Raines v. Byrd: a Death Knell for the Congressional Suit? - Adam L. Blank

• Citation: Vol. 49 No. 2
• Publication year: 1998

Raines v. Byrd: A Death Knell for the Congressional Suit?

In Raines v. Byrd,¹ the Supreme Court of the United States denied standing to six members of Congress who challenged the constitutional-ity of the Line Item Veto Act. In its first consideration of congressional standing in nearly two decades, the Court held that a perceived diminution in institutional voting strength did not create a sufficiently particularized injury in fact to satisfy the Article III "case or controver-sy" requirement.²

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 9, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Line Item Veto Act ("the Act")³ passed by the 104th Congress. In operation, the Act gives the President the power to "cancel in whole" specific spending provisions within certain types of appropriations bills⁴ without invoking the traditional constitutional veto authority.⁵ Once an item has been canceled, the Act immediately prohibits the challenged expenditure or tax benefit "from having legal force or effect."⁶ Reinstatement of any canceled provision can be accomplished only through bicameral passage of an itemized "disapproval bill" within thirty days, to which the President may again dissent through the use of the conventional veto power.⁷ Congress can override this presidential veto only as prescribed in Article I.⁸ The Act overwhelmingly passed the Senate on March 27,

1996 by a vote of 69 to 31.⁹ A day later, the House passed the identical bill by a 232 to 177 margin.¹⁰

The Act went into effect on January 1, 1997.¹¹ The following day, six individual Congressmen filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.¹² They alleged the Act contravened "the text and purpose of . . . the Presentment Clause."¹³ Defendants raised objections to the claim's justiciability, alleging that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek relief, that the case was not yet ripe for judicial resolution because the cancellation power had not yet been exercised by the President, and that the "equitable discretion" doctrine required dismissal in deference to substantial separation of powers concerns.¹⁴

The district court, relying on traditional standing requirements, held that plaintiffs had shown at "an irreducible minimum" an injury (1) that was personal to them, (2) that had actually been inflicted by defendants or was certainly impending, and (3) that was redressable by judicial decree.¹⁵ The court accepted plaintiffs' assertion that the Act impaired their Article I voting power through its practical dilution of any appropriations vote to mere approval of a "menu" of proposed expendi-tures¹⁶ from which the President could pick and choose.¹⁷ "Under the

Act the dynamic of lawmaking is fundamentally altered," the court explained.¹⁸

Rejecting defendants' argument that the claim lacked ripeness until the President exercised the authority granted under the Act,¹⁹ the court proceeded to address the merits of plaintiffs' claims, finding (1) that Congress had exceeded its traditional power to delegate;²⁰ (2) that the authority it purported to grant the executive branch was a "basic" legislative function; and (3) that the existence of legislative alternatives, such as repeal or suspension of the Act's effect on particular legislation, did not alter the President's new standing as "co-maker of the Nation's laws."²¹ The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and held the Act unconstitutional.²²

Pursuant to the Act's provisions for a direct²³ and expedited ap-peal,²⁴ defendants sought review in the Supreme Court. After noting proper jurisdiction, a six-member majority led by Chief Justice Rehn-quist vacated the judgment of the district court, finding that appellees lacked standing to initiate the suit.²⁵

II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF STANDING JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's current test for general standing finds its genesis in Allen v. Wright,²⁶ a case brought by parents of children attending public schools in districts undergoing desegregation. In Wright private taxpayers sought injunctive relief against the Internal Revenue Service, alleging that the agency was prolonging the desegregation process through its continued recognition of discriminatory private schools as "tax-exempt."²⁷ In denying standing to plaintiffs, Justice O'Connor stated that "the law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers."²⁸ The proper inquiry was whether plaintiff had alleged (1) a "personal injury" that (2) was "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct" and (3) was "likely to be redressed" by a favorable judicial decision.²⁹ The Court conceded that the language of this test was somewhat imprecise but concluded that an "extensive body of case law" already existed to guide lower courts through the appropriate analysis.³⁰

