Toward reviving rationality in argument: adding pieces to Johnson's puzzle.

• Author: Bruschke, Jon
• Position: R.H. Johnson

Argument has been studied from a number of viewpoints and defined in a variety of ways. It has been subscripted ([argument.sub.1], [argument.sub.2], and even possibly [argument.sub.0]), it has been alliterated (process, product, and procedure, in Wenzel's [1990] terms), its verb has been altered (having rather than making an argument), it has been converted to acronyms (CRC approaches versus the MDLs in TOA [Willard, 1989]), it has been converted to its grammatical uses (argument as a noun versus argument as a verb [Bruschke, 1995]), or its features have simply been listed (Brockriede, 1990). Without belaboring the intricacies of all of these approaches, it is safe to say that they range from the broad to the narrow. Those taking a more de-differentiating attitude can easily dismiss strict boundaries with ready examples that defy borders and can muster impressive theoretical reasons why the perimeters cannot exist. These approaches produce very broad definitions. Those taking a more narrow view, conversely, have a damnable time maintaining clear distinctions for their categories in an era where critical theories are increasingly rendering distinctions of any variety untenable. Even simple things like "yellow" or "ball" are categories that are hard to defend, as Rouse (1987) has explained Hesse's examples. The most narrow views consider only reasoned suasory discourse to be argument (in its various forms referred to as making an argument, argument as a noun, or argument as product) while the most broad definitions include virtually any human action that can have some symbolic value assigned to it (called argument as process, argument as verb, or argument as "disagreement relevant expansion" [Willard, 1989]).

Although definitions of argument are perhaps as myriad as the authors who try to define it, few scholars find it necessary to choose between the broad and narrow interpretations. While a certain definition may distinguish between, say, the making of rather than the having of an argument, there is not necessarily a need to exclude either the noun or the verb from the province of argument. Either definition is acceptable, either leads to insights, and the question is one of preference rather than correctness. Even Charles Willard has protested that his broad theories are not meant to preclude the serious study of issues that fall under the more narrow definitions of argument. Even the narrow definitions seem to be aimed at defining a core of study rather than denying that there is insight to be gained at the periphery. Given these definitional stances, one might suspect that argument is a field with a healthy body of scholarship wrestling with the complexities of logical suasory discourse at the core of the field as well as a healthy group of essays examining more open-ended issues found at the outer boundaries of the field. It turns out that this is not the case and our research does not mirror our definitions.

In fact, argument theorists have largely backed away from evaluations of the logic of an argument (I hope to define "logic" more carefully later, but for now think of it as any claim than an argument is correct or incorrect). A quick review of the articles in the past decade's issues of Argumentation and Advocacy is telling. The discipline commonly engages in rhetorical criticism, conducts interpersonal studies of disagreement behavior, issues cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary studies of debates, offers persuasion and quasi-persuasion studies, and serves as a sounding board for intercollegiate debate professionals. Only two articles (Walton, 1991; Young, Launer, & Austin, 1990) have concerned themselves with the "correctness" of an argument in the traditional sense. Even then, Young and Launer opt for an approach that blends audience-centered and formal approaches. Introductory texts (e.g., Rieke & Sillars, 1993) generally have more discussion about the connection between argument and logic than contemporary journal articles, and one peculiarity of the field of argument is that theoretical advances seem to come in textbooks as often as professional journals (Johnson, 2000).

