Regulation and Compliance Motivations: Examining Different Approaches

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00428.x
• Published date: 01 January 2005
• Date: 01 January 2005
• Author: Peter J. May

Regulation and Compliance Motivations: Examining Different Approaches 31

Peter J. May

University of Washington

Regulation and Compliance Motivations:

Examining Different Approaches

This research examines how traditional regulatory and voluntary approaches affect motivations to

address potential harms to water quality. The traditional approach consists of governmental en-

forcement of mandatory requirements; the voluntary approach consists of government calling

attention to potential harms and facilitating actions to address them. These approaches are best

thought of as ends of a continuum rather than as the sole choices. Three sets of findings emerge

from the research. One, not surprisingly, is that traditional regulation is more effective than the

voluntary approach alone. A second shows that deterrent fears and the sense of duty to comply

are important motivations for action. A third concerns factors that account for the variation in each

motivation for which inspections, peer reputation, and attitudes toward government are shown to

be important considerations. These findings point to the duality of deterrent fears and civic obliga-

tions as motivations to address potential harms.

Various regulations in the United States have been criti-

cized for a number of years for having unreasonable re-

quirements and heavy-handed enforcement. In particular,

environmental regulations have been singled out as ex-

amples of excessive regulation (Bardach and Kagan 1982;

Andrews 1999; Fiorino 1995). These criticisms, together

with the realization that the environmental problems of

today are different than those of 30 years ago, have spawned

a search for viable alternatives to traditional forms of en-

vironmental regulation (Fiorino 2001; Gunningham and

Grabosky 1998; Kettl 2002; NAPA 1995). This search has

led to new thinking about regulatory alternatives, with re-

cent attention on cooperative and voluntary approaches

(Harrison 1999; Lyon and Maxwell 2001; Potoski and

Prakash 2002).

The traditional perspective is that mandatory prohibi-

tions for harmful actions are essential and that it is neces-

sary for government agencies to enforce compliance with

those rules. Cooperative approaches entail collaboration

between regulatory authorities and regulated entities, ei-

ther in negotiating requirements (Marcus, Geffen, and Sex-

ton 2002; Kerwin 1999) or in monitoring and obtaining

compliance through the use of incentives (Harrison 1999;

Sparrow 2000). Under the voluntary approach, government

calls attention to a potential harm and facilitates voluntary

actions by relevant firms or industry associations to ad-

dress that harm (Coglianese and Nash 2001; Potoski and

Prakash 2002). While there are many variants of each of

these approaches, a basic distinction among them is the

degree to which government compels compliance. Of par-

ticular interest for this research is the difference between

mandatory regulation, which involves a central role for

government, and voluntary approaches, which entail a

much more limited governmental role.

The notion that firms will voluntarily undertake actions

to reduce pollution or go beyond minimum requirements

is contrary to the image of profit-seeking firms that ignore

the external impact of their operations. However, experi-

ence with a diverse set of voluntary programs demonstrates

that at least some firms are motivated to act out of a com-

bination of civic duty, good public relations, market dif-

ferentiation, and a fear of more stringent government regu-

lation (Arora and Carson 1996; Prakash 2000; Segerson

and Miceli 1998). At the same time, related research has

demonstrated the limitations of these programs by show-

ing that participation by firms is uneven, the gains in pol-

Peter J. May is a professor of political science at the University of Washing-

ton. His research addresses regulatory policy design, enforcement and com-

pliance with environmental regulations, and policy processes. His recent re-

search has appeared in the

Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Journal

of Policy Analysis and Management, Journal of Public Administration Re-

search and Theory, Law and Policy,

and

State and Local Government Re-

view.

E-mail: pmay@u.washington.edu.