to the crisis, Farrell and Goodnight (1981) identify a decline in "the practical art of rhetoric". Dionisopoulos and Crable (1988) contend that the future of nuclear energy in this country depended upon scientists both inside and outside the nuclear industry engaging in an extended public relations campaign to convince the public first, that the industry had identified and systematically resolved the causes of the Three Mile Island crisis, and second, that nuclear energy was vital to the country's future. Dependence upon science can be limited to the legitimacy of a single corporation or product. For instance, when the Food and Drug Administration reported that Rely tampons were linked to toxic shock syndrome, Proctor & Gamble hired a group of independent scientists, physicians, microbiologists, and epidemiologists to work with their own scientists in an effort to challenge the government's findings as inconclusive. When this group was "unable to give Procter & Gamble executives the information they so desperately needed," the company voluntarily pulled the Rely product from the market (Fink, 1986, p. 197). These examples suggest that a debate involving scientific evidence can and often does occur during and after an organizational crisis.

Inherent in the scientific method of research are a series of standard operational procedures endorsed by generations of scientists to enhance the likelihood that what is offered as scientific evidence is accurate. However, as Fisher (1978) explained, science must "remain consistent with the 'common-sense experience of social reality'". Hence, for science to be practical, as in the case of organizational crises, interpretation and application of findings to social exigences are essential. This interpretation and application, along with scrutiny of tangible research procedures, generate a discourse which Prelli (1989) suggests "is accepted or rejected on grounds of its reasonableness--given the issue at stake, the knowledge conditions of the scientific community, and the perceived expertise |ethos~ of the makers of the claims". Of particular interest to this study is the role of ethos in determining the reasonableness of scientific argument. Specifically, this study explores the question, to what extent can organizations adhere to the norms of scientific ethos when defending their products and procedures during times of crisis? To answer this question, I offer a case study in which a test of ethical norms for the scientific community is applied to a sample of scientific arguments offered by the Exxon Corporation in response to the Valdez oil spill. Accordingly, I first describe the context of the Valdez disaster in terms of an organizational crisis. Next, I describe the nature of scientific argument and the norms of scientific ethos. These norms are then applied to several speeches delivered by the CEO of Exxon. Finally, I offer an explanation of how and why a complimentary relationship between the norms and counter norms of scientific ethos is an appropriate and realistic standard for effectively measuring the ethics of profit seeking organizations engaged in scientific argument during times of crisis.

CONTEXT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL

In order to establish the context for Exxon's scientific argumentation in the wake of the Valdez crisis, it is essential to offer some boundaries for what I label scientific argument. Wander (1976) suggests that science is amenable to rhetorical investigation in situations where an assertion is scientifically disproven, when conflicting scientific evidence exist, and when scientists attempt to persuade one another. In these instances, science and rhetoric are intertwined. More specifically, Prelli (1989) claims that a rhetoric of science must "reflect the 'logic' of scientific thinking--indeed the scientific method itself". I do not mean to suggest that any use of evidence obtained by means of the scientific method should be considered scientific argument. Instead, for purposes of this study, I consider scientific argument to be rooted in the scientific method. For example, if a claim is supported or refuted through a description of the scientific procedures used to obtain those results, the claim would represent scientific argument. Similarly, procedural arguments based upon the application of scientifically obtained data to social exigences is also considered scientific argument.

The Exxon Valdez crisis makes an excellent case study for understanding the influence of crisis on an organization's use of scientific argument. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, 25 miles south of Valdez, Alaska. Exxon began offloading the 42 million gallons of oil that remained in the tanker, but a two-day absence of effective containment equipment resulted in the largest spill in U.S. history (Johnson, 1991). Public outrage following the spill threatened the entire oil industry's future access to the oil rich state of Alaska. Eventually, the Exxon tanker spilled over 240,000 barrels of oil into the Prince William Sound (Schneider, p. L22). Negligence on the part of the ship's captain, Joseph Hazelwood, was clearly established within a week of the spill. Exxon immediately accepted complete responsibility for the spill and began to assemble its clean-up operation. However, the events in the weeks following the spill created an intense debate between Exxon, the state of Alaska, and environmental interest groups regarding the quality and efficiency of the clean-up effort.

The volume of oil spilled, the limited equipment on hand, and the high winds following the accident made containing the spilled oil impossible. Despite protests from Exxon, the turbulent weather also resulted in state officials precluding the use of chemical dispersants (Johnson, 1991). Because the spill was not contained, oil began to taint beeches and devastate wildlife within three days. A week after the spill, the Alaska Department of Fish and Games closed the herring season in the Prince William Sound, depriving area fishermen of $12.2 million in revenue ("Chronology," p. 11). For weeks after the accident, the oil continued to spread and environmental devastation intensified. Estimates of the damage varied widely. By May 15, 1989, it was estimated that between 2500 and 6000 square miles of ocean and from 300 to 800 miles of shoreline had been tainted ("Disturbing Numbers," 1989). Because of this prolonged escalation, the Valdez spill remained a prominent news story, and Exxon's clean-up operation was persistently scrutinized in media coverage. Exxon not only faced public criticism for the spill, but for its clean-up as well. Further, Exxon ultimately became responsible for determining the future of oil exploration and transportation in Alaska and other remote wilderness areas. Having accepted responsibility for the spill, Exxon's exigence became defending the adequacy of its mammoth clean-up operation.

The remote and rugged terrain of the Prince William Sound required that Exxon utilize highly complex and, in many cases, experimental procedures in the clean-up process. To reach consensus with governing officials, special interest groups, the media, and ultimately the public regarding the innovative procedures it employed, Exxon engaged in scientific argument. Because of Exxon's clearly biased position in the case of the clean-up, we are given cause to question the degree to which Exxon followed the norms of scientific ethos when advocating its procedures and refuting the claims of its adversaries. A brief review of organizational crisis literature is helpful in further understanding the context surrounding Exxon in the Valdez crisis.

Fink (1987) defines an organizational crisis as a situation that runs the risk of escalating in intensity, falling under close media or government scrutiny, interfering with the normal operations of business, jeopardizing the positive public image presently enjoyed by a company or its officers, and damaging a company's bottom line in any way. Seeger (1987) equates crisis with a threat to an organization's legitimacy. He suggests that an organization's legitimacy is based upon its ability to establish congruence between the values implied by its actions and the accepted norms within its environment. He contends that the legitimation process is "in part rhetorical and involves offering adequate justifications within a consensus producing dialogue concerning the value of the institution and its activities". A crisis in legitimacy occurs when the organization's dialogue no longer fulfills the legitimate expectations of an environment (Sellnow and Seeger, 1989). The severe criticism Exxon faced during its clean-up operations represented a threat to legitimacy. The means for absolving that threat involved a public defense of its clean up operations, the complexity of which necessitated scientific argument.

Explanatory or defensive communication by an organization is made difficult by the characteristics inherent in organizational crisis situations. Hermann (1963) claims that crises possess three characteristics: threat, surprise, and short response time. Not only must an organization respond quickly to an event that it could not or did not foresee, it must do so while under the pressure of an imposing loss of profit, legitimacy, or both. When...