Representative Bureaucracy, Institutional Support, and Clientele Need: The Case of Undocumented Students

• Author: Daniel P. Hawes
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00953997211063155
• Published date: 01 September 2022
• Date: 01 September 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997211063155

Administration & Society

2022, Vol. 54(8) 1465 –1492

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/00953997211063155

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Article

Representative

Bureaucracy,

Institutional Support,

and Clientele Need: The

Case of Undocumented

Students

Daniel P. Hawes1

Abstract

The theory of representative bureaucracy posits that passive representation

is associated with improvements in policy outcomes for represented groups.

This research examines the institutional conditions under which representative

bureaucracy is enhanced or limited. It posits that the benefits of representation

will be enhanced when institutional supports are stronger and when clientele

need is greatest. Using a unique longitudinal, multi-level dataset, this paper tests

competing theoretical conditions (including resource constraints, and task

difficulty) under which representative bureaucracy is enhanced or constrained.

The analysis tracks student-level performance of 400,000 undocumented

students in Texas public schools from 2003 to 2011 providing a powerful

empirical test as well as practical policy implications for administrators. It finds

that the effects of representation are strongest when resources are abundant

and clientele need is greatest. This suggests representative may be even more

valuable to organizations than previously thought.

Keywords

representative bureaucracy, immigration, multi-level panel data,

undocumented students, education

1Kent State University, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:

Daniel P. Hawes, Department of Political Science, Kent State University, 302 Bowman Hall,

Kent, OH 44242-0001, USA.

Email: dhawes2@kent.edu

1063155AAS0010.1177/00953997211063155Administration & SocietyHawes

research-article2021

1466 Administration & Society 54(8)

Introduction

Extant work on representative bureaucracy has examined the determinants of

passive and active representation, the link between passive and active repre-

sentation and, more recently, how passive representation can increase sym-

bolic representation; that is, how the composition of bureaucracy can change

citizen behavior. Meier (2019) proposes several theoretical conditions under

which the effects of representation will matter more (or less) and challenges

scholars to empirically test the conditions of brepresentation. This research

takes up this challenge and contributes to our theoretical and empirical under-

standing of how representation operates. Specifically, it examines the condi-

tions under which the effects of passive representation are either enhanced or

diminished. Put simply, it proposes that the effectiveness of passive represen-

tation will be greatest in organizations with more institutional support for

bureaucrats and in situations where there is greatest clientele need. The find-

ings show that the effects of representation are strongest when resources and

need are greatest. These findings present a new way of considering the

importance and power of representation since it appears to have its greatest

impact when it is needed most.

Representative Bureaucracy

Bureaucratic representation has generally been conceptualized in at least two

ways: passive and active. Passive representation “concerns the source of ori-

gin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror the soci-

ety” (Mosher, 1968, p. 12). That is, it refers to how well bureaucrats “look

like” the citizens they represent in terms of key demographic characteristics.

Alternatively, active representation occurs when “an individual is expected to

press for the interests and desires of those whom he is to represent, whether

they be [sic] the whole people or some segment” (pp. 11–12).

The link between passive and active representation is certainly not guar-

anteed and several necessary conditions have been posited (Meier, 1993b;

Thompson, 1976). First, segregation in an agency’s workforce will work to

undermine active representation. If underrepresented employees are rele-

gated to positions with little or no opportunity to shape policy outcomes, they

will be unable to actively pursue policies that will benefit those whom they

passively represent. Second, if organizational socialization is overly intense

and bureaucrats adopt the organization’s attitudes as their own, active repre-

sentation may be limited, particularly if those values are in conflict with the

values of the passively represented group. Third, the agency’s clientele must

include the passively represented group. That is, the agency in question must