Recognition of the People's Republic of China

• Date: 01 July 1959
• Published date: 01 July 1959
• DOI: 10.1177/000271625932400110
• Author: Edgar Snow
• Subject Matter: Articles

Recognition of the People’s Republic of China
By EDGAR SNOW
ABSTRACT: The United States alliance with the Nationalist
regime on Taiwan is a form of armed intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of China. Today it is clear that the aims of that
policy cannot be realized in the visible future. The costs of
maintaining Chiang Kai-shek far exceed the American invest-
ment in nonmilitary help to other Asian lands; preoccupation
with armed answers to the challenge of poverty obscures
American understanding of the real needs of all underdeveloped
countries. State Department justifications for continued non-
recognition of China are threadbare; defining functional alter-
natives is not easy.
Outstanding Sino-American issues are
negotiable, given the will on both sides. The future of Taiwan
most likely would be settled, once serious "recognition talks"
began, by compromise between Peking and the Taiwan succes-
sors to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. Recognition by the United
States and the United Nations would greatly enhance the in-
ternational prestige of the People’s Republic of China. It
would mean serious modifications in the cold war and accept-
ance of the implications of a prolonged period of competitive
co-existence. Recognition, therefore, is not something to be
lightly undertaken without a clear alternative program and dy-
namic concepts and means of winning the "battle" of competi-
tive co-existence. Continuation of our present policy will,
however, lose that battle to the Communist bloc by default.
Edgar Snow, an American Foreign Correspondent in Asia and Europe for more than
twenty years, published the first interviews ever given by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai,
and other Chinese Communist leaders, in 1936-37. He covered the Sino-Japanese War
(1931-33 and 1937-41); returned to the United States in 1941 and was assigned over-
seas to Africa, India, Iran, China, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Austria. Mr. Snow was an Associate Editor of the Saturday Evening Post from 1943 to
1953. Among other books, he is the author of The Battle for Asia (
1941
)
and Pattern
of Soviet Power (1945). He was a Research Consultant of Harvard University (
1956-
57), which published his Random Notes on Red China (
1957
).
75

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76
I N THE days of Chinese provincial the present stalemate-or dead end, as
i. warlords it used to be said that
some see it-in our policy?
&dquo;China is only a geographical expres-
In the eyes of most of Asia, and in
sion.&dquo;
To fit the current paradox the
the candid appraisal of many Americans,
cliché would have to read: &dquo;China is
current United States policy is one of
only a political expression.&dquo;
Various
intervention in the internal affairs of
powers define China to suit their con-
China.
On and around Taiwan our
venience. In United States official se-
armed forces defend an alliance with
mantics the refugee Nationalist regime
the deposed Kuomintang, or National-
on Taiwan Island is synonymous with
ist, leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and his
China despite the fact that it exercises
followers in exile from mainland China.
no power over more than 98 per cent
We hold the regime in Taiwan-which
of the Chinese population.
retains the name National Government
In order to simplify and avoid con-
of China-to be the only legitimate all-
fusion the word China is here taken to
China authority. Officially, we insist
mean the subcontinent or mainland ter-
that this view corresponds to the inter-
ritory historically known by that name.
ests of some 670 million Chinese. The
It is used interchangeably with &dquo;politi-
will of the people in this respect, how-
cal expressions&dquo; such as the People’s
ever, has never been tested by plebiscite
Government of China, the Chinese Com-
even among the 8 million Taiwanese-
munist regime, the Chinese People’s Re-
over whom Chinese Nationalist power
public and the Peking regime. The
was established, after World War II,
word Taiwan is used interchangeably
by the use of force, including the sup-
with &dquo;political expressions&dquo; such as Na-
pression of an incipient autonomous
tionalist China, the National govern-
movement which cost the lives of be-
ment, and the Nationalist regime.
tween 5,000 and 20,000 natives.2
2
What is the origin of United States
&dquo;The United States holds the view
policy of nonrecognition of the People’s
that it [the People’s Republic of China]
Republic? What are the official reasons
will one day pass,&dquo; said Secretary of
for continuance of that policy? Has it
State John Foster Dulles in defense of
worked in the &dquo;enlightened self-interest&dquo;
American policy. &dquo;By withholding dip-
of the American people, as the late
lomatic recognition from Peiping it
John Foster Dulles contended,:’ and if
seeks to hasten that passing.&dquo; 3 That
so, how? Some critics believe that it
nonrecognition and the Taiwan alliance
costs more than it is worth both in
are
regarded as offensive weapons
treasure expended to support it and
against China was further indicated
in the jeopardy imposed by it on more
when Mr. Dulles declared: &dquo;We owe it
important considerations than it serves.
to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese
What are the alternatives to that policy?
people, to do all that we can to con-
What might be the terms of settlement
tribute to that passing.&dquo; 4
making diplomatic recognition possible?
The United States has intervened in
What would be the effects on American
China before, but only in concert with
interests?
What would we and the
other powers. Today we have alliances,
world stand to lose or gain by meeting
with forty-four states other than Tai-
some of China’s needs in order to break
2
Jack Belden, China Shakes the World,
1

Our Policies
Toward Communism in
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 395.
China. U. S. Department of State, Bulletin,
3

Op. cit. (note 1 supra
),
p. 30.
37-91-95 (July 15, 1957), p. 93.
4

Ibid., p. 94.

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77
wan, any one of which might involve us
naval forces, Chiang possessed, as the
in war; but none is obliged to support
core of his strength, some 39 divisions
our alliance with Chiang.
Our inter-
of supposedly crack troops well armed,
vention is unilateral and in effect makes
supplied, and trained by Americans.
Taiwan an American protectorate.
Those divisions were almost totally dis-
armed in the North, and the Commu-
ORIGIN OF US POLICY
nists used the captured American equip-
American intervention in China began
ment, plus some Japanese arms seized
more or less accidentally during World
in Manchuria (when Soviet troops
War II.
From Pearl Harbor onward
looked the other way), to complete their
China was heavily dependent on Ameri-
conquest.
can military and economic aid given
In 1949, when the Communist domi-
exclusively to the central government
nated government was set up in Peking,
at Chungking, a one-party structure
it invited diplomatic relations with
under the Kuomintang, or Nationalists,
powers ready to treat China &dquo;on a basis
led by Chiang Kai-shek. The only
of equality.&dquo; Another condition was, of
other armed political party in China
course, that the powers sever connec-
was organized by the Communists.
tions with the Nationalists who had fled
They had no political legality inside
to Taiwan with the help of American
Nationalist held areas, but they had re-
ships and the Chinese navy, which re-
tained their own stronghold in North-
mained loyal to the old regime. Ameri-
west China as a condition of the truce
can military advice and aid to Chiang
which, in 1937, ended the first decade-
Kai-shek had run into the billions; un-
long Nationalist-Communist civil war
doubtedly that was held against the
in a united front against Japan. During
United States by the Communists; their
the eight years of anti-Japanese war the
victory cost them more than two million
Communists greatly enlarged their in-
dead. However, the new regime did not
fluence and numbers by means of guer-
exclude the United States from its offer
rilla warfare behind the Japanese lines.
of diplomatic relations. Sixteen powers,
By 1945 native forces led by the Com-
including Great Britain, promptly recog-
munists had proved so effective at utiliz-
nized the de facto situation. The United
ing war conditions to expand, that they
States did not. In protest against mis-
were able to offer a major challenge to
treatment of Americans who remained
Chiang Kai-shek when he attempted to
in China, the United States soon with-
take over control of Manchuria and
drew all its officials and closed its em-
Eastern China after Japan’s surrender.
bassy and consulates.
Repeated efforts were made to avoid
Then for a time the American policy
open civil war by changing the Nation-
was one of &dquo;letting the dust settle.&dquo; By
alist government into a coalition giving
late spring of 1950, there were indica-
representation to the Communists. In
tions that the United States would not
1945 President Truman sent General
oppose the seating of China in the
George C. Marshall to China to try to
United Nations and might not long in-
mediate in the formation of such a coali-
sist on the legitimacy of the rump
tion. His mission was a failure. In the
regime in Taiwan or deny China’s claims
subsequent great civil war Chiang Kai-
to sovereignty there.5 The outbreak of
shek’s armies of some 21/ million men
hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950,
virtually dissolved. Besides having a
changed everything and has profoundly
modern air force...