Reviews : Hill, David Jayne. World Organization. Pp. ix, 214. New York: Columbia University Press, 1911
| Date | 01 September 1912 |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271621204300121 |
| Author | Wm I. Hull |
| Published date | 01 September 1912 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
336
REVIEWS
Hill,
David
Jayne.
World
Organization.
Pp.
ix,
214.
New
York:
Columbia
University
Press,
1911.
The
author
of
this
book,
distinguished
in
diplomacy
and
in
scholarship
alike,
has
put
into
it
the
conclusions
drawn
from
his
long
and
varied
diplomatic
expe-
rience
and
the
fruits
of
his
wide
and
deep
research.
His
object
was
to
state
as
concisely
as
was
consistent
with
lucidity
the
origin
and
development
of
world
organization,
considered
in
its
juristic
sense,
as
affected
by
the
nature
of
the
modern
state;
and
this
object
he
has
admirably
fulfilled.
&dquo;World
organization&dquo;
he
defines
to
be
&dquo;the
task
of
so
uniting
governments
in
the
support
of
principles
of
justice
as
to
apply
them
not
only
within
the
limits
of
the
state,
but
also
between
states.&dquo;
&dquo;
Starting
with
the
Roman
imperial
idea
of
the
essential
unity
of
mankind,
he
traces
the
rise
of
the
modern
state,-
neither
from
some
transcendental source,
nor
from
any
Caesarian
operation,-
but
from
the
nature
and
social
needs
of
man.
With
such
an
origin,
and
developed
by
the
pressure
of
the
same
necessities,
the
modern
state
has
naturally
become
the
embodiment
and
protagonist
of
jural
law
as
the
security
for
human
rights;
and
in
this
capacity,
it is
the
greatest
of
human
institutions,
and
is
entitled
to
the
highest
respect
and
perfect
loyalty.
Because
it is
the
protagonist
of
law,
and
for
that
reason
only,
the
state
has
been
equipped
with
armaments
on
land
and
sea;
but,
equipped
with
these
and
other
powers,
there
is
a
real
peril
lest
it
should
regard
itself
as
superior
to
law
and
use
its
powers
to
act
&dquo;as
it
sees
fit.&dquo;
Its
origin
and
growth,
and
its
raison
d’être
alike,
belie
the
theory
that
it
may
use
its
&dquo;sovereignty&dquo;
both
to
command
the
obedience
of
its
nationals
to
law,
and
to
assert
its
supremacy
above
the
law
in
its
international
relations.
The
assumed
&dquo;right&dquo;
of
absolutism,
asserted
by
four
or
five
hundred
poten-
tates
some
three
centuries
ago;
Machiavelli’s
theory
of
absolutism;
and
Bodin’s
conception
of
sovereignty
as
identical
with
&dquo;majestas,&dquo;
that
is,
absolute
and
perpetual
power:
have
all
exerted
their
influence
to
place
the
state
within
the
realm
of
might
and
outside
the
pale
of
right.
Even
in
our
own
time,
such
writers
as
Ruemelin
and
Lord
Lytton
regard
the
state
as
having
&dquo;no
body
to
be
kicked,
and
no
soul
to
be
damned,&dquo;
and
as
being
therefore
neither
moral
nor
juristic.
But
Althusius,
brought
face
to
face
with
the
formation
of
the
Dutch
Repub-
lic,
placed
sovereignty
within
that
sphere
in
which
alone
it
can
possibly
exist
in
the
modern
state,
the
sphere
of law.
Another
great
Netherlander,
Hugo
Grotius,
applied
to
the
state
the
same
juristic
idea
in
the
wider
field
of
its
inter-
national
relations,
and
placed
it
upon
the
bed
rock
of
&dquo;the
dictates
of
right
reason.&dquo;
This
principle,
feebly
applied
in
the
Peace
of
Westphalia,
and
sup-
ported
by
the
innumerable
disciples
of
Grotius
in
every
civilized
land
and
century
since,
has
triumphed
within
the
science
of
politics
and
is
asserting
itself
more
and
more
frequently
and
emphatically
in
the
practice
of
national
government
and
in
international
relations
as
well.
As
a
corollary
of
the
triumph
of
this
conception
of
the
state,
true
patriotism
has
come
to
be
loyalty
to
the
principles
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