Producing identities: gender problematization and feminist argumentation.

• Author: Bruner, M. Lane
• Position: Special Issue: Argumentation and Feminisms

Feminist argumentation studies have frequently been limited in significant ways because of tendencies to reify gender stereotypes. There is a propensity in many rhetorical studies devoted to "women's" argumentation to assume that men and women are essentially one way or another because of biological factors, socialization processes, or usually a combination of the two (Campbell, 1973, 1989; Foss and Griffin, 1992, 1995; Dow and Tonn, 1993; Tonn, 1996). These rhetorical studies dealing with "feminist argumentation" have predominantly been of three types: "archival" studies that reveal how important female rhetors have been relatively ignored by "traditional" rhetorical scholarship (Campbell, 1989, 1991), studies distinguishing "patriarchal" and "feminist" argumentation characteristics (Foss and Griffin, 1992, 1995), and studies dealing with "feminine style" (Campbell, 1973; Dow and Tonn, 1993; Tonn, 1996). Rhetorical theory, concerned as it is with public influence, is intimately concerned with the argumentation process, and this essay seeks to explore the way in which feminist argumentation is articulated in these contemporary rhetorical studies. While these studies have played an important role in unmasking unquestioned presuppositions within the field of rhetorical studies, I would like to suggest that these three types of feminist critique tend to reify gender stereotypes more than problematize them, and that a more productive notion of feminist argumentation can be found by synthesizing feminist insights from other studies in a variety of fields.

This essay, then, will begin by briefly tracing the development of these three forms of rhetorical studies in order to clarify the theories of feminist argumentation that inform them. These forms have played a pivotal role in furthering the interests of women and working on the limits of what is considered acceptable within the field. But it is also the case that the essentializing tendencies in these forms of rhetorical studies indeed, to use Campbell's (1973) famous phrase, tend to make "feminism" and pervasive forms of "argumentation" oxymoronic. That is, what is "essential" in "feminine style" is fundamentally non-argumentative inasmuch as "feminist" argumentation is seen as being different in kind from aggressive, "patriarchal" argumentation. Next, I will show how scholars outside of these particular research traditions have pointed to a way of understanding feminist argumentation that avoids the reification of gender stereotypes and leads instead to a different way of thinking about argumentation.

Over the last three decades feminist theory has progressively moved away from the relatively simplistic notion that "patriarchy" stands for coercive and constraining forces and that "feminism" stands for nurturing and capacity generating forces residing within language systems. Identity theorists have moved instead toward the notion that language systems are both constraining and enabling (Foucault, 1983b; Butler, 1990; Simons, 1995). Furthermore, identity politics in general have recently been problematized by critics who point out various shortcomings in both "naive essentialisms" and certain brands of deconstructive responses to such essentialisms (Adams, 1989; Briskin, 1990; Bailey, 1993; Bruner, 1996). The culmination of this theoretical and critical trajectory leads in part to what I argue is an ethics of identity and a feminist argumentation strategy called limit work.(1) Limit work is the perpetual analysis of the limits of subjectivity in order to distinguish enabling constraints from constraining limitations (Simons, p. 22). Ultimately, this essay argues that feminist argumentation is not oxymoronic, that dichotomizing argumentation into "patriarchal" and "feminine" characteristics disempowers and unnecessarily constrains feminisms, that "feminine style" reifies gender stereotypes, and that the theoretical perspectives of Mary Adams (1989), Judith Butler (1990), Michel Foucault (1977, 1984), and Jon Simons (1995) can be combined to create a notion of feminist argumentation that transgresses the limits revealed by the important essays critiqued in the following section.

FEMINIST ARGUMENTATION AS OXYMORON IN RHETORlCAL STUDIES

As is well known, communication studies before 1970 could generally be characterized as "womanless" (Foss and Foss, 1983; Spitzack and Carter, 1987; Biesecker, 1992). For this reason, conscientious communication scholars such as Campbell (1973, 1989, 1991) engaged in the process of describing feminist argumentation strategies and recovering the numerous lost voices of important female rhetors. As Barbara Biesecker (1992) recognizes, "It is clear that the . . . archival approach to sensitizing the discipline of Rhetoric to 'sexual difference' was both politically necessary and unquestionably powerful at a certain political-historical moment" (p. 87). Nonetheless, while Campbell's (1973) study did indeed describe the argumentation strategies of feminists in the early 1970s, her analysis also tended to assess women's argumentation against "patriarchal" standards, leading Campbell to conclude that women's liberation and directly confrontational argumentation are oxymoronic within patriarchal society.

