Privacy Is Precious: On the Attempt to Lift Anonymity on the Internet to Increase Revenue

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12192
Published date01 June 2017
Date01 June 2017
Privacy Is Precious: On the Attempt to Lift
Anonymity on the Internet to Increase Revenue
TOBIAS REGNER
Friedrich Schiller University Jena
Jena
tobias.regner@uni-jena.de
GERHARD RIENER
D¨
usseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich Heine Universit¨
at D¨
usseldorf
Universit¨
atsstraße 1
40225 D¨
usseldorf
Germany
riener@dice.hhu.de
We investigate the effect of a reduction of anonymity on consumers’ purchase decisions (whether
to buy, and if so how much to pay) at an online music store with Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW)-
like pricing and in an Internet experiment mimicking the real world situation. Revealing the
customer’s name, e-mail, and payment to the artist (seller) led to insignificantly higher payments,
although it drastically reduced the number of customers purchasing. Overall, the regime led to
a revenue loss of 25%. In the online experiment, revenue drops by 35%. These results suggest
that the positive effect of reduced anonymity, previously established for donation or public goods
contexts, does not extend to a consumption environment. Instead, the substantial opt-out of
customers is likely to be motivated by concerns about privacy.
1. Introduction
How to price what you want to sell has always been a major task. In contrast to con-
ventional uniform pricing recently emerging, Pay-What-You-Want (henceforth PWYW)
business models do not require the decision what price to set: customers choose by
themselves how much to pay. The band Radiohead, for instance, released their album
“In Rainbows” under a PWYW regime on their own web site and attracted hundreds
of thousands of paying customers. Although part of this success should be attributed
to the publicity Radiohead received for their pioneering efforts, Kim et al. (2009), Reg-
ner and Barria (2009), Gneezy et al. (2010), and Riener and Traxler (2012) show that
PWYW can indeed be a successful and sustainable business model. The continuing
success of the PWYW platform Humble Bundle—the bundles of indie video games reg-
ularly surpassed $1M in revenue—suggests that this type of payment regime is a viable
option especially for digital content.1Chao et al. (2015), Kahsay and Samahita (2015),
Isaac et al. (2015), and Mak et al. (2015) identify theoretical conditions under which
The authors are very grateful to John Buckman of Magnatune for providing them with the data. Further-
more, the authors thank VolkerBenndorf, Uri Gneezy, and Hans Theo Normann for valuable comments and
suggestions.
1. Digital content has negligible marginal costs of reproduction, but it can be very difficult to exclude
nonpayers from consuming it. Hence, the pricing of digital content received quite some attention in recent
years leading to developments of ideas on pricing regimes that may help to prevent the infringement of
property rights of digital content (see, e.g., Varian,2005, Domon and Yamazaki, 2004 or Cremer and Pestieau,
C2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume26, Number 2, Summer 2017, 318–336
Anonymity on the Internet 319
a PWYW business model performs favorably in comparison to conventional uniform
pricing.
Although the task of setting the right price becomes superfluous under a PWYW
pricing scheme, the innovation brings along new questions that are relevant for business
success. What makes (at least some) people pay more than they have to in these circum-
stances? Underlying motivations for paying voluntarily have been identified recently.
Gneezy et al. (2012) argue that self-image motivations are the driving force behind pos-
itive payments at a restaurant, Schmidt et al. (2014) find support for fairness concerns
among buyers in an experimental product market with a PWYW option and Regner
(2015) finds that reciprocity is a determinant of generous payments at an online music
store. What else may affect the payment decision? Social-image concerns (B´
enabou and
Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) could be
a possible motivation in a PWYW setting. Customers may not only pay what they want
but more than that in order to appear generous in frontof others. Triggering social-image
concerns may also be relatively easy,as publishing the payment comes at nearly no cost.
Hence, decreasing buyer’s anonymity may be a promising feature to increase PWYW
revenues.
Westudy an attempt to utilize a decrease in anonymity in order to increase revenue
and investigate its effect on payment behavior. We identify the effect by exploiting an
exogenous variation of the payment regime at Magnatune, an online music store with
PWYW-like pricing.2For a limited period, Magnatune deviated from their anonymous
payment interface and reduced the anonymity of customers by announcing that identity
(name plus e-mail) and payment of a customer will be transmitted to the artist of
the purchased music album. This was mentioned prominently during the payment
process. Our study evaluates the behavioral reactions and their consequences on average
payments and total revenue for the company.
The effect of a decrease in anonymity on people’s choices has been studied mainly
in contexts of public goods and charitable giving. In a seminal paper, Hoffman et al.
(1996) study the effect of social distance on giving, which started a series of experiments
about the role of anonymity in prosocial behavior. The central result of this literature
is that average donations in dictator games (respectively, contributions in public goods
games) would rise under less anonymity.These findings may be seen as an indication that
reduced anonymity also has a positive effect on voluntary payments for a consumed
product/service. However, customers could anticipate that they may be tempted to
pay more than they actually want to due to the social pressure and decide to avoid
the payment decision.3They may prefer to rather not buy at all, when they know
their anonymity will be lifted especially when alternative sellers are around. Hence,
although the social pressure argument predicts a positive effect at the intensive margin
2009). However, how to price digital content is still a puzzle, while ever more of it becomes available.
For an overview, see also Council (2000). Details about the Humble Bundle platform can be found under
http://www.humblebundle.com/(accessed January 2016).
2. At the time of our study, Magnatune used a PWYW-like business model selling music albums over
an Internet platform. Customers were free to choose how much they want to pay, as long as the price was
between $5 and $18. Magnatune recommended a price of $8.
3. This question of sorting out has been investigated recently in the context of charitable giving, see the
work of DellaVigna et al. (2012) and Andreoni et al. (forthcoming). These studies find that people avoid
interaction with a solicitor in response to social pressure (still, people who face social pressure donate more).
The focus of our study is on market interactions in which a buyer makes a payment and the seller delivers a
product or service. Hence, we investigate how sensitive potential consumers react to a reductionof anonymity
in terms of purchasing at all and (voluntary) payment.

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