Product Liability
| Publication year | 2017 |
Product Liability
Franklin P. Brannen Jr.
P. Michael Freed
Kristen S. Cawley
Marcus Strong
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This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law between June 1, 2015 and May 31, 2017.1 It covers noteworthy cases decided during this period by the Georgia Supreme Court, Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in Georgia.
A. Definition of Manufacturer
Georgia product liability law limits strict liability to the manufacturer of the product at issue.2 Non-manufacturers in the sales chain may only be found liable under a negligence or breach of warranty theory. Defining
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whether a defendant is or is not a manufacturer, therefore, is a critical issue in many product liability cases.
In Williams v. Pacific Cycle, Inc.,3 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the definition of "manufacturer." The plaintiff in Williams suffered a brain injury when he fell off of his bicycle and struck his head on the pavement. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was wearing a Pulsar model Schwinn bike helmet. Pacific Cycle, the owner of the Schwinn brand name, granted a license to PTI Sports (PTI) to sell helmets using the Schwinn brand.4 Then, Pacific Cycle purchased certain assets from PTI including an inventory of Schwinn bicycle helmets. The subject helmet had been manufactured by Strategic Sports Ltd. (Strategic). The plaintiff filed suit against Pacific Cycle seeking relief under several theories including strict liability for design defect, negligent design and manufacture, and negligent import, sale, and distribution. The district court granted summary judgment to Pacific Cycle on all of the plaintiff's claims.5
The Eleventh Circuit considered whether certain actions on the part of PTI took Pacific Cycle out of the category of product seller and made it a manufacturer that could be subject to a strict liability claim.6 These actions included that PTI provided the instructional booklet and header card for the Pulsar, provided some design specifications, imported the Pulsar, and shipped the Pulsar to a retailer.7 The court also considered whether Pacific Cycle's role as an importer, which required it to adhere to certain Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations, made it a manufacturer subject to strict liability claims under Georgia law.8
As to these two questions, the court held the actions attributable to Pacific Cycle were not sufficient to make it a manufacturer. Further, the fact that Pacific Cycle was a bicycle helmet importer subject to federal regulations did not make it a manufacturer under Georgia law.9 It was a product seller pursuant to section 51-1-11.110 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), which excluded it from strict liability.11 The court also considered the question of whether Pacific Cycle was an "ostensible manufacturer" under Georgia law and may be held liable for
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negligent design and manufacture.12 The court held that Pacific Cycle could not be held liable for negligent manufacture or design as an ostensible manufacturer because neither it nor its licensee designed or manufactured the helmet.13
In Pfeil v. Mike's Golf Carts, LLC,14 the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia also considered the question of what it means to be a product manufacturer.15 The plaintiffs brought a negligence and strict liability product claim for injuries sustained when part of a golf cart's suspension broke causing the cart to flip over. The defendant purchased a used 2002 Club Car limo golf cart and installed a cargo box, roll bar, dipped-camo body, cooler rack, winch, eleven-horsepower motor, 700-amp controller, heavy-duty F and R switch, ten-inch lift kit, clay basket, gun rack, as well as twelve-inch rims, six 8-volt batteries, and 27-inch tires. The parties disputed whether the customized golf cart was a "Beast Buggy model" or the accessories added were part of the defendant's "Beast Package."16 The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that the defendant was not the manufacturer as a matter of law because the evidence conflicted as to whether the defendant assembled component parts into a single product and sold it under its own name (the Beast Buggy).17
In Andrews v. Autoliv Japan, Ltd.,18 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia also addressed the definition of a product manufacturer.19 There, Andrews died when his head struck the steering wheel of his 2005 Mazda 3 after it left the road and struck some trees. Andrews's estate and surviving spouse filed suit against Autoliv Japan and others for damages contending that a defective seatbelt assembly was the cause of his death. The main issue was whether Autoliv designed the seatbelt assembly for the 2005 Mazda 3.20 The evidence showed that Autoliv's role was limited to choosing the components appropriate for the Mazda 3 based on Mazda's specifications, while Mazda made the ultimate decision regarding the types of components to incorporate.21 The court granted Autoliv's motion for summary judgment,
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finding that it was not the designer of the seatbelt assembly and that this type of involvement was insufficient to create a triable issue with respect to strict liability under O.C.GA. § 51-1-11.22
B. Causation
Proximate cause is an essential element of any product liability claim.23 This requirement applies regardless of the type of defect the plaintiff alleges (such as design defect or manufacturing defect) or the theory of recovery (such as strict liability or negligence). Any break in the chain of causation precludes plaintiff's recovery.24
In Roper v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.,25 the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia also discussed the causation element.26 In Roper, the plaintiff filed suit against certain defendants, including Kawasaki, seeking to recover for injuries resulting from a motorcycle accident. A year after the accident, Kawasaki issued a "Warning and Recall Notice" because of a defect with the voltage regulator (VR) in certain motorcycle models, including the one plaintiff owned and was riding when he crashed. The VR helps maintain the battery's charge while the engine is running. Kawasaki filed a motion to exclude plaintiff's expert testimony and a motion for summary judgment for lack of causation evidence.27
The court excluded the plaintiff's experts' testimony under the Daubert28 standard.29 Georgia law requires expert testimony "to prove causation if the causal connection between the defective product and the plaintiff's injuries is not 'a natural inference that a juror could make through human experience.'"30 The question, therefore, was "whether a juror could infer through natural human experience that the VR in Plaintiff's motorcycle caused his engine to stall."31 The court could not say that a juror could infer causation through human experience where the case involved alleged failure of a complex electrical system.32 With
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his expert having been excluded, the plaintiff could not establish a causal relationship between the motorcycle VR and the underlying accident, entitling Kawasaki to summary judgment.33
In Dennis v. D&F Equipment Sales, Inc., 34 the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia considered whether certain facts took the question of proximate cause away from a jury.35 Dennis filed suit, alleging that D&F was strictly liable for injuries she sustained as a proximate result of a defective vertical conveyor at the factory at which she worked because it lacked an emergency stop button (e-stop) in the immediate vicinity of the conveyor's intended workstation. D&F moved for summary judgment as to all claims. D&F argued that Dennis could not establish a causal connection between any defect in the vertical conveyor and Dennis's injury because there was no evidence that an e-stop would have prevented her injury. The defendant pointed out that:
(1) an individual other than Ms. Dennis would have needed to trigger the e-stop, and it is not clear whether any employees were close enough to do so; and (2) it is impossible to say without speculation or conjecture whether Ms. Dennis's injury would have been minimized by the addition of an e-stop.36
The court held that it was not "the role of the Court to speculate as to whether other employees would have been able to turn off the [conveyor] if there had been an e-stop, or as to whether the triggering of an e-stop would have minimized Ms. Dennis's injury"; these were jury questions.37
D&F also argued that, "even if an e-stop would have minimized Ms. Dennis's injury, the fact that she was instructed to stand in an area that was not a designated workstation was an unforeseeable negligent act that negate[d] D&F's liability as the manufacturer."38 The court concluded that the relevant question "to this argument [was] whether D&F could have foreseen that an employee might be working in the area where Ms. Dennis was standing."39 The court found that this question was far from "plain and undisputed" and was a question for a jury.40
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A. Manufacturing Defect
Georgia law defines a manufacturing defect as "a deviation from some objective standard or a departure from the manufacturer's specifications established for the creation of the product."41 However, a plaintiff cannot put forth a mere allegation that a product malfunctioned to create an issue of disputed material fact as to whether a manufacturing defect existed when a product left the manufacturer's control.42
The plaintiff in McClendon v. Manitou Americas, Inc.43 sustained injuries to his head and neck while operating a forklift manufactured by defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the...
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