Reorganizations and Reforms: Promises, Promises
| Author | Marvin Cummins,Vera Vogelsang-Coombs |
| DOI | 10.1177/0734371X8200200203 |
| Date | 01 March 1982 |
| Published date | 01 March 1982 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
21
REORGANIZATIONS
AND
REFORMS:
PROMISES,
PROMISES*
Vera
Vogelsang-Coombs
Washington
University
Marvin
Cummins
Washington
University
Abstract
In
this
analysis,
the
authors
argue
that
reorganizations
symbolize
a
chief
executive’s
attempt
to
dominate
the
bureaucracy.
Using
the
Senior
Executive
Service
as
a
case
study,
it
is
contended
that
executive
reorganizations
are
pervasive
rites
of
presidential
politics
and
civil
service
reform
is
a
myth
on
which
this
rite
is
based.
Unlike
other
students
of
the
subject,
Vogelsang-Coombs
and
Cum-
mins
do
not
share
the
view
that
the
bureaucracy
problem
can
be
solved.
Reorganizations
change
the
form,
but
not
necessarily
the
underlying
political
reality,
of
public
administration.
Introduction
Reorganization
abounds
in
American
governments.
The
faith
in
reorganiza-
tion
seems
to
be
nurtured
on
eternal
promises.
Bureaucracy
is
but
the
tool
of
the
political
government,
and
in
political
governance,
as
in
many
other
difficult
tasks,
a
great
deal
of
energy
can
be
displaced
in
preparing
the
tools.
Prepara-
tion
is,
after
all,
the
promise
of
performance
yet
to
come.
In
fact,
the
frequen-
cy
of
executive
reorganization
is
astounding.
Seidman
(1975e
3)
calls
reorganiza-
tions
&dquo;almost
a
religion
in
Washington.&dquo;
Between
1949
and
1978,
100
reorganization
plans
were
submitted
to
the
Congress.’
The
standard
rationale
for
reorganization
is
the
President
wants
to
influence
the
career
bureaucracy
by
structural
changes
which
alter
the
distribution
of
power
in
favor
of
the
Presi-
dent.
Reorganization
proposals
tend
to
be
&dquo;president-enhancing&dquo;
(Arnold,
1979).
Heclo
(1979:
7)
describes
the
relationship
as
follows:
Government
performance
(in
the
sense
of
both
negative
constraints
and
the
positive
use
of
the
bureaucracy)
can
be
thought
of
as
the
product
of
political
leadership
times
bureaucratic
power.
A
product
rather
than
merely
a
sum
is
at
stake
because,
depending
upon
how
politicans
and
bureaucrats
are
linked,
either
one
can
diminish
or
magnify
the
impact
of
the
other
on
total
performance.
*This
article
is
a
revision
of
a
paper
presented
at
the
1980
Midwestern
Political
Science
Association
Meeting,
Pick-Congress
Hotel,
Chicago,
April
24-26,
1980.
We
would
like
to
thank
the
following
people
for
assistance,
advice,
and
criticism
in
executing
the research:
Dr.
Edi
Goldenberg
of
the
University
of
Michigan,
Dr.
Patricia
Rosenbaum
of
Washington
University,
Ms.
Anne
Andrew
of
the
Washington
Office
of
the
Office
of
Personnel
Management,
and
Mr.
Gerald
Hinch
of
the
Mid-continent
Regional
Office
of
the
Office
of
Personnel
Management.
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