A Reflexive Approach to Risk and Intervention for Third‐Party Intervenors

• Date: 01 June 2013
• Author: Larissa Fast
• Published date: 01 June 2013
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21075

A Re exive Approach to Risk and Intervention for

Third-Party Intervenors

Larissa Fast

In violent contexts, intervenors face dangers and are sometimes targets

of violence themselves. Data and discussion about these risks and strate-

gies to address them are missing from the peacebuilding literature.  is

article begins to address this gap. I argue that existing con ict analysis

models provide a foundation for risk analysis, but they do not recognize

the interplay between an organization’s policies and intervention

approaches and its security. I review two generations of con ict analysis

frameworks and then present an approach that identi es various

dimensions and types of risk and vulnerability for third-party interve-

nors and integrates easily into existing analytical frameworks.

In a town outside the capital city of a relatively stable southern African

country, a demonstration resulted in a stone-throwing attack on the

o ces of a secular relief and development nongovernmental organization

(NGO). Other NGO o ces nearby remained una ected. Demonstrators

were protesting the rendition of  ve Muslim teachers, an incident seemingly

unrelated to the organization itself. What precipitated the attack against this

organization but not other NGOs working in the same location?

When it investigated the incident, the organization discovered serious

misconceptions among the local population about the NGO, its mission,

and its work, particularly related to its identity as a secular organization

C R Q, vol. 30, no. 4, Summer 2013 467

© Wiley Periodicals, Inc. and the Association for Con ict Resolution

Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) • DOI: 10.1002/crq.21075

I thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the manuscript. I presented an

earlier version of this article at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association

at New Orleans in February 2010. In addition, I credit the 3Ps model to John Paul Lederach,

a colleague at the Kroc Institute, and SPITCEROW to Christopher Mitchell, emeritus profes-

sor at the School for Con ict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.

468 FAST

C R Q • DOI: 10.1002/crq

and its purpose and activities in the town. First, the local community per-

ceived the NGO as a “Christian charity.” Although the organization had a

secular identity, it rented its o ce from the local diocese of the Catholic

Church. While the country is majority Christian, Muslims constituted

70 percent of the population in that area.  e organization’s sta members,

however, did not re ect this reality; it employed a majority of Christians

from the capital city and only two Muslims. Some of its sta members

openly propagated their beliefs at work, adorning the o ce walls with

Christian posters and other religious symbols. Furthermore, the NGO

operated its projects outside the town, in neighboring towns and villages.

As a result, the local community observed the comings and goings of sta

members in vehicles branded with the organization’s logo, but neither wit-

nessed nor understood the NGO’s activities or contributions. To them, the

NGO implemented no visible projects and had no clear positive e ect on

the town or its citizens.  e fact that the majority of the organization’s sta

came from other parts of the country inhibited its ability to counteract

these assumptions, since its sta members did not have strong ties to the

local community.

Together these factors combined to create the perception of a Christian

agency operating in a majority Muslim area, with little bene t to the local

population. When religious tensions  ared around the perceived injustice

of the rendition of the  ve Muslim teachers, the organization became a

target.  e investigation concluded that the organization needed to change

perceptions by reaching out to the community to change its reputation

and by educating the local community about its identity and mission.

 ese actions, they expected, would increase its acceptance by the com-

munity (anonymous personal communication, 2009).

 is incident highlights the risks, de ned as the potential for harm or

adverse consequences, that relief and development organizations face as an

inherent part of their work.  e dangers a ecting aid workers and aid

operations have received increasing attention over the past decade, and

with good reason. In 2011, 151 attacks on aid workers resulted in the

deaths of 86 workers, with an additional 127 who were seriously injured

and 95 who were kidnapped (Humanitarian Outcomes 2012).  e high

incidents of fatality, kidnapping, and severe injury are especially infamous

in places such as Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia, the three most danger-

ous places for aid workers (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009).

Aid agencies have responded with increased attention to and sophistication