Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation

• Author: Madalina Busuioc,Martin Lodge
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12612
• Published date: 01 January 2017
• Date: 01 January 2017

Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation 91

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 77, Iss. 1, pp. 91–100. © 2016 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12612.

Martin Lodge is professor of political

science and public policy and director of the

Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation

at the London School of Economics, United

Kingdom. His research interests are in the

areas of executive politics and regulation.

He is coeditor of

Public Administration.

E-mail : m.lodge@lse.ac.uk

Madalina Busuioc is senior lecturer

in politics at the University of Exeter,

United Kingdom. Her research is focused

on issues of regulation and governance,

with a particular emphasis on the study of

bureaucratic agencies operating both at

national and European Union levels, public

accountability, agency independence, and

aspects of institutional design. She is author

of

European Agencies: Law and Practices

of Accountability

(Oxford University Press,

2013).

E-mail : e.m.busuioc@exeter.ac.uk

Abstract : Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable

variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however,

about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation-concerned literatures,

this article argues that a reputation-based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how

account-giving actors and account-holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make

sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism

of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The

resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account-giver and account-

holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.

Practitioner Points

• Reputational concerns drive the way in which account-givers and account-holders relate to each other.

• Contingent on external audience perceptions, reputational concerns can disproportionately focus

organizational attention on visible, controversial, or politicized aspects.

• Public interest risks becoming narrowed down to the pursuit of salience for account-givers and account-

holders alike.

• Deficits arise when “what matters” for organizations (whether they are account-holders or account-givers) is

not aligned with “what matters” from a public interest perspective.

• No “ideal” accountability design exists that does not generate “desired” and “undesired” behaviors.

Madalina Busuioc

University of Exeter, United Kingdom

Martin Lodge

London School of Economics, United Kingdom

Reputation and Accountability Relationships:

Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation

Cassio: Reputation, reputation, reputation. Oh, I

have lost my reputation.

I have lost the immor tal part of myself, and what

remains is bestial …

Iago: … Reputation is an idle and most false

imposition, often got without merit and lost

without deserving. …

— Othello, Act 2, Scene 3

O rganizations are facing mounting

accountability expectations. Dubnick,

for example, notes that accountability is

often cited as “both the cause and the cure for every

ailment and imperfection in government” (Dubnick

2011 , 707; see also Dubnick and Fredrickson

2011). Resulting demand overloads, conflicting

expectations, “multiple accountabilities disorders,”

and such pathologies are widely diagnosed (Bevan and

Hood 2006 ; Bovens, Schillemans, and ‘t Hart 2008;

Dubnick 2005 ; Flinders 2011 ; Hood 2007 ; Koppell

2005 ; Messner 2009 ). Accountability is said to be

about “the management of expectations” (Romzek

and Dubnick 1987 ), but how do public organizations

actually manage the diverse expectations and demands

placed on them by different audiences?

Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in

organizational interest, intensity, and investment in

accountability relationships—on the part of both

account-givers and account-holders. For instance,

the literature on political accountability points

to variation in account-holders’ involvement and

interest ranging from high intensity to largely

ineffectual account-holding activities characterized

by “undersight” (Zegart 1999 , 2011 ) and “passive

principals” (Brandsma 2013 ). Similarly, whereas

a whole host of studies speak of runaway agents,

another strain highlights the proactive nature of

account-giving by nonministerial agencies (Koop

2014 ; Puppis et al. 2014 ; Reiss 2011 ).

While we have a large variety of accountability

typologies and diagnoses, less is known about

what explains differences in actual investment

in accountability relationships. What is the