The Court clarified these basic principles in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife³¹ after environmental groups challenged a joint regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that revised the "consulta-tion" requirement of the Endangered Species Act.³² Noting that the groups' "desire to use and observe an animal species" was a cognizable interest for standing purposes, the Court nevertheless denied standing because plaintiffs could not show they would be "'directly' affected" by the Secretary's enforcement of the regulation beyond their "special interest" in the subject.³³ The Court explained that to satisfy the Article III standing requirements, a plaintiff must first have suffered an actual or imminent "injury in fact"³⁴ —an element the Court defined as harm "affect[ing] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."³⁵ Second, the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct and may not be "'th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.'"³⁶ Third, "it must be 'likely/ as opposed to merely 'speculative,'" that the requested relief would resolve the dispute.³⁷

In contrast, when a member of a co-equal branch of government seeks relief via the federal judiciary for alleged injuries suffered while serving in an official capacity, federal courts are more vigilant in protecting the stringent standing requirements mandated by Article III. Despite the perfunctory statement that "there are no special standards for determin- ing Congressional standing questions,"³⁸ federal courts must in addition to the three-part analysis consider the "prudential" concern of unneces-sarily intruding on an inter-branch political dispute.³⁹

The leading case on legislative standing arose in 1939 in Coleman v. Miller.⁴⁰ In 1937 the Kansas Senate reconsidered ratification of the proposed Child Labor Amendment,⁴¹ which had been submitted for state approval thirteen years earlier pursuant to Article V of the United States Constitution.⁴² The vote resulted in twenty ballots cast for ratification and an equal number opposed. The Lieutenant Governor, as presiding officer of the Senate, cast his deciding ballot in favor of ratification.⁴³ The twenty Senators who had voted against ratifica-tion⁴⁴ sought, and were denied, mandamus relief by the Supreme Court of Kansas, which refused to compel the Secretary of the Senate to record that the proposal had not received Senate approval.⁴⁵ Upon review by the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Hughes held that petitioners had standing to seek judicial protection of their interest in "maintaining the effectiveness of their votes."⁴⁶ The Court reasoned that but for the ballot of the Lieutenant Governor, the Senators' votes would have been sufficient to defeat ratification.⁴⁷ As it was, the affected Senators' votes were "virtually held for naught."⁴⁸

Federal lawmakers have consistently attempted to rely on Coleman for its holding that legislators have a vested interest in securing the viability of their voting strength through the judicial process.⁴⁹ In Kennedy v. Sampson,⁵⁰ a United States Senator challenged the consti- tutionality of the presidential "pocket veto," alleging its use denied him the full effect of his vote in favor of the bill in question. The D.C. Circuit⁵¹ expanded Coleman to include members of Congress claiming total vote nullification.⁵² Circuit Judge Tamm ruled that "[n]o more essential interest could be asserted by a legislator" than vindication of the effectiveness of his vote.⁵³ The court also held that individual legislators seeking this type of relief need not solicit approval from other members of the affected voting block before initiating litigation because the plaintiff need only be '"among the injured,' . . . not . . . the most grievously or most directly injured."⁵⁴

The D.C. Circuit has subsequently refused to extend Coleman beyond the limited situation of a complete nullification of a lawmaker's prior vote on a specific piece of legislation as the result of a deviation from constitutionally mandated legislative procedure. In Harrington v. Bush,⁵⁵ the court cautioned that a separation of powers issue arises whenever "a federal court decides a case brought by a United States legislator."⁵⁶ Existence of a potential conflict is not dispositive in standing analysis, but it is a concern of which the court must "properly take notice."⁵⁷

In Harrington an individual Congressman brought suit claiming the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") was actively misappropriating funds for illegal purposes. The Representative sought a detailed accounting record of CIA expenditures, arguing that any illegal activity would directly "bear upon" his voting duty both in regards to future appropria-tions bills benefitting the agency and to his constitutional obligation to initiate impeachment proceedings if necessary.⁵⁸ The misuse of funds, it was argued, also diluted the quality and effectiveness of his earlier appropriations votes.⁵⁹ The court quickly rejected the "bear upon" arguments, finding they...