Putting the Pieces Back Together: Moral Intensity and Its Impact on the Four‐component Model of Morality

• Author: Trevor T. Moores,H. Jeff Smith,Moez Limayem
• Date: 01 June 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/basr.12141
• Published date: 01 June 2018

Putting the Pieces Back

Together: Moral Intensity and

Its Impact on the Four-

component Model of Morality

TREVOR T. MOORES, H. JEFF SMITH, AND MOEZ LIMAYEM

ABSTRACT

A large body of research has examined the relationship

between moral intensity (MI) and the four-component

model of morality, typically, by separating MI into its con-

stituent dimensions and regressing them individually

against the four-component model. This approach, how-

ever, violates the definition of MI as a single construct. To

correct this problem, we develop and test a model of the

impact of MI as a single, 6-item formative construct. We

find that when MI is taken into account, moral recogni-

tion is not significant. MI does, however, serve as a strong

trigger for judgment. We also determine that splitting MI

into multiple factors does not significantly affect the

results, confirming the assertion that MI is a single,

coherent construct.

Trevor T. Moores is a Professor in the Paul H. Chook Department of Information Systems and

Statistics, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York,

NY. E-mail: tmoores@baruch.cuny.edu. H. Jeff Smith is the George and Mildred Panuska Pro-

fessor in Business at the Department of Information Systems and Analytics, Farmer School of

Business, Miami University, Oxford, OH. E-mail: jeff.smith@MiamiOH.edu. Moez Limayem is

Dean of the Muma College of Business, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL. E-mail:

mlimayem@usf.edu.

V

C2018 W. Michael Hoffman Center for Business Ethics at Bentley University. Published by

Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington

Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. DOI: 10.1111/basr.12141

Business and Society Review 123:2 243–268

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INTRODUCTION

Issue contingency theory was developed by Jones (1991) as a

reaction to the idea—prevalent in business ethics at the time—

that an individual’s moral behavior can be understood by eluci-

dating the stages of the ethical decision-making process. Jones

(1991) points out that none of the extant models (notably, Dubin-

sky and Loken 1989; Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell

1986; Trevino 1986) can differentiate between an egregious act,

such as releasing a dangerous product to market, and a trivial act,

such as pilfering office supplies. What is missing is a moderating

variable that taps into the features of the act and prompts an ethi-

cal response. Jones (1991) states: “ethical decision making is

issue-contingent; that is, characteristics of the moral issue itself,

collectively called moral intensity, are important determinants of

ethical decision making and behavior” (Jones 1991, p. 371, original

italics).

Jones (1991) defines the ethical decision-making process in

terms of Rest’s (1986) four component model of morality, where

moral behavior is produced by the interaction of sensitivity, judg-

ment, motivation, and character. Sensitivity refers to recognizing a

moral problem exists and understanding the cause-effect chain of

events that inflict harm. Judgment involves deciding which action

is most justifiable. Motivation refers to the degree of commitment

to the moral course of action. Character involves enacting and per-

sisting in the moral task. These components are often relabeled as

moral recognition (REC), judgment (JUD), intention (INT), and

behavior (BEH). The components are hypothesized to interact in

complex feed-forward and feed-back loops, where a failure to act

morally might be due to a refusal to recognize the moral issue at

stake, or downplaying the impetus to act.

The moral intensity (MI) construct—which is hypothesized to

impact on all four components—includes six dimensions: (1) Mag-

nitude of Consequences refers to the sum of harms (or benefits)

done to the victims (or beneficiaries) of the act, where an act that

causes 1,000 people to suffer an injury is of greater magnitude

than an act that causes 10 people to suffer the same injury; (2)

Social Consensus is the degree of social agreement that a proposed

act is evil (or good), such that, bribing a government official may be

seen as corruption and a social evil in one country, but seen as the

244 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW