Public Ideology, Minority Threat, and Felony Collateral Sanctions

• Author: Karen F. Parker,Tanya N. Whittle
• DOI: 10.1177/0734016814543352
• Published date: 01 December 2014
• Date: 01 December 2014
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article
Criminal Justice Review
2014, Vol. 39(4) 432-454
Public Ideology, Minority
ª 2014 Georgia State University
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Threat, and Felony Collateral
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DOI: 10.1177/0734016814543352
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Sanctions: A State-Level
Analysis
Tanya N. Whittle1 and Karen F. Parker1
Abstract
Federal and state felony collateral sanctions directly impact the opportunities and resources avail-
able to ex-felons and in turn their ability to successfully reenter society after conviction and possible
incarceration. Because felony collateral sanctions vary greatly from state to state, we offer a state-
level analysis of factors that produce differences in collateral sanctions levels adopted by U.S. states.
Religion, political climate, and minority threat explanations have been linked to criminal penalty
severity; however, no one to date has applied these explanations to felony collateral sanctions
besides felony disenfranchisement at the macro level. With zero-truncated Poisson (ZTP) proce-
dures, this study examines whether religion, political climate, and minority threat explanations result
in states’ adopting greater collateral sanctions against convicted felons. Our research reveals that
conservative climate, religiosity, and racial threat, but not ethnic threat or punitiveness, significantly
affect state-level collateral sanctions. States with large minority and conservative populations are
more likely to have more stigmatizing collateral sanction that can affect recidivism. We find that race
rather than ethnicity is an important predictor of the collateral sanctions levels that states adopt;
however, public ideology in the form of conservatism and religiosity has a greater effect on collateral
sanctions. Policy implications are discussed.
Keywords
minority threat, public ideology, collateral sanctions, state-level, reentry
Introduction
Can the political climate and racial and ethnic makeup of a state determine whether a convicted felon
receives collateral sanctions? So much of the existing research focuses on the barriers experienced
by felons upon reentering the community, such as difficulties finding work and/or housing,
1 Department of Sociology & Criminal Justice, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA
Corresponding Author:
Tanya N. Whittle, Department of Sociology & Criminal Justice, University of Delaware, 325 Smith Hall, Newark, DE 19716,
USA.
Email: twhittle@udel.edu

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Whittle and Parker
433
reconnecting with family members, feeling a part of the community, and obtaining basic necessities
such as food and shelter. Although obstacles often occur as a direct result of incarceration, felony
disenfranchisement, and other ‘‘collateral sanctions’’ enacted through legislation also negatively
affect ex-felons (Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2002). That is, specific federal- and state-level legislation
limit the employment and civic participation of ex-felons. Additionally, laws can restrict a convicted
felon’s access to welfare and educational assistance. While some sanctions occur at the federal level,
voter disenfranchisement and most employment and access to public assistance restrictions occur at
the state level (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011). It is these macro-level processes, such
as state-level variation in the adoption of collateral sanctions, that are the focus of our current
research.
For example, despite evidence that legal employment greatly contributes to ex-felons’ successful
reentry (Pager, 2007; Wheelock, 2005), especially among those over 27 years of age (Uggen, 2000),
state and federal laws frequently prevent ex-felons from obtaining legal employment in some occu-
pational fields (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011). Additionally, access to welfare in the
form of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) is determined on a state-by-state basis despite federal laws that ban felons with
drug or sex offenses from receiving assistance (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011).
While studies examine the consequences of felony convictions on individuals, such as finding
employment (Nelson, Deess, & Allen, 1999; Sampson & Laub, 1993; Tripodi, Kim, & Bender,
2010; Uggen, 2000; Visher & Kachnowski, 2009), redeveloping family ties and community reinte-
gration (Sampson & Laub, 1993; Travis, Solomon, & Waul, 2001; Uggen, Manza, & Behrens, 2004;
Uggen, Wakefield, and Western, 2005), research that examines the adoption of collateral sanctions
beyond felon disenfranchisement at the state level does not exist (Manza & Uggen, 2006). Further-
more, even though political, economic, and racial characteristics have been tied to the greater appli-
cation of severe sanctions (e.g., death penalty), and other aspects of social control (e.g., arrest rates),
no study has explored whether these structural forces also influence a state’s adoption of legal bar-
riers. Our research attempts to explore how the types and number of collateral sanctions vary from
state to state (see Appendix A for a list) and determine if the political and religious ideologies of the
state, in addition to racial tensions, influence the rate that legal barriers are applied to convicted
felons. There are sound theoretical reasons to pursue this empirical question, and we hope to fill
a gap in an important and timely area of research.
Public Ideologies: Political and Religious
Punishment for crimes is a highly political issue (Chambliss, 1994, 1999; Garland 1990, 2005;
Mauer, 2001; Yates & Fording, 2005). What is considered a crime and how it is punished is deter-
mined by state- and federal-level government decisions. Numerous politicians have run on a ‘‘tough
on crime’’ and penal reform platforms during election cycles, asking citizens to ‘‘indulge rhetori-
cally in a politics of moralism’’ (Gottschalk 2006).
Conservatism is generally associated with greater support for punitiveness due to the belief that
crime is an individual and immoral choice and that criminals should be punished in a manner that is
equally harmful to the criminal (Burnham, 1970; Garland, 1990; Thorne, 1990). Additionally, con-
servatives are more likely to view punishment as a general deterrent (Molnar, 1976) and support the
death penalty (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003). Liberals, on the other hand, are more likely
to view crime as a result of poor environmental and social conditions that warrant rehabilitation
(Garland, 2001; Taylor, Walton, & Young, 1973; Thorne, 1990).
In the United States, the strength of the Republican party, which is identified as the ‘‘law and
order’’ and conservative party, is related to increased prison admission rates (Jacobs & Helms,
1996). Additionally, law and order campaigns have been prevalent among Republican candidates