Ed Schiappa's collection of papers under the title Warranting Assent provides another poignant case in point. Schiappa (1995) is vociferous and eloquent in making his case for argument evaluation: "Argument evaluation has many uses, including improving argumentative competence, teaching critical thinking, and improving decision making. The benefits of argument evaluation are coterminous with the benefits of the study and practice of argumentation itself, for one cannot he successful at either without the ability to recognize the difference between good and bad arguments" (p. ix). Given the editor's desire to separate good and bad arguments one might expect several papers devoted to analyzing the logical strength of various claims. Instead, three of the four sections of the book are not concerned with logic at all. Two sections focus on ideological and axiological evaluations, which are the sort of approaches that have been expressly contrasted with logical assessments. The fourth division is called "epistemological" approaches and most nearly mirrors a logical perspective. Of the three essays contained in that section, one is a re-print of the Young and Launer article, one is a narrative critique (narrative, by the way, is the approach Young and Launer explicitly identified as the most obvious attempt to move away from logical evaluations), and the third is an essay by Dennis Gouran discussing logical failures in the Challenger accident. Even Gouran's essay isn't so much dedicated to evaluating arguments as valid or not, but instead takes for granted that huge logical errors were made and focuses on proving that these errors were argumentative in nature and not procedural. Thus, even in a volume dedicated to argument evaluation with an editor concerned about separating the good from the bad less than one twelfth of the pages are dedicated to any concern with logic at all, and even those do not constitute anything close to paradigm cases of logical criticism.

What has thrown rational assessments of argument off track? Johnson sees the threat to argument-as-reason coming from popular culture's aversion to intellect and right-leaning scholars who prefer a mathematical logic to argument's more open rationality (2000). Although argument may well be under siege from more traditional scholars who prefer symbolic logic over the less conclusive field of argument, rationality does not have many more friends on the left. Scholars have, in the main, concluded that Platonic truth does not exist. On the one hand, as Fritch and Leeper (1993) describe, argument scholars have been almost universally interested in "discover[ing] truth as a product of the valid form" (p. 186), while on the other hand they have had great difficulty generating an epistemology identifying truth in any form (Roth, 1987). A recent twist is that any claim to truth may inadvertently serve dominant interests. Cox (1993) summarizes the dilemma well: "(1) we may fail to mediate difference or achieve a shared rationale for action; or (2) we may in fact succeed but at the cost of being complicitous with the dominant reason or common sense of a culture" (p. 11). Unable to discover an absolute truth but unwilling to abandon it, many scholars have sought a middle ground by seeking methods of evaluation that fuse the logical components of arguments with their ethical, emotional, and poetic features (see e.g., Bruschke, 1995; Fritch & Leeper, 1993; Klumpp, 1990; McKerrow, 1993; Nelson, 1991; Young & Launer, 1995). As Young, Lanner, and Austin (1990) comment: "Many contemporary theorists would have the critic abandon traditional forms of argument analysis and evaluation for an audience-centered perspective" (p. 89). The general hope is that the arguments most worthy of adherence will enjoy both a logical and poetic advantage and be embraced by an audience. Narrative and Burkean approaches generally proceed from premises like these. Lost in the shuffle is a lucid definition of how an evaluation of logical correctness is even possible. Willard (1990) speaks for the majority: "Thought and emotion are inseparable ... Rationality comes easily in armchairs. But it may not mean much to say that one should be free of prejudice, bias, power, and politics. One never is" (pp. 224-225). The result has been that argument scholars have directed much more energy toward analyses of pathos and mythos rather than logos, even when taking audience-centered approaches. More work in the area seems important; even those theorists who have made halting efforts to incorporate correctness in their theories have not managed to generate a body of research stemming from those theories.

The imbalance is unfortunate. It is not necessary to slight the more critical approaches to assert that the field of argument should have something to say about which arguments are the better ones from a rational perspective. Even Willard (1983; 1989), who takes as his starting point Gadamer's indeterminacy claims and argues that criticism should be

evaluation free (1983, p.245), understands that even if we cannot know a stable truth, the rigors of life demand that we act as if we do (1983, p. 235) and act as lay "scientists" trying to make sense of the world. In the end, Willard concedes that there are situations in which the use of argument standards may be "plausibly defended" (1989, p. 318) and believes that we should help our readers develop "good judgment." The concept of "good judgment" is poorly defined (Bruschke, 1992) and Willard has precious little to say about when argument standards may be "plausibly defended." Despite the gap in developing standards, it is important to note that even scholars who adopt the strongest indeterminacy theories must concede that humans make real choices with material...