Retaliatory Auto Theft

• Author: Bruce A. Jacobs,Michael Cherbonneau
• Date: 01 November 2015
• DOI: 10.1177/1043986215608533
• Published date: 01 November 2015
• Subject Matter: Articles

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

2015, Vol. 31(4) 468 –491

© 2015 SAGE Publications

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DOI: 10.1177/1043986215608533

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Article

Retaliatory Auto Theft

Michael Cherbonneau1 and Bruce A. Jacobs2

Abstract

Drawing from a qualitative sample of active auto thieves, this article examines the

moralistic underpinnings of auto theft. Our findings indicate that retaliatory auto theft

is either direct or indirect. In direct forms of payback, auto theft reprises a specific

violator for a specific affront, and the theft serves as that reprisal. In indirect payback,

the target’s culpability is lacking: Auto theft either removes some generalized loss or

facilitates a broader retributive objective secondary to the theft target. Discussion

focuses on the distinction between revenge and retribution and how auto theft

emerges as a feasible choice given the universe of available retaliatory options, and

despite the longstanding preference among street offenders for violence.

Keywords

retaliation, offender decision-making, motor vehicle theft

Introduction

While much is understood about decision-making in predatory street crimes such as

robbery and burglary (e.g., Bennett & Wright, 1984; Cromwell & Olson, 2004; Gabor

et al., 1987; Hochstetler, 2001; Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs, Topalli, & Wright, 2003; Katz,

1991; Shover, 1996; Topalli & Wright, 2004; Tunnell, 1992; Walsh, 1986; R. T. Wright

& Decker, 1994, 1997; R. Wright, Brookman, & Bennett, 2006), relatively little is

known about the core decision-making processes of auto theft (but see, Cherbonneau

& Copes, 2006, 2012; Fleming, 1999; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014a, 2014b; Light,

Nee, & Ingham, 1993). Even less is known about the etiology of this crime exclusive

of financial or expressive motives (but see, Copes, 2003, pp. 324-326). Drawing from

a qualitative sample of active auto thieves, we address that lacuna here by examining

1University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, USA

2University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Michael Cherbonneau, Criminology and Criminal Justice Department, University of North Florida, 1

UNF Drive, Jacksonville, FL 32224, USA.

Email: m.cherbonneau@unf.edu

608533CCJXXX10.1177/1043986215608533Journal of Contemporary Criminal JusticeCherbonneau and Jacobs

research-article2015

Cherbonneau and Jacobs 469

the moralistic basis of auto theft and its conceptual implications for retributive

decision-making.

Offender Decision-Making and Street Criminal

Retaliation

In line with the recent interest in criminal decision-making, researchers have endeav-

ored to explore the risks and rewards that offenders attach to specific crimes and how

those perceptions guide criminal choice (e.g., Bennett & Wright, 1984; Carroll &

Weaver, 1986; Copes & Cherbonneau, 2014; Cromwell & Olson, 2004; Feeney, 1986;

Hochstetler & Copes, 2003; Jacobs, 1999; Shover, 1996; Tunnell, 1992; R. T. Wright

& Decker, 1994, 1997). Persistent street offenders have been the subject of an appre-

ciable share of this research (see, for example, Brookman, Bennett, Hochstetler, &

Copes, 2011; Copes, 2003; Hochstetler, 2002; Jacobs, 2000; Katz, 1991; Rosenfeld,

Jacobs, & Wright, 2003; Shover & Honaker, 1992). This state of affairs is not surpris-

ing: Street offenders commit a disproportionate amount of serious violent and property

crime and consume significant criminal justice resources in attempts to interdict and

deter them (Sherman, 2007; Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972).

Generally speaking, the study of offender decision-making is nested within several

broader theoretical traditions, which include deterrence, rational choice, and routine

activities (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Clarke & Felson, 1993; Cornish & Clarke, 1986;

Felson & Boba, 2009; Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 2010; Nagin, 1998; Paternoster, 2010;

Piquero & Tibbetts, 2002). Each of these perspectives is unique, but all tend to under-

emphasize the role of situational context in offending decisions (Jacobs & Wright,

1999; Von Hirsch, Bottoms, Burney, & Wilkström, 1999). Indeed, a hallmark of stud-

ies in this tradition is the assumption of “attenuated positivism” (Lofland, 1969),

wherein offender agency is bypassed or presumed outright in favor of softly determin-

istic views of criminal conduct (see Clarke & Cornish, 1985).

This tendency owes largely to quantitative, survey-based research designs that dom-

inate inquiry in this area (see Loughran, Pogarsky, Piquero, & Paternoster, 2011;

Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 2006; Paternoster, 1989; Peterson & Braiker, 1980;

Piquero & Rengert, 1999). Because survey methodology explores decision-making in

the abstract, it limits the scope of research to a small range of decisions that link con-

temporaneous risk/reward perceptions to hypothetical crime participation and projected

offending (Apel, 2013; Von Hirsch et al., 1999). While useful for testing core tenets of

decision-making theory, this approach tends to truncate criminal choice and presuppose

its nuanced nature (Topalli, 2011). This is unfortunate given that all social action—

including crime—is nested in, and shaped by, context (R. T. Wright & Decker, 1994).

Renowned for their ability to overcome these limitations are qualitative, ethno-

graphic field-based studies of offenders (Topalli, 2011). Here, sample size and gener-

alizability—the bedrock of quantitative research—are sacrificed in favor of relatively

small, targeted samples of known offenders to address the nuances of criminal deci-

sion-making (see Bennett & Wright, 1984; Carroll & Weaver, 1986; Copes & Vieraitis,

2012; Cromwell & Olson, 2004; Jacobs, 1999, 2000; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014a;