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434
Criminal Justice Review 39(4)
to garner support from poor constituents who are more likely to be victims of crime (Beckett, 1997),
and in turn, conservative states punish more severely (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs, Qian,
Carmichael, & Kent, 2007). Democrats, however, spend less on law enforcement and penal pro-
grams (Caldeira and Cowart, 1980). According to research by Hibbs (1987), Republican officials
are more likely to select penal policies that benefit the wealthy at the expense of poorer constitu-
ents—constituents who are more likely to become involved in the criminal justice system (see also
Blank and Blinder, 1986). Republican support at the county level is positively related to enhanced
use of asset forfeiture (Helms & Costanza, 2009), and Helms and Costanza (2010) report ‘‘African
Americans who were tried and sentenced in Republican-leaning jurisdictions faced, on average,
more severe penalties than other offenders’’ (p. 484); however, they note that such disparate racial
sentencing is conditioned by political context and racial factors and therefore not uniformly
disparate.
In states where conservatism and the public attitudes toward crime and justice are punitive, we
posit a higher level of collateral sanctions. Specifically, we hypothesize that a higher percentage
of conservative voters and punitiveness at the state level will be directly associated with greater col-
lateral sanctions. U.S. Presidential election poll results can be a useful way to gauge conservatism.
For example, the percentage of the state’s voters that participated in the election who voted for a
Republican presidential candidate can indicate the level of conservatism in each state; however, this
may not accurately capture punitive attitudes among the public. State-level punitiveness may be bet-
ter measured through public opinion surveys that specifically ask about criminal justice issues such
as the death penalty, gun control, and other tough on crime topics. Although some argue that public
opinion has little direct impact on criminal justice policy (Beckett, 1997; Brown, 2006; Matthews,
2005) and that politicians overestimate the punitiveness of their constituents (Gottschalk 2008), oth-
ers have found evidence that public opinion has affected criminal justice policy and outcomes such
as incarceration rates (Enns, 2010, 2013)
Religion has also historically influenced the growth of punishments for criminal acts (Erikson,
1966; Iganatieff, 1978; McGowen, 1995). Protestantism—the most common religion in the United
States—particularly fundamentalist Protestantism is positively associated with support for more
severe punishments and retribution for crime (Curry, 1996; Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin, & Bur-...