Regulating California’s Prison Population

AuthorJames Austin
DOI10.1177/0002716215602700
Published date01 March 2016
Date01 March 2016
Subject MatterII. The Diffusion and Translation of Law and Policy Reform
84 ANNALS, AAPSS, 664, March 2016
DOI: 10.1177/0002716215602700
Regulating
California’s
Prison
Population: The
Use of Sticks
and Carrots
By
JAMES AUSTIN
602700ANN The Annals of the American AcademyRegulating California’s Prison Population
research-article2015
While many scholars and social commentators bemoan
the rise of “mass incarceration” in the United States,
few states have succeeded in significantly reducing
prison populations. Fueled by systemic changes in
penal codes, sentencing practices, and federal funding
all designed to increase the use of imprisonment, most
states have been unable to reverse the massive increase
that has transpired over the past four decades. More
alarming, there are few indications that mass incarcera-
tion will be reduced any time soon. There are a few
exceptions, with California being one. Since 2007,
California’s prison population has dropped by over
43,000 prisoners. Reductions have also been achieved
in the state parole (82,000) and probation (15,000)
populations. Today there are 146,000 fewer Californians
in prison, jail, parole, or probation. Initially driven
largely by a period of lengthy litigation, a rare federal
court order to depopulate, several other reforms,
reflecting a sticks and carrots approach, were intro-
duced beginning in 2007 to lower imprisonment rates.
Among them was “Realignment,” which relocated
approximately 27,000 state prisoners to the counties.
However, it required another stick in the form of a bal-
lot initiative (Proposition 47) to further reduce the
prison population and meet compliance with the fed-
eral court order. In the end, it was the externally
imposed dual “sticks” of litigation and a ballot initiative
that proved to be the driving forces in reducing
California’s use of mass incarceration.
Keywords: mass incarceration; Realignment; regula-
tion; financial incentives
The Use of Regulation to Govern
and Reform Institutional and
Individual Behavior
There is considerable interest in the use of
government-based regulation, often in the form
James Austin is the President of the JFA Institute.
Before taking this position, he was codirector of the
Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections at the
George Washington University in Washington, D.C.,
Executive Vice President of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, and a Correctional Sociologist
for the Illinois Department of Corrections.
Correspondence: jfainstitute@gmail.com
REGULATING CALIFORNIA’S PRISON POPULATION 85
of law, legislation, and administrative rules, to govern and reform social and insti-
tutional behavior. Increasingly, modern society is relying on formal regulatory
systems to influence business and social institutions as well as individuals.
Greater reliance on formal regulatory systems can be traced to the New Deal,
where the federal government began to regulate the workplace in terms of the
40-hour work week, banning child labor, unemployment compensation, Social
Security, and health insurance, to name a few. Most recently, in the world of
finance, the Great Recession of 2008 has fostered considerable debate on
whether it was caused by a lack of oversight by federal regulatory agencies in the
marketplace. Now there is concern about whether increased regulation is exces-
sive and whether an unregulated “marketplace” is the most efficient model for
fostering the common good (Silbey 2013).
In the area of the environment, there is considerable debate on how best to
control climate change, either through complex cap-and-trade incentives or let-
ting the marketplace generate the most efficient solution(s). Here again the
debate is over whether regulation by the state to control pollution and the poten-
tial damaging effects of climate change will be effective.
Regulation (via legislation, litigation, or administrative rule) is also used to
restructure or reform current individual and institutional behavior. For example,
the federal tax code is used to either encourage or discourage economic activity
and profits for certain sectors of the economy. If we want to encourage people to
buy houses, we provide tax credits on the mortgage interest they pay. If we want
people to buy solar energy systems or purchase more energy efficient appliances
and electric cars, we provide tax credits. If we want people to reduce smoking,
we impose high taxes on cigarettes to make them less affordable.
The historic use of mental health institutions or asylums to control and man-
age mental illness can also be seen as a regulatory issue. There has been a major
reduction in the number of people institutionalized for such reasons. As reported
by Spelman (2009) and Gottschalk (2009), the massive decarceration of state
hospitals was the result of two developments. First was the successful invention
of mind-altering drugs such as Thorazine that allowed the mentally ill to be
treated in community-based settings. A second factor was litigation that chal-
lenged the use of patients as workers without pay.
In 1973, a federal district court ruled (in Souder v. Brennan) that patients in
mental health institutions must be considered employees and paid the minimum
wage required by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 whenever they per-
formed any activity that conferred an economic benefit on an institution. Based
on this ruling and other developments, the economic viability of many state men-
tal institutions was diminished as patients no longer worked for free. This
included passage of Medicaid, with the federal government subsidizing the care
of the mentally ill in local hospitals and nursing homes. These developments
reduced the state mental health population from about 560,000 in the 1950s to
under 40,000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).
This article uses the lens of regulation to analyze efforts to downsize
California’s prison system and the associated challenges of inducing compliance
across counties. I proceed, first, by providing background on the rise of mass

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