For example, in the groundbreaking essay entitled "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation: An Oxymoron," Campbell (1973) argued that, ". . . insofar as the role of rhetor entails qualities of self-reliance, self-confidence, and independence, its very assumption is a violation of the female role [according to patriarchal standards]" (p. 75). Campbell points out that "No values . . . are more deeply engrained than those defining 'masculinity' and 'femininity'" (p. 77) and, therefore, women who argue confrontation-ally attack "the entire psychosocial reality" (p. 75). While Campbell cannot in any way be accused of naive essentialism (assuming that gender is "natural"), because she explicitly recognizes that gender roles are "psycho-social" realities, her essay is fundamentally a description of the ways in which "feminists" are compelled to argue because of sex-role conflicts engendered by the dominant, patriarchal, psychosocial reality. According to these patriarchal standards, to argue in a directly confrontational manner could best be described as "male," and "female" argumentation (albeit it due to psychosocial reality) is "feminine" in that it is characterized by "affirmation of the affective, of the validity of personal experience, of the necessity for self-exposure and self-criticism, of the value of dialogue, and the goal of autonomous, individual decision making" (p. 79). Such descriptions, though, are themselves based upon "patriarchal" assumptions and dichotomies, and an important question is whether or not such descriptions are adequate without a simultaneous critique of the ways in which gender stereotypes are reified by such "descriptions."

Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin (1992, 1995), perhaps more than any other prominent rhetorical critics, also have strong assumptions concerning what it means to be a "patriarchal" arguer and a "feminist" arguer. Unlike Campbell, however, Foss and Griffin tend to underplay "psychosocial" factors and divide argumentation strategies into "patriarchal" and "feminist" categories, assuming that patriarchal argumentation and feminist argumentation are mutually exclusive ways of arguing. For example, Foss and Griffin (1995) state that "the traditional conception of rhetoric . . . is characterized by efforts to change others and thus to gain control over them, self-worth derived from and measured by the power exerted over others, and a devaluation of the life worlds of others. This is a rhetoric of patriarchy, reflecting its values of change, competition, and domination" (pp. 3-4). As an alternative to "traditional" persuasion, they offer an alternative "feminist rhetoric" based upon "equality, immanent value, and self-determination" (p. 4).

While the authors suggest that their feminist, "invitational rhetoric" is only viable in certain situations, thus recognizing that mutual respect is not always attainable, it is their characterization of "patriarchy" and "feminism" that are at issue here.(2) Unfortunately, such gender dichotomizations reify the very kinds of gender stereotypes that tend to disempower women. Basically, Foss and Griffin's characterization of patriarchal argumentation is that it is "dominating," "controlling," "competitive," and views the audience as an "enemy." Feminist argumentation, on the other hand, is characterized as "nurturing," "affirmative," promoting self-determination, mutual respect, camaraderie, and views the audience as a "friend." However, such dichotomization disempowers feminism itself, causes feminist argumentation to become oxymoronic, and their "descriptions" tend to assume a prescriptive character. Forms of argument where the arguer wants to change someone's mind are considered "patriarchal" and purely coercive and "feminists" are reduced to "perspective offering." In other words, if feminist argumentation theory assumes that one cannot constrain and enable at the same time, or nurture and at the same time seek to change the perspective of another, then feminist argumentation is limited to a very narrow range of argumentative situations.

One final example of the ways in which contemporary rhetorical researchers tend to engage in descriptive studies that take on a prescriptive character and build upon, more than problematize, socially constructed gender roles is in critiques concerned with "feminine style" (Campbell, 1973; Dow and Tonn, 1993; Tonn, 1996). As Dow and Tonn (1993) point out, "feminine style" studies assume that "the common experiences of women in the process of craft-learning" and "mothering" lead to a unique style of arguing characterized by a personal tone, the use of personal experiences as evidence, an emphasis on audience...