Probing the Strategic Intricacies of Public–Private Partnership: The Patent as a Comparative Reference

• Date: 01 July 2001
• Author: Richard K. Ghere
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00048
• Published date: 01 July 2001

Probing the Strategic Intricacies of Public-Private Partnership 441

Richard K. Ghere

University of Dayton

Probing the Strategic Intricacies of

Public–Private Partnership: The Patent as a

Comparative Reference

This article pursues a detailed understanding of strategic considerations in large-scale partner-

ship negotiations that have implications for public service over the long term. Specifically, this

study focuses upon the strategic context of negotiation between governmental entities and pri-

vate firms as fundamental to partnership viability. Metaphorical comparison between U.S. patent

policy (especially as it pertains to cutting-edge biotechnical and digital information issues) and

public–private partnership is used to coax out new insight about the latter. The first section

sketches an outline of U.S. patent policy as a means of generating analogous questions that can

structure discussion of strategy in public–private partnerships. The second section explores the

intricacies of public partnership by responding to four questions derived from the patent meta-

phor. In probing the implications of strategic partnership issues for public managers, the final

section defines new capacity-building roles that are consistent with governance as an emerging

form of public administration.

Richard K. Ghere is an associate professor of political science at the Univer-

sity of Dayton, where he teaches MPA courses as well as an undergraduate

course in public policy related to technology and social values. His research

focuses on public partnerships, government ethics, and technology concerns.

Email: Richard.ghere@notes.udayton.edu.

Discussion about the privatization of public services

often reflects the analyst’s policy preferences regarding cor-

porate involvement in government affairs. Advocates of

public–private partnerships generally predict near-term per-

formance efficiencies for government in the form of cost

reduction and enhanced service quality (Goldsmith 1997;

Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Savas 1987). Alternatively,

critics associate government privatization with an erosion

of traditional public-service values, such as commitments

to equity, due process, ethics, and accountability in gov-

ernment (Fainstein and Fainstein 1995; Frederickson 1997;

Robertson and Acar 1999). Both perspectives may inform

the initial privatization decision, but neither offers public

managers much guidance after policy makers opt for such

ventures, however advisedly.

In explicating the nature of twenty-first century gover-

nance, Charles Goodsell asserts (1999, 4) that public ad-

ministrators will be called upon to create (but not neces-

sarily to constitute) capacity to act on “bewildering,

unpredictable, and hydra-headed matters.” When applied

to public–private partnerships, Goodsell’s characterization

more logically typifies gaming situations than monitoring

and control processes. Indeed, partnership arrangements—

long-term ventures that involve numerous financing and

responsibility-sharing agreements—can be aptly discussed

in terms of (1) choices that arise in the contexts of (2) in-

terdependence, (3) imperfect information, and (4) chance—

the four elements of a game (McDonald 1950, 62). Char-

acterizing partnerships as games and discerning strategies

therein assume certain risks of misinterpretation. First,

some may regard references to partnership games as un-

duly cavalier treatment of such a contentious issue. Sec-

ond, efforts to elaborate on private-vendor mind-sets and

motivations (as gleaned from privatization conversation

discussed in subsequent sections) can be misconstrued as

advocating privatization and outsourcing. The purpose of

this article is not to debate the pros and cons of privatization,

but to assist public managers in recognizing the strategic

nuances of complex and sophisticated privatization games.

So far as governance will continue to entail such public–