Roper v. Simmons: a Dead-end for the Juvenile Death Penalty - Robert F. Glass

• Publication year: 2006

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Roper v. Simmons: A Dead-End for the Juvenile Death Penalty

In Roper v. Simmons,¹ the United States Supreme Court held that executing a person under the age of eighteen constituted cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment² to the United States Constitution.³ Relying on support ranging from scientific and sociological studies to the laws of foreign countries, the Court reversed its 1989 ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky,⁴ which upheld the constitutionality of juvenile execution. This case is important because it (1) represents the Court's increasingly restrictive view with regard to permissible punishment under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and (2) raises significant questions about the Supreme Court's use of international and foreign law to support its conclusions-as it did here-for future issues.

I. Factual Background

Seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons said he wanted to murder someone. A junior in high school, Simmons enlisted two friends to join his plan to break into a victim's home, abduct the victim and, while bound, transport the victim to a bridge to be thrown to its death. Simmons assured his friends that because they were minors, they could "get away with it."⁵ At approximately 2:00 a.m. on the night of the murder, Simmons met up with Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer. Tessmer decided not to participate, but Simmons and Benjamin did, and proceeded to the residence of Steven and Shirley Cook. Reaching through an open window to unlock the back door, Simmons and Benjamin entered the house.⁶ Meanwhile, Mrs. Cook was upstairs, asleep, but soon awoke as Simmons turned on the hallway light. Simmons then proceeded into the bedroom amidst Mrs. Cook's inquiry as to "[w]ho's there[?]"⁷ Simmons immediately recognized Mrs. Cook: The two had previously been involved in a car accident which, according to Simmons, ignited his desire to murder her. Mrs. Cook was bound with duct tape and transported to a state park in her own car. Simmons and Benjamin covered her head with a towel, reinforced the bindings, escorted her to a railroad crossing over the Meramec River, where she was thrown to her death.⁸

Steven Cook had been out of town when his wife was abducted. And when he returned—his wife gone and the bedroom in shambles—he reported Mrs. Cook missing. That same afternoon, Mrs. Cook's body was recovered from the river. In the meantime, Simmons was parading his feat, lauding himself for killing Mrs. Cook because, as he remarked, "the bitch seen my face."⁹ Simmons was apprehended the following day after word spread about his involvement in Mrs. Cook's disappearance. He was taken to a local police station, read his Miranda rights, and only two hours into interrogation, confessed to the murder of Shirley Cook. Simmons also agreed to produce a videotaped reenactment of the event. He was charged with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-degree murder.

Because Simmons was seventeen when the crime occurred, he was considered an adult under Missouri law.¹⁰ The prosecution introduced both the videotaped reenactment of the crime and testimony of Simmons's gloating after the murder. The jury convicted Simmons of murder. No witnesses were put on by the defense in the guilt phase. In seeking the death penalty, the prosecution noted several aggravating factors, specifically that the murder was (1) performed for monetary gain; (2) to prevent Simmons's lawful arrest with regard to the car accident; and (3) involved depravity of mind and inhuman conduct. Members of the Cook family testified as to the devastation wrought by Mrs. Cook's murder.

The issue of Simmons's age highlighted the closing arguments. After the judge instructed the jury that age was a permissible mitigating factor, the prosecution drove home a brutal portrayal of the crime, discounting the fact that it was carried out by a seventeen year old. The defense, to the contrary, urged the jury to consider age as a prime consideration for the gravity of the punishment it recommended. Nevertheless, the jury recommended the death penalty and the trial judge imposed the sentence. The court further denied Simmons's request to set aside the sentence for ineffective counsel. The trial court denied the motion for postconviction relief and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.¹¹

In light of the 2002 Supreme Court holding in Atkins v. Virginia,¹² which prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded person under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Simmons filed a new petition for postconviction relief, analogizing his position as a juvenile to that of the precedent established in Atkins. The Missouri Supreme Court granted Simmons's petition and set aside the death sentence, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the imposition of the death penalty on defendants under the age of eighteen constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.¹³

II. Legal Background

A. Overview

The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."¹⁴ Adopted from the 1688 English Declaration ofRights-which similarly prohibited excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment-the Eighth Amendment has been the source of heated controversy.¹⁵ The heart of that controversy is what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Framers provided little guidance and, as a result, the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" has been left to the courts.¹⁶ The Supreme Court has noted that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment typically serves three primary objectives: (1) to limit the types of punishment that can be imposed; (2) to proscribe grossly disproportionate punishment as related to the severity of the crime; and (3) to limit what type of conduct may be considered criminal.¹⁷ The Court has also noted that, at its most fundamental level, the Eighth Amendment seeks to preserve the dignity of man.¹⁸ Because many consider the death penalty a violation of the Eighth Amendment even when applied to adults, the issue of executing juveniles¹⁹ is extremely controversial.

B. The Development of Capital Punishment Jurisprudence Prior to the Juvenile Death Penalty

Questions involving the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment began to emerge most notably in the second half of the twentieth century. In 1958, the Court in Trop v. Dulles²⁰ first articulated what would become the perennial standard in evaluating the parameters of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.²¹ Considering the question of whether denationalization as a punishment was cruel and unusual punishment, the Court noted that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."²² Although the Court did not expand on what factors were to account for the progress of a maturing society, the Court did look to the overwhelming disavowal of denationalization as punishment from the international community and United Nations surveys.²³

Several critical cases came before the Court in the 1970s relating to the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In Furman v. Georgia,²⁴ the Supreme Court considered whether the imposition of the death penalty for three condemned defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment as incorporated to the states by the Due Process Clause.²⁵ In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the defendants' sentences, holding that where juries or judges wield unbridled authority to determine whether the defendants before them are to be sentenced to death, and no standards govern the application of the penalty, the Court will not countenance the arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the gravest penalty possible.²⁶ Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,²⁷ the Court again considered whether the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in all circumstances, but nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment.²⁸ Only a year later, however, in Coker v. Georgia,²⁹ the Court concluded that capital punishment for conviction of rape did constitute cruel and unusual punishment.³⁰ Thus, Eighth Amendment issues were springing up before the Court at a rapid pace.

C. Turning Point: Age as a Mitigating Factor

In 1978 in Lockett v. Ohio,³¹ the Court considered whether the required imposition of the death penalty under an Ohio statute³² constituted cruel and unusual punishment when the statute precluded the sentencer from considering a range of mitigating factors, including age.³³ There, the twenty-one-year-old defendant was convicted of aggravated murder after driving the get-away car in a robbery and murder, and was subsequently sentenced to death.³⁴ The Court reversed the defendant's death sentence because the sentencer was not permitted to consider relevant mitigating factors in determining whether capital punishment should be imposed.³⁵ The Court noted that, unlike any other punishment, the death penalty necessitates an individualized decision because of the gravity of the ultimate determination.³⁶ This individualized decision includes the consideration of "any aspect of the defendant's character and record," and while in this case, the defendant's minor role was a prominent mitigating factor, age also fell within that category.³⁷

Four years later in Eddings v. Oklahoma,³⁸ the Court considered whether the consideration of age as the only mitigating factor prior to imposing the death penalty on a juvenile defendant comported with the requirements established in Lockett.³⁹ There, the Court also reversed the defendant's death sentence because the trial and appellate courts failed to consider...