Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy Developments, 2006–2010

AuthorRichard Doyle
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02304.x
Published date01 January 2011
Date01 January 2011
Public
Documents:
Recent Trends in
Federal Earmarks
Richard Doyle is an associate professor
of public budgeting in the Graduate School
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
E-mail: rdoyle@nps.edu
34 Public Administration Review • January | February 2011
Nancy Roberts, Editor
Richard Doyle
Naval Postgraduate School
In response to widespread perceptions of problems
associated with congressional earmarks, reform e orts
began in late 2006 and continued through 2010.
is essay summarizes those problems, explains the
distribution of earmarks within Congress, and documents
their rise and relative fall between 1991 and 2010 using
government and public interest group databases.  e
author explains and critiques earmark reform policies,
including congressional rules, initiatives taken by the
congressional appropriations committees, and reforms
pursued by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
administrations. Congressional rules and committee-
initiated reforms have been most e ective, resulting in
signi cant improvements in earmark transparency and
accountability.  e number and dollar value of earmarks
rst dropped noticeably in  scal year 2007 after an
earmark moratorium, and then stabilized as reforms
were implemented. It is premature to conclude that these
levels will continue or that reforms will alter the policy
content of earmarks or their distribution among members
of Congress.
Earmarking, Savage argued, “is an important
political and budgetary issue” (2009, 448). Its
signi cance, however, lies in the perspective
taken on it. For example, in a comprehensive critique
of the contemporary budget process, Rubin noted that
earmarks have grown “beyond the ability of legisla-
tors to evaluate and prioritize,” and that some of them
“have been revealed as rewards for  nancial donors,
contributing to the impression that government is
corrupt” (2007, 608).  ey are no longer, she argued,
part of “the hurly-burly of competitive budgeting”
(614). Brookings scholars saw the same problem in
that same year, observing that earmarking had gotten
“out of hand and was used and abused in a fashion we
have not seen before in recent years” (Mann, Binder,
and Ornstein 2007). CQ Weekly observed that “ear-
marks . . . have been cited as a symbol of everything
that’s wrong with Congress” (Benkelman 2007).
As earmarks became associated with a series of high-
pro le scandals and investigations involving members
of Congress, lobbyists, and others, public interest
organizations such as Citizens Against Government
Waste (CAGW) and Taxpayers for Common Sense
(TCS) focused extraordinarily critical attention on
them.  e mainstream media were similarly critical.
In a single week in 2008, three television network
news broadcasts mentioned earmarks 91 times, nearly
as often as they made reference to Afghanistan (Alter-
man and Zornick 2008).
Within Congress, a handful of senators and congress-
men consistently attacked earmarks as spending bills
moved through Congress. Congressman Je Flake
referred to earmarks as “the currency of corruption
in Congress” (2006), “no-bid contracts” (2009),
and a “gateway drug to out-of-control spending”
(USA Today 2009). Senator John McCain regularly
attempted to strike earmarks from appropriations leg-
islation. Earmarking became something of a campaign
issue during the congressional elections in 2006 and
2008, and Senator McCain employed his opposition
to earmarks in 2009 “to rally conservatives reluctant
to support his presidential campaign” (Kane 2009).
e sound and fury associated with earmarks signify
potential problems of several types, outlined here,
none of them a threat to constitutional or  scal order.
ose di culties have become less acute as a con-
sequence of reforms put in place between 2006 and
2010.
The Earmark Critique
Several themes dominate the earmark critique. First is
the notion that earmarks serve only the members of
Congress who procure them rather than some larger
public purpose.  e argument is that some members
of Congress use earmarks to steer funds to companies
that, in return, provide or arrange for the provision
of campaign contributions.  is “busy intersection
between political fund-raising and taxpayer spending”
has been at the heart of a series of events associated
with a lobbying  rm called the PMA Group (Kirk-
patrick 2006).  e late congressman John Murtha,
Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy
Developments, 2006–2010

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