Reason Taking the Reins From Impulsivity
| Author | Ray Paternoster,Thomas Loughran,Chae Mamayek |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043986215608532 |
| Published date | 01 November 2015 |
| Date | 01 November 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2015
Article
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
2015, Vol. 31(4) 426 –448
Reason Taking the Reins
© 2015 SAGE Publications
Reprints and permissions:
From Impulsivity: The
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1043986215608532
ccj.sagepub.com
Promise of Dual-Systems
Thinking for Criminology
Chae Mamayek1, Thomas Loughran1,
and Ray Paternoster1
Abstract
Aspects of criminological theory are premised on the belief that criminals make poor
decisions. There have been suggestions that individual differences in self-control, willpower,
impulsivity, time orientation, or more recently, thoughtfully reflective decision making
(TRDM) influence choices and, ultimately, deviant outcomes. While much of the literature
suggests there are differences among these concepts, they are often used interchangeably
or at least noted to share common ground. Using survey data collected from university
undergraduate students, this article explores the conceptual and empirical overlap and
areas of distinction between key theoretical constructs. Using hypotheses derived from
a dual-systems model, findings suggest impulsivity, self-control, temptation, and TRDM
are distinct but interrelated constructs. Impulsivity was positively related to intentions
to drink and drive in a hypothetical scenario, but temptation, self-control, and TRDM
had no significant effect on intentions. Consistent with a dual-systems conceptualization,
we found impulsivity and self-control work in tandem, as the risk of drinking and driving
was highest for those respondents who were highly impulsive and had low self-control.
Future research may seek to use a dual-system model to further reconcile trait-based and
decision-based models of criminological theory.
Keywords
self-control, impulsivity, temptation, TRDM, individual differences, dual-systems model
Our impulses are too strong for our judgment sometimes.
—Thomas Hardy
1University of Maryland, College Park, USA
Corresponding Author:
Chae Mamayek, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of Maryland,
2163 LeFrak Hall, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
Email: mamayekc@umd.edu
Mamayek et al.
427
Introduction
In recent years, criminological theory has seemed to move along two separate and very
distinct paths. One path is represented by trait-based theories which posit that crime
and a wide assortment of other self-harming behaviors are the product of stable-
individual differences in some underlying propensity to commit these acts. The second
path is associated with decision-based theories where crime and problem behaviors are
understood to be a rational response to the balance of situational temptations and
restraints, the estimated net utility of such behavior, or due to breakdowns in rational
decision making such as poor decision-making strategies/styles, discounting of
delayed events, or decision-making heuristics and shortcuts. Both theoretical models
have existed and even thrived within criminology while virtually ignoring the other’s
possible strengths and the seemingly obvious connection between the two on a number
of points.1 Just as troubling has been the confusion within the trait-based perspective
as to exactly what time-stable individual trait or traits are important in understanding
crime. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), for example, have argued that the individual-
level trait that explains “all crime, at all times and, for that matter, many forms of
behavior that are not sanctioned by the state” (p. 117) is what they term self-control.
The definition of self-control has, however, been both all-inclusive at times and has
changed over the years. For example, in the 1990 exposition, self-control appears to
entail the individual’s capacity to resist impulsive behavior, yet it also seems to include
impulsivity as one of its dimensions—that is, among other things, low self-control is
impulsivity.
There is, however, a third possible path which can reconcile these divergent posi-
tions that has been given a great amount of attention in cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics and that is the notion of dual-system decision making. There are
different specific versions of dual-system theories, but the common ground is that they
all assume that decision making consists of two distinct but related systems (Camerer,
2007; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008; Stanovich, 1999,
2011). One system is intuitive, fast, and is based on affect and the demands of the
immediate situation. It might easily be called more impulsive decision making. The
second system is slow, and is based on the collection and processing of information,
and is, therefore, premised on contemplation and the rational consideration of the costs
and benefits of action, particularly the long-term costs and gains of a given action.
These are not completely different and unrelated processes, for they work together in
that as Kahneman (2011) noted, “[o]ne of the functions of System 2 (the slower, more
thoughtful system) is to monitor and control the actions ‘suggested’ by System 1”
(p. 45). In other words, while our more emotive and intuitive system may impulsively
suggest one line of action, the more thoughtful and slower part determines whether
that is a good action to take and can, therefore, be expressed, or a not-so-good action
that can and should be inhibited.
Dual-system models, then, hold out the promise of uniting the trait-based and deci-
sion-based models of criminological theory because they combine intuitive, strongly
affective, and impulsive inputs to behavior as well as more rational, thoughtful, and
428
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 31(4)
deliberate inputs. The position of dual-systems theory is that risk-taking behavior such
as crime, drug use, and promiscuous sex is not due solely to impulsive people acting
impulsively, nor is it entirely due to the rational weighing of the costs and gains of
such risks, but involves the operation of both. Before dual-systems theory can unite
the trait-based and decision-based paths in criminology, however, there is a need to
clear up the ambiguity present in current understanding of key criminological concepts
like impulsivity and self-control because there seems to be little agreement as to what
these terms mean, and perhaps most frequently they are treated as synonymous.
In what follows, we first present brief descriptions of trait-based and decision-
based theories of crime. In the former, we also present what we think is a fundamental
misunderstanding about self-control in the field and how this concept differs from
impulsivity. We then move to a discussion as to how dual-system models can reconcile
trait- and decision-based models and hypothesize that both systems are involved in
understanding antisocial behavior like crime. We derive some hypotheses from the
dual-systems model and test these with data collected from a sample of university
students. We close by discussing the implications of our findings for criminological
theory.
Trait-Based Theories of Crime
Trait theories, which presume that crime is based on time-stable individual differences
in the propensity to engage in risky or harmful behaviors, are among the oldest in the
discipline (Goddard, 1914; Hooton, 1939; Prichard, 1837). The essence of a trait-
based approach is that the individual possesses a characteristic that makes them more
likely to commit crimes and other self-risky behaviors. Sometimes, this trait is biologi-
cal as in atavism (Lombroso, 1876), or it is psychological as in the psychopathic per-
sonality (Cleckley, 1941; Yochelson & Samenow, 1976); other times, it is the
combination of the two (Eysenck, 1977; Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Wilson &
Herrnstein, 1985); and at still others, there is a decidedly social origin (Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990). Over the years, one of the most consistent traits that has been linked to
crime and other self-harmful behaviors such as gambling, drug and alcohol addiction,
and psychiatric disorders is impulsivity. Impulsivity has been variously defined but
seems to involve at its core the notion of behavior that is committed without foresight
or contemplation. Impulsive behavior consists of actions that one does without think-
ing about the actions or the consequences very much or at all. It is characterized as
involving speedy decision making, a lack of planning, and a reliance on quick intuition
or affect rather than cognition. While the trait of impulsivity has been linked to a wide
assortment of antisocial and self-injurious behaviors, an impulsive decision is not in
itself bad, and the way a decision is made should be differentiated from its outcome.
For example, while acting on impulse can lead to unwise and unaffordable purchases,
weight gain, smoking, drinking, and gambling problems, it also helps us swerve the
car to avoid crashing into a deer that darted out into the road, respond to a fire alarm,
or even seize a good financial opportunity. At times, then, impulsive behavior can be
good.
Mamayek et al.
429
Frederick (2002) has provided a good illustration of an impulsive act with his test
of cognitive reflection. A subject is provided with the following: “A ball and a bat
together cost US$1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost?” An immediate, effortless,...
To continue reading
Request your trial