Public-Interest Institutionalism

• Date: 01 April 2014
• Published date: 01 April 2014
• DOI: 10.1177/0095399712453926
• Author: Avshalom Ginosar
• Subject Matter: Articles

Administration & Society

2014, Vol. 46(3) 301 –317

© 2012 SAGE Publications

DOI: 10.1177/0095399712453926

aas.sagepub.com

453926AAS46310.1177/0095399712

453926Administration & SocietyGinosar

© 2012 SAGE Publications

1The Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Emek Yezreel, Israel

Corresponding Author:

Avshalom Ginosar, The Communication Department, The Academic College of Emek Yezreel,

D.N. Emek Yezreel, Israel.

Email: avshalomg@yvc.ac.il

Public-Interest

Institutionalism: A Positive

Perspective on Regulation

Avshalom Ginosar1

Abstract

Two ongoing debates in regulation research concentrate on public-interest

versus private-interest theories, and actor-centered theories versus institu-

tionalism. The first controversy is about the origins and goals of regulation,

and the latter is about the analysis of regulatory processes. A theoretical

framework that combines these four concepts is suggested. Four patterns of

regulation are presented; each addresses a regulatory goal as well as a regu-

latory process. Each pattern is associated with a different type of regulator:

the selfish, the manipulative, the combative, and the coordinating. The author

argues that by employing institutional considerations and tools, the coordi-

nating regulator best serves the public interest.

Keywords

regulation, public interest, institutions, framing

Introduction

Two main debates have occupied the academic literature on regulation and

public policy for decades. First is the debate on the origins and consequences

of regulation, with different perspectives being generated by the public-

interest or private-interest theory of regulation. The former asserts that the

common good (even if contestable) is the rationale for regulation and its

Article

302 Administration & Society 46(3)

consequences, and the latter asserts that the self-interest of business, bureau-

cracies, and organized groups shapes the form and content of regulation and

its consequences. The second debate is about regulation as a policy process

and the extent to which either institutional or actor-centered theories of pub-

lic policy best explain the origins and consequences of regulation. Whereas

the institutional theories point to structures, contexts, values, and ideas as the

main explanations, the actor-centered theories emphasize actors’ interests,

relative power, and interdependencies as the major factors in the effort to

investigate and understand the regulatory process.

This study suggests an analytical framework that combines all the above-

mentioned components in four different patterns of regulation, each of which

points to different regulatory goals and institutional factors. This theoretical

approach was developed following a previous empirical study (Ginosar, 2012;

Ginosar & Levi-Faur, 2010), which compared the policy processes through

which new regulatory regimes of product placement (PP) in commercial televi-

sion have emerged. The previous studies focused on the policy processes and

emphasized that different ways of framing the policy issue (the regulation of

PP) had affected the processes’ outcomes. This current work addresses the

major role of the regulator as well as the importance of institutional elements in

shaping new regulations. Each of the suggested four patterns of regulation is

associated with a certain type of regulator. Two of these types—who appear as

combatants or coordinators—serve the public interest rather than the private

one. The other two types—the selfish and the manipulative—serve private

interests. This could mean the regulator’s interests, the interests of the regulated

bodies, or both. My main argument is that coordinating, while employing insti-

tutional settings and considerations, best serves the public interest.

The analysis I suggest adds to a relatively new wave of studies (Christensen,

2011; Croley, 2008, 2011) that brings back public-interest theory to the center

of scholarly discussion. These studies do not accord with the dominant school

of regulatory research in the last three or four decades where private interests

were seen—at least empirically—as the goals of regulation (Peltzman, 1976;

Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971).

This article is structured as follows. The following section presents the

two debates in the literature about the origins and goals of regulation, and

about the main factors in the regulatory process. The section titled “A

Framework for the Analysis of Regulation” introduces the analytical frame-

work, which consists of four patterns of regulation and four associated types

of regulators. In “The Regulator as a Coordinator and the Public Interest”

section, the focus is on the coordinating type of regulator and the supposed

contribution of this type to the preserving and promoting of the public inter-

est. The final section summarizes and concludes.