Informal arguing: the likelihood of providing arguments, rebuttals, refutations, and evidence in an argumentative interaction.

• Author: Limon, M. Sean

During informal arguments, arguments that people have with others over a host of issues such as political or social topics (Ricco, 2002), interactants assert and support a position or claim with the goal of demonstrating the superiority of one's view. At the core of argumentative ability are reasoning and critical thinking skills (Erwin & Sebrell, 2003; Follert & Colbert, 1983; Korcok, 1997; Vaughn, 2005). Ancient scholars such as Socrates, Aristotle, and Cicero regarded the ability to argue as the pinnacle of thinking, and with good reason; argumentative thinking guides decisions we make about personal issues as well as societal issues (Kuhn, 1991).

Argumentation can occur during a discussion when a claim is advanced and at least two people are trying to persuade each other. Persuading others of the superiority of a claim should at least consist of advancing one's arguments and refuting the arguments of others (Infante, 1981; Walton, 1989). Therefore, in order to be convincing, one needs to have the ability to perform certain skills that are indicative of an argumentative discussion (Freeley & Steinberg, 2005; Reinard, 1991; Reike, Sillars & Peterson, 2005). Yet, extant literature suggests that lay people do not exhibit such skills.

Kuhn's work is seminal (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Kuhn, Weinstock, & Flaton, 1994) in understanding the nature of informal arguing. Kuhn and her colleagues have established that, generally speaking, lay people have unsophisticated arguing skills. Kuhn's (1991) study of lay people's ability to provide a case for theory behind their thinking indicated that some argumentation skills, like counterarguing, were not likely to be performed. Another study of teens discussing capital punishment showed that teens focused on supporting their own arguments and avoided addressing the arguments of their opponent (Felton & Kuhn, 2001).

We find the aforementioned data fascinating and informative about the nature of informal arguing, and we are curious as to the generalizability of these data in alternative conditions. In this study, we present Kuhn and her colleagues' work and discuss some potential methodological and contextual issues that could account for the trends in the extant data. Finally, we present an exploratory study of informal arguing to test our questions.

IMPORTANCE OF ARGUING AND ARGUMENTATION SKILLS

Kuhn (2005) posits that argument is a form of inquiry and that when people are engaged in argument (alone or collectively) they must attempt to solve a problem, resolve an issue, or make a decision. Engaging in argumentative dialogue enhances individual thinking competencies by forcing people to think through their rationale for holding particular opinions (Kuhn). Moreover, research suggests that collaborative arguing is even more beneficial than practicing skills of argument by oneself (Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 19911. Kuhn stated "Without the ability to argue, an individual's potential to contribute to the collective welfare would be diminished" (p. 1141. Yet, Kuhn's work reveals that the majority of students (in her studies) do not display excellent argument skills (1991, 2005).

Regardless of the type of argumentative interaction, certain skill sets are expected. When in an argumentative situation, arguers may feel, as Reinard (1991) stated, "... obligated to use traditional standards of argument and reasoning to examine positions" (p. 9). These skills enable arguers' effectiveness in presenting their side of an issue. Among these skills are advocating an argument ("Coherent reason offered for one's opinion for the issue under discussion" [Levine & Boster, 1996, p. 352]), refuting others' arguments (the usage of arguments and/or evidence to attack another's argument), rebutting others' arguments (the process of defending one's own argument after it has been attacked by another arguer), and the presentation of various types of evidence (information taken from material of fact or opinion used to establish the probable truth of a claim [see Reinard, 1988]). Although all of these skills are advocated as important for increasing one's argumentative potential (i.e., Cacioppo, Petty & Morris, 1983; Infante, 1981 ; Infante & Rancer, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1984, 1986; Ricco, 2002, Rips, 1998), Kuhn (1991, 2005) suggests that people lack such skill.

Persuasion and social influence scholars have a long tradition of studying the elements making messages persuasive. It is considered axiomatic that it is necessary to provide evidence to back one's arguments. The literature is mixed on what kinds of evidence is most effective at persuading (e.g., narrative or statistical); but suffice it to say that both are important in changing attitudes dependent on the circumstance (Allen et al., 2000). Likewise, scholarship implies that the ability to refute and rebut an opponent's arguments is as important as presenting one's own arguments. The literature on two-sided refutational arguments, for example, shows that people who understand both sides of an argument--not just their own side--are viewed as more trustworthy, fair, and open-minded (Allen, 1991; O'Keefe, 1993). Finally, citing expert evidence has long been thought to be a persuasive tactic (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Yet, extant literature indicates that lay people do not exhibit such skills.

In 1991, Kuhn published an influential book that examined lay people's arguing ability. Kuhn's participants, who represented people from across the lifespan, were asked to describe their views on crime and unemployment and to provide supporting evidence for their theories. Additionally, they were asked to contemplate alternative theories and counterarguments. Kuhn's results revealed that out of 160 participants, only twenty-two were able to develop refutations (counterarguments), and many did not provide evidence when they did so. Kuhn noted similar deficiencies across domains; for example, even teachers displayed an inability to produce (what she terms) genuine evidence in some cases. For all levels of expertise, Kuhn stated that there was a bias toward "my side;" that is, people are able to talk about their own side of an issue, but inept at discussing any other side of the issue.

Felton and Kuhn (2001) conducted a comparison of the dialogue of teens and young adults (college aged) who discussed capital punishment. Their data showed that teens focused on supporting their own arguments and avoided addressing the arguments of their opponent. Young adults were more likely than teens to address their opponents' arguments, mostly through the use of counterarguments. Kuhn, Shaw and Felton (1997) also examined dyadic interactions of individuals in early adolescence and young adulthood. They found that dyadic interaction significantly enhanced quality of reasoning "relative to a more minimal, single-occasion dyadic engagement or a control condition" (p. 287). Their data did reveal qualitative improvement in reasoning over time; in particular they observed a shift from one-sided to two-sided arguments, arguments based within a framework of alternatives, and meta-cognitive awareness of coexistence of multiple views.

We find the aforementioned data important. Although we do not question the veracity of these data, we are curious about their replicability in other situations. Our rationale is based in some limitations to these studies. First, Kuhn's (1991) data could be affected by the nature of the interviews; thus, we believe that people should be studied while in the midst of a discussion that they may perceive to be more confrontational (i.e., where arguers are on the defense). Kuhn did not observe argumentative interaction in this particular study. Rather, she interviewed people about "how" they "would" refute an argument, rebut others' statements, or collect evidence if need be. This procedure allows Kuhn to assess people's thinking abilities, but decreases external validity in the case of argumentative dialogue (e.g., Reinard, 1991; Ripps, 1998). If it is the case, as we argue, that Kuhn's data can only be generalized to thinking about arguing, then we know little about situations where arguers must critically analyze opposing arguments and engage in refuting and rebutting (Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983). Individuals' ability to critically think about refutations and rebuttals while in the midst of an argument is also telling of their arguing abilities (Astleitner, 2005; Vaughn, 2005).

Second, Kuhn et al.'s data (1997, 2001) examined dialogue, and therefore these data go beyond asking people to only think about what they would do. Yet, the generalizability of these studies could be affected by the non-confrontational nature of the participants' instructions. Participants were asked to "share your opinions;" and, in both cases interactants could have been paired with people who shared their opinion (it appears that the 1997 data and the 2001 data are from the same large-scale study). This could account for the lack of counterarguments on the part of arguers. Hence, we had participants believe that they would be having a conversation with someone with the opposite opinion as themselves.

Third, Kuhn was interested in studying arguments...