Rodriguez v. State: Addressing Georgia's Implied Consent Requirements for Non-english-speaking Drivers - Adam Ferrell

• Jurisdiction: Georgia,United States,Federal
• Publication year: 2003
• Citation: Vol. 54 No. 3

Casenote

Rodriguez v. State: Addressing Georgia's

Implied Consent Requirements for Non-

English-Speaking Drivers

In Rodriguez v. State¹ the Georgia Supreme Court held that a non-English-speaking defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol was not denied equal protection or due process under the United States Constitution or the Georgia Constitution when the results of his blood-alcohol tests were admitted at trial, even though the implied consent warning required under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated

("O.C.G.A.") section 40-5-67.1² was not read or interpreted in a language that defendant could understand.³

I. Factual Background

Omar Rodriguez was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") in Dekalb County, Georgia. Rodriguez's native language was Spanish, and he did not speak English. The arresting officer read the required implied consent warning to Rodriguez in English. Rodriguez subsequently submitted to a blood alcohol test, and the trial court admitted the results of that test as evidence at trial.⁴

On appeal, Rodriguez contended that the results of his blood-alcohol tests should have been suppressed at trial. He argued that O.C.G.A. section 24-9-103⁵ violates equal protection because it does not require the state to provide a qualified interpreter to non-English-speaking DUI defendants. Rodriguez further contended that O.C.G.A. section 40-567.1⁶ and section 40-6-392(a)(3)⁷ violate equal protection because English-speaking DUI defendants have their implied consent warning read to them in English, whereas non-English-speaking defendants do not have their implied consent warning read to them in a language that they understand. Lastly, Rodriguez contended that his due process rights were violated because the implied consent warning was not read to him in a language that he could understand, and therefore, he was unable to exercise those rights in a meaningful manner.⁸

The court addressed each of Rodriguez's contentions on appeal and held that Rodriguez's first equal protection claim failed because he, as a non-English-speaking defendant, was not similarly situated to hearing-impaired persons.⁹ Rodriguez's second equal protection claim also failed because sections 40-5-67.1 and 40-6-392 do not create a classification between English-speaking defendants and non-English-speaking defendants, and Rodriguez failed to show that the statutes were enacted or applied with a discriminatory purpose.¹⁰ Finally, the court held that Rodriguez's due process claim failed because due process does not encompass a requirement that a defendant be meaningfully informed of his rights under the implied consent statute so that he can exercise those rights in a meaningful manner—the implied consent warning is a matter of legislative grace rather than due process.¹¹ For those reasons, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing the results of Rodriguez's chemical blood-alcohol test into evidence, and consequently, the court affirmed Rodriguez's conviction under section 40-6-391.¹²

II. Legal Background

Many states that have laws criminalizing DUI also have implied consent statutes.¹³ These implied consent statutes, although slightly different from state to state, commonly provide that a person driving on state highways is deemed to have impliedly consented to a test of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance upon arrest for the commission of any offense while driving under the influence of alco-hol.¹⁴ The arrested individual usually has the option of refusing such testing on condition that the individual's driving privileges will be revoked for a substantial period of time.¹⁵ In addition, there is typically a provision that an individual arrested for an offense while driving under the influence of alcohol shall be issued a verbal warning informing the individual of his rights under the implied consent statute.¹⁶

The constitutionality of using chemical analysis evidence obtained over a defendant's objection has been challenged at the federal level. The United States Supreme Court has held that the use in evidence of the results of a chemical analysis of blood taken involuntarily from a defendant after his arrest for DUI does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment¹⁷ or the defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁸ Furthermore, the evidentiary use of such blood test results does not violate a defendant's right against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment when the police officer was justified in believing the defendant to be intoxicated and when the test was performed in a reasonable time, place, and manner.¹⁹

In Schmerber v. California,²⁰ the Court emphasized that the blood was withdrawn from defendant in a "simple, medically acceptable manner in a hospital environment," and therefore, the blood test did not violate defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-ment.²¹ The Court also held that defendant's right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment was not violated because the privilege only protects a defendant from being required to testify against himself or from being required to provide the State with evidence of a "testimonial or communicative nature."²² Because the analysis of a blood sample taken from a defendant does not fall within that category of evidence, the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by admission of such evidence against a defendant.²³ Finally, the Court held that the police officer did not violate defendant's right against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment because the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI; the officer could have reasonably believed that unless a blood test were taken immediately, the evidence of alcohol would have been destroyed, and the means by which the blood was taken and tested was reason-able.²⁴ Therefore, based upon the Court's holding in Schmerber, unless there is a state statute or constitutional provision that provides otherwise, the use of chemical analysis evidence obtained in the absence of defendant's consent will generally be admissible against the defendant and will not be held to violate the federal constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to due process, or the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.²⁵

Courts in some states have held that the results of a chemical test are only admissible against a defendant charged with DUI if the defendant consents or submits to the test without objection.²⁶ However, most states have circumvented the judicial question of whether such evidence is admissible by legislatively enacting implied consent statutes that imply a defendant's consent to chemical testing.²⁷

Georgia is one state that has chosen to imply a defendant's consent to chemical testing as a matter oflaw.²⁸ Georgia's implied consent statute was first enacted in 1968, and the language and meaning of the statute have changed very little over the years.²⁹ The present implied consent statute is found at O.C.G.A. section 40-5-55.³⁰ Under the language of that statute any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to Code Section 40-6-392, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391 or if such person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.³¹

In requiring such implied consent for determining the presence of alcohol, the legislature intended to promote the welfare and safety ofthe general public.³² The statute provides that such test(s) shall be administered at the request of any law enforcement officer who has reason to believe that a person was driving in violation of O.C.G.A. section 40-6-391.³³ Furthermore, the test(s) shall be administered as soon as possible once the officer has established reasonable grounds for his belief that a person was driving in violation of O.C.G.A. section 40-6391.³⁴ The statute also expressly states that if a person is "dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering such person incapable of refusal" then that person's consent shall not be deemed to have been withdrawn, and the proper test(s) shall still be administered.³⁵ At the time a chemical test is requested by the law enforcement officer, the appropriate implied consent warning found at O.C.G.A. section 40-5-67.1 must be read to the defendant.³⁶

The constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 40-5-55 has been addressed by the Georgia courts on several occasions. In Allen v. State,³⁷ the Georgia Supreme Court held that the State may constitutionally take a blood sample from a defendant in the absence of the defendant's consent.³⁸ The court reasoned that section 40-5-55 gives a defendant the right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test; therefore, the statute actually grants a right not afforded by the state constitution.³⁹ The courts have also established that the choice afforded a defendant under section 40-5-55 of whether to submit to or refuse a chemical test is not protected under the privilege against self-incrimination.⁴⁰ Furthermore, a police officer's request under section 40-5-55 for multiple chemical tests from a defendant does not violate a defendant's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.⁴¹

As stated earlier, Georgia law requires an officer to read the appropriate implied consent warning under O.C.G.A. section 40-5-67.1 to a defendant at the time a chemical test is requested. The courts first addressed the situation of a non-English-speaking defendant who was read his